The documents here represent a section of the Molotov Holding of the former central party archives of the CPSU which deals with the exchanges between the CPI and the CPSU (B) in 1952 after the discussions between the two parties in Moscow the previous year.

The materials cover a series of historical questions of the CPI about which historical questions of the CPI which have been extremely opaque in terms of the Soviet understanding and which arise in discussions which are provoked by the right wing politics of the Congress, the communal forces and rightist sections of the socialist movement. They shed great light on the Soviet view on the policies of the CPI during the wartime and the postwar period. This forms only a part of the extensive exchanges: thus the earlier letter by Ajoy Ghosh and the response of Stalin are not available to us. It is likely that other exchanges may come to light in the future and help us to understand the different positions better.

The documentation also indicates the method by which the Soviet party formed its policies on various issues. Here we find as elsewhere the reply drafted by the central committee, the comments of the Soviet leadership, and the final draft prepared by the central committee on a particular range of questions.

Of enormous value are the Soviet views of the approach of the CPI to the Congress Party and Subhash Chandra Bose in the period of the anti-fascist war. The Soviet party did not accept the CPI policies regarding the British. As is known, the CPI supported the British on the grounds that they were allied with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership was of the opinion that the British in fact avoided opening a second front against Fascist Germany and desired the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to engage in mutually destructive combat. At the same time the Congress Party promoted the disruptive ‘Quit India’ movement which weakened the anti-fascist war despite its limited action against the British. In the view of the CPSU (B) the CPI should have conducted an independent struggle against British imperialism paving the way for seizure of power by the CPI.

Regarding Subash Chandra Bose the CPSU b considered that he had openly supported fascist Germany during the war and the ‘Indian National Army’ which was created with help of Japanese imperialism was directed against the coalition of democratic powers.

According to the Soviet leadership, the CPI should have demarcated itself from both the Congress and Bose and initiated a mass movement against the British using all forms of struggle, including non-payment of taxes and rents, conducting partisan warfare in the rural areas and organising general strikes and uprisings in the cities. Such tactics would have assisted the Soviet Union in the anti-fascist war. Victory over the British would have assisted the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist war. The possible occupation by Japan should have led to a struggle on the lines of events in South-East Asia in Vietnam and Malaya. Had British rule continued in power the mass struggles of the war would have permitted the working class to come to the fore thereby preventing the betrayal of the national emancipation by the Congress Party.

The CPSU b distinguished between the leadership of the Congress Party in the ‘Quit India’ movement which hindered the anti-fascist war and the rank-and-file Congress supporters. In a similar way it demarcated between the ‘pro-fascist’ leadership of Bose and his supporters in the Forward Bloc.  

This criticism by the CPSU b helps us comprehend the rightist views which prevailed after the 20th Congress with regard to Nehru, Gandhi and Bose in the Indian communist movement and the ‘progressive intelligentsia’.

The second question raised by Ajoy Ghosh shows the inability of the party to comprehend the semi-colonial reality of the country. The CPI programme of 1951 understood that the country was the largest dependent semi-colonial country in Asia. Yet Ajoy Ghosh’s letter shows an inability to relate this question to the presence and domination of British capital along the line of the Leninist notion of imperialism and refute the Congress- nationalist views that the British had left the country and that the Indians were independent and ruled through their own government. This presaged the rightist views which became prevalent in the second half of the 1950s.

The Kashmir question represented the third major question under discussion. An earlier published exchange of the two parties had given the views of different leaders of the CPI, the CPSU b and Stalin himself. See: Indo Pakistan Relations https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv14n1/indopak.htm. Both parties understood that though both India and Pakistan were collaborationist states the latter was willing to allow the US and Britain to establish military bases on its soil. As a result the communists had to distinguish between the two countries.

Ajoy Ghosh details the role of the party on the Kashmir question in relation to the National Conference and the Congress Party such as to abolish the monarchy, carry out the agrarian revolution and prevent the reduction of the Kashmir state to an Indian province. The CPI evidently played an important positive role in these matters and combated the reactionary role of the Nehru leadership of Congress. The Soviet view that the tactical line of the Communist Party of Pakistan should be separate is a valuable piece of information with multiple implications: it should call for the Kashmiri people to have the right to determine their future without the intervention of the United Nations and US and British imperialism.

The comments relating to the parliamentary question are instructive. In this period as the history of the CPSU b, the CPC and other parties reveals that the policy of ‘revolutionary parliamentarism’ prevailed.  The CPI had intervened in the colonial elections which had a limited franchise. The party, when it withdrew the Telengana movement, stashed away its arms and participated in the general elections. Today ‘revolutionary parliamentarism’ as a policy is barely accepted in the communist movement in India across the board. Ajoy Ghosh enumerated the positive results of the parliamentary participation for peasants and workers despite the problems arising from lack of experience in this sphere. In some quarters the parliamentary participation has been interpreted as the beginnings of a parliamentary path; hence it is interesting to note that the CPSU b in its revolutionary period saw nothing untoward in the CPI’s electoral participation.

Three successive deviations dominated the CPI from the 1940s. The first rightist deviation was represented by P.C. Joshi and was so characterized for its illusions regarding the Nehru wing of the Congress Party as well as the British Labour Party.

This was replaced by the left deviation represented by B.T. Ranadive before the Second Congress of the CPI in 1948. It was criticized for its support for the ‘Trotskyite-Titoist’ notion of socialist revolution which had prompted Stalin to persuade the Cominform to write its famous editorial which supported the first stage of People’s Democracy as the appropriate stage of the Indian revolution. Moreover, the Ranadive group was subjected to criticism for its ’left’ strikes which had been beyond the capacity of the working class. This deviation was also noted by the communist parties of China and Ceylon. These considerations may have led the CPSU to support the temporary expulsion of the Ranadive group from the CPI.

The third deviation in the CPI was headed by the Andhra Committee. After the publication of the Comintern editorial, the Andhra Committee which conducted the Telengana armed struggle had supported the idea of the establishment of people’s democracy in the country as the stage of revolution. As was clear from the Moscow discussions the Andhra Committee, despite leading an inspiring struggle of partisan warfare, had serious misunderstandings on the Chinese revolution. It failed to recognize the central role played by the Soviet Army in defeating Japanese imperialism as a result of which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was able to take shelter in liberated Manchuria and preserve it from the onslaughts of the Kuomintang and so laid the basis for it to begin the liberation of southern China.  The CPSU b pointed out that India had none of the advantages of the Chinese revolution like having a friendly rear. Hence it was imperative for the CPI to combine partisan warfare with strikes and urban uprisings of the working class.

The Andhra Committee deviation was corrected in the Moscow discussions and the new outlook became crystallised in the CPI Programme and Tactical Line (1951).

After the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union the errors of the P C Joshi group and the Andhra Committee again came to the forefront to vitiate the communist movement. The result of this was the negation of the CPI Programme and Tactical Line by almost all sections of the communist movement. Notable exceptions to this were some communist revolutionaries such as Parimal Das Gupta and P. Sundarayya in the CPI M.

Translated from English

Dear friend!

Many thanks for your letter, in which you had answered all the questions that we had asked. This letter will be of great help to us.

1. Nevertheless, I would like to get a clarification on one of the questions. This is related to the position, on which our party stood in 1942. Presently, I will elaborate on how I understand your criticism of this position.

The line, which we followed in 1942, was wrong because it rejected the struggle against British imperialism. At that time we stated that we should not fight the British because the British were allied with the USSR in an antifascist war. We needed instead, to make it clear to our people that the British sabotaged the war against Hitler by refusing to open a Second Front and keeping their colonial peoples subjugated. The British counted upon the USSR and Hitlerite Germany’s weakening each other and enable the British to dominate Europe after the war, having saved their colonial empire. So, the struggle against fascism was simultaneously a struggle against the British imperialists.

Further, we had to explain to our people that the leaders of the Congress who struggled under the slogan “Quit India” tried to simply pressure the British in order to strike a deal with them. All their struggle came down to organizing a few manifestations against the British in the cities and a few skirmishes. They did not want to wage struggle against the princes and landlords, who made up the main support base for the British dominance, and did not wage a genuine mass revolutionary movement for freedom.

We had to also note that Bose, by entering into a union with Japan, and also creating illusions that the Japanese army would liberate India, had betrayed the case of freedom, preparing the conditions for the enslavement of India.

Therefore, distancing ourselves widely from both the Congress and Bose, we had to try to develop a mass movement against the British up to a revolutionary seizure of power by the people, by using all forms of struggle, organizing mass campaigns against payment of taxes and rents, organizing guerrilla warfare in the countryside, organising general strikes and uprisings in the cities. Our criticism of Congress had to be aimed at exposing its deceptive stance on the question of bringing down the British dominance, and on denouncing Bose, who betrayed the Indian people in the interest of the Japanese.

Following such tactics, we would not harm the interests of the USSR in the anti-fascist war but, on the opposite, would assist them.

Had we achieved success in our struggle against the British, the new government, formed as a result of this struggle, would ally itself firmly with the USSR and continue a decisive war against the fascism. If, during this struggle, the Japanese occupied our country, then the anti-imperialist war would continue, with the struggle being directed mainly against the Japanese, as it occurred in Vietnam and Malaya. Finally, if neither of these two scenarios occurred, and the British still occupied India, then the Party, having spread its roots deeply among the masses of people during the war, would be able to isolate both Congress and Bose from the masses, take the lead in the post-war movement, and successfully prevent the betrayal of the national struggle for freedom by the Congress.

Following such tactics, the Party would be helpful to the cause of freedom and democracy both during and after the War. I am asking you to correct me if I am wrong.

On this question, we would like to have a full clarification, because time has come when we should be able to correctly evaluate our party’s whole history, its achievements and errors in each period.

2. Another question on which we would like to know your opinion is how we should characterize our country’s situation in our daily agitational (propagandist) work.

Usually, our agitators say that India is not a free country and stress upon the various limitations to our freedom. They stress the fact that India belongs to the British Commonwealth of nations and that there are British officers in its army, and so on. However, experience shows that the great majority of our people do not agree with such a position. They can see that there are no foreign troops in our country, and that basically all of the officials are Indians. Our people are proud of the fact that India has achieved freedom; at the same time, the people hate those who keep power in their hands to protect the interests of the princes, landlords and monopolists, and give concessions to the British and the Americans.

Given such circumstances, should we stress upon the fact that we have not achieved freedom? Or we have to step forward as defenders of national freedom and national sovereignty demanding that the freedoms conquered by the people as a result of struggle and sacrifice – whatever these freedoms are – should be protected from the foreign imperialists and expanded through exit from the British empire and through liquidation of the princely states and the landlords?

Our experience shows that the idea of defence and expansion of freedom is popular, while the attempts to show that nothing has changed in the country and that the British still dominate it fails and leads us to distracting discussions. This does not give us an opportunity to arouse the people against the American proliferation. Now in all of our speeches, whenever we use the word “freedom”, we say “the so-called freedom”; and we always use this word in inverted commas while writing. Should we continue with this position, or should we abandon it?

Should we continue stating that nothing has been achieved, or should we address the people of the nation as a party which struggles for preservation and expansion of national freedom?

When we expose the recruitment of the Gurkhas for the Malayan war, should we consider this recruitment as a proof that India has not achieved freedom, or should we denounce this measure as incompatible with our independence and sovereignty?

As you see, the matter is how to approach the solution of this issue. We would like to know your opinion.

3. Apparently, you have been informed of the recent agreement between the Indian government and Kashmir. I will somewhat clarify the essence of the matter.

The leadership of National Conference in Kashmir decided to liquidate the monarchy about 3 months ago. Indian government did not agree with this because it considered that it would create a difficult situation in India. Dr Katju, the internal minister, tried to convince Kashmir representatives that such actions on their part would break the Constitution. However, the real reason, as Gopalaswami Aiyangar spoke out by negligence, is the fear that the people of other princely states would come out with similar demands.

The leaders of National Conference consulted us on this matter. We advised them to continue to do what they were doing and table a resolution for the liquidation of monarchy to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. They did it, as the demand for the abolition of monarchy persisted in Kashmir.

Immediately after the bill was approved for discussion, Indian government called the leaders of Kashmir to Delhi and announced that time had come for Kashmir to join India fully, e.g. to recognize the power of Indian Supreme Court, agree to the inclusion of Kashmir into the united financial system of India, to recognize the right of the Indian president to govern Kashmir in case of emergency, and to defend for the people of Kashmir, the same basic rights that had been given to the people of India. All this would turn Kashmir into a regular Indian province and put an end to its autonomy. This would render any fundamental changes in the agrarian relations impossible. During the negotiations, Aiyangar hinted that if Kashmir refused to accept these conditions, India’s hands would be “forced” to accept the U.N. suggestion for a plebiscite with partial demilitarization of Kashmir.

There is no doubt that had such plebiscite taken place, Kashmir would have gone to Pakistan. We were faced with extremely difficult situation. Suspension of talks would be catastrophic and would greatly strengthen the pro-Pakistani elements. At the same time, accepting the conditions of the Indian government would mean refuting even those agrarian reforms that had been done, not to mention any further reforms.

Thus we advised the leaders of Kashmir to do everything possible to reach an agreement. At the same time, we were making clear that the monarchy had to be liquidated, that Kashmir had to implement all the planned agrarian reforms, and that the emergency powers of the Indian president should note extend to Kashmir without the consent of the government of Kashmir. As for the inclusion of Kashmir into the united financial system of India, this question should be discussed later on.

There were debates inside the Indian cabinet as to what point of view to have on all these matters. Dr. Katju and Gopalaswami Aiyangar pushed for Sheikh Abdulla’s accepting all the conditions of the Indian government, otherwise the talks should be called off. Nehru, however, did not want this. He wanted to reach an agreement because he understood that calling off of the negotiations would cause serious consequences in India and abroad.

The agreement which was finally reached comes mainly out of those suggestions that we had given to the leaders of the National Conference of Kashmir. We consider this agreement the best one that could be reached under existing circumstances.

4. Situation in the country in the aftermath of the elections

The elections have shown a large shift towards the left in the masses and great strengthening of the Party. A part of the central government wanted to immediately launch repressions against the Party. Another part, as I already mentioned, believed that it would create a dangerous situation in the country. As a result of mass campaigns organized by the Party, the majority of communists were freed from imprisonment, and many orders to arrest communists were cancelled. In most cases, the government had to step back. For example, after the strike in Bombay food subsidies were partially restored; death penalty to Bahan, one of our comrades from Madras, was reconsidered and Madras government agreed to issue a statute which prohibited the eviction of peasants by landlords. The government feels that its positions have been weakened, and it concedes on many issues if enough pressure is put on it.

This has created exceptionally favourable circumstances which, however, we could not use fully due to the following reasons:

a. For more than 3 months, many of our best personnel were fully occupied with parliamentary and state legislature work. Parliamentary activity is a new field for our comrades. We cannot forget also that the last session of the parliament was a budget session. Comrades had to go into all the details and difficulties of budgeting, learn about the rules and procedures in parliament, and so on. As a result insufficient attention was paid to the work in the Party and the mass organizations.

b. As a result of the above, in the provinces where our position is particularly strong – Madras, Hayderabad, Cochin-Travancore and West Bengal – we were not able to improve our position.

c. Until now, we have not been able to create a strong centre in the party, and have not fulfilled the publication plan for the agitational and propagandist literature. Of the 7 members of the Politbureau, only two – the Secretary General and Namboodiripad – work in the central apparatus. All the other members of the Politbureau are occupied with the work in their provinces. I notice that as a result of our great victories in the elections, some comrades have developed a complacent feeling, and some of them are starting to rely on spontaneous radicalization of the masses. It is most sharply expressed in the fact that some comrades do not understand the importance of creating a strong centre in the Party.

Even the leading comrades are occupied only with the daily practical work in the legislative bodies as well as local Party and mass organizations. Formally, everyone understands the necessity of creating a strong centre, but when a practical question of who will work in it comes up, everyone refers to his or her “difficulties”.

d. Due to the absence of a proper centre in the Party, we can neither address the problem of mass movement nor solve the political and organizational differences which have appeared in some provinces. If such state of affairs continues to exist, the number of unresolved issues will be growing, which will lead to a serious crisis.

e. The difficulties will be aggravated by the existence of four centres in different cities in India – the parliamentary one in Delhi, the one for the Peasant Union in Calcutta, All-Indian Congress of Unions and the Printing Press in Bombay, and the Central Committee of the Party in Madras. They journey from one centre to another is costly and takes long time.

On August 10, the Politbureau will discuss the situation in the aftermath of the elections, and will draw upon how to resolve the issues that have appeared.

5. Famine in Rajasthan

The United Committee of struggle against the famine in Rajasthan, which is located in B…, has asked the Soviet labour unions for help. This organization includes the Communist Party, the “Ensaf Mazdoor Party”, social organizations, independents and so on. It is the only organization which conducts the large work on fighting the famine; it has raised about 30 thousand rupees, and large amount of grain. It has several distributes help to starving people in many places. I reckon that this organization should be given help.

August 5, 1952. Ajoy Ghosh

[54]

Proposal

Decision by Central Committee of VKP(b)

The question by the Indian CP

1. Accept the proposal of the answers to the questions by com. A. Ghosh (attached).

2. Entrust the task of handing the attached answers over to the Central Committee of the Indian CP to the USSR state security ministry (Com. Ignatiev).

[55]

Attachment

Answers by the Friends to the Questions by Com. A. GHOSH

I. About the temporary expulsion of the former members of Politbureau – Ranadive, Bhowani Sen, Adhikari and Lahiri.

Answer: In our opinion, the decision by the All-India party conference in relation to Ranadive, Bhowani Sen, Adhikari and Lahiri will contribute to strengthening of the party discipline and to nurturing the masses of party members in the spirit of strictly following the organizational principle of the party.

Having expelled these comrades from the party temporarily, the Conference did a right thing, thus granting them an opportunity to prove to the party that they are prepared to correct the errors they had made, and to continue their struggle for the vital interests of the working class of India and the whole Indian People in the ranks of the party in the future.

II. About the attitude of the Indian CP to the anti-British struggle of 1942.

Answer: We agree with you that the question of attitude of the Indian CP to the anti-British struggle of 1942 has serious significance for you, as you write. Nevertheless, we believe that at present, the debates on this question in the party would cause unnecessary disputes and disagreements and would drive the party away from its business-like practical work.

We believe that the Indian CP was taking a correct position against the anti-British struggle of 1942. Whatever the motives that were driving the participants of the 1942 struggle against the British, their destructive work in the industry, transportation, etc. was directed objectively at weakening the military efforts by the coalition of democratic powers, and, therefore, were in support of the fascist block.

The Indian CP had no grounds for changing its tactics in the direct aftermath of the battle of Stalingrad, because the war was not over yet. The destruction of Hitler’s troops near Stalingrad had laid a strong basis for the victory over the fascist German armies, but new mighty strikes were needed to make the defeat of the Hitlerite Germany a fact.

[56]

No doubt, the whole mass of the participants in the anti-British struggle cannot be seen as traitors of the Indian national interests. Many of them were confused, which does not, however, make their mistakes smaller, because the participants of the movement objectively weakened, in that period, the forces that resisted fascism.

On the question of Subhas Bose, one should not worsen the relations with the “Forward Bloc”, one should not lose the democratic part of this party as an ally. It is known that Subhas Bose openly supported fascist Germany during the war, and the army which he created with the help of Japanese imperialists was meant to fight the coalition of democratic powers.

III. On the position of the CP of Pakistan on the question of Kashmir

Answer: In our opinion, it would be correct if the CP of Pakistan put forward a tactical slogan of guaranteeing the Kashmir People an opportunity to resolve the issue of future political status of Kashmir, and not allowing any interference by the UN and the American/British imperialists who stand behind it into the resolution of Kashmir issue.

[61]

To Comrade STALIN

Proposed answers to the questions by the Secretary General of the Indian CP Ajoy Ghosh on the issue of the anti-British struggle of 1942 and on other issues, related to the activity by the Indian CP, are presented.

The letter by comrade A. Ghosh was sent around on July 2 of this year.

The proposed statement by the Central Committee of VKP(b) is attached.

Please take into consideration.

Chairman of the Internal Political Commission of the Central Committee of VKP(b) (V. Grigoryan)

July 4, 1952

[62]

Proposal

Decision by Central Committee of VKP(b)

The question by the Indian CP

2. Accept the proposal of the answers to the questions by com. A. Ghosh (attached).

3. Entrust the task of handing the attached answers over to the Central Committee of the Indian CP to the USSR state security ministry (Com. Ignatiev).

[63]

Attachment

Answers by the Friends to the Questions by Com. A. GHOSH

I. About the temporary expulsion of the former members of Politbureau – Ranadive, Bhowani Sen, Adhikari and Lahiri.

Answer: In our opinion, the decision by the All-India party conference in relation to Ranadive, Bhowani Sen, Adhikari and Lahiri will contribute to strengthening of the party discipline and to nurturing the masses of party members in the spirit of strictly following the organizational principle of the party.

Having expelled these comrades from the party temporarily, the Conference did a right thing, thus granting them an opportunity to prove to the party that they are prepared to correct the errors they had made, and to continue their struggle for the vital interests of the working class of India and the whole Indian People in the ranks of the party in the future.

II. About the attitude of the Indian CP to the anti-British struggle of 1942.

Answer: We agree with you that the question of attitude of the Indian CP to the anti-British struggle of 1942 has serious significance for you, as you write. Nevertheless, we believe that at present, the {added: wide} debates on this question in the party would cause unnecessary disputes and disagreements and would drive the party away from its {business-like – crossed out} practical {work – crossed out} tasks.

In our opinion, the Indian CP during the war was occupying an incorrect position not conducting an active struggle against the British imperialism and containing the class struggle by workers and {the protesting undertakings by – added} peasants. One must not have been start out of some, allegedly speaking, alliance obligations by India {which was in a state of a colony – added} to England {which oppressed it – added}; no alliance existed as a united front between the imperialist England and the colonial India. Indian communists had to conduct an independent struggle with the British imperialists up to their ability {, developing the national liberation movement of the Indian People}.

[64]

In relation to this, the question of whether the Indian CP had to change its tactics after the battle of Stalingrad is no longer relevant.

No doubt, the whole mass of the followers of Subhas Bose cannot be seen as traitors or as “fifth column of Japanese fascism”, despite the fact that Subhas Bose during the war, being in Japan, openly sided with militarist Japan and fascist Germany, {receiving help from the side of the – crossed out} {being in a status of an agent of the – added} Japanese imperialists {in creating – crossed out} {when they were creating – added} the so called Indian national army. On the question of Subhas Bose, one should not worsen the relations with the “Forward Bloc” party in order not to lose the democratic part of this party as an ally.

III. On the position of the CP of Pakistan on the question of Kashmir

Answer: We believe that on specific issues for tactical purposes the communist parties of India and Pakistan could express different views. If the Pakistani CP talks in favour of attaching Kashmir to India, it will make its situation more difficult and provide an excuse for provocations against itself. Therefore the Pakistani CP could at present put forward a tactical demand of guaranteeing the Kashmir People an opportunity, on the basis of free expression of will, to resolve on their own the issue of future political status of Kashmir.

[75]

For Comrade Stalin

The improved proposal of the answers to the questions by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Indian CP A. Ghosh is presented, which the State security committee of the USSR received from its resident in Delhi.

The proposed decision by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) is attached.

Please consider.

Chairman of the External Politics Commission of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) (V. Grigoryan)

July 4, 1952

Copies are sent around to comrades: Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev.

[76]

Proposal

Decision by Central Committee of VKP(b)

The question by the Indian CP

3. Accept the proposal of the answers to the questions by Com. A. Ghosh (attached).

4. Entrust the task of handing the attached answers over to the Central Committee of the Indian CP to the USSR state security ministry (Com. Ignatiev).

[77]

Attachment

Answers by the Friends to the Questions by Com. A. GHOSH

1. What is known to the representatives of the USSR in India about Satyanarayan Sinha, Indian MP, who recently came out with an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist statement in parliament?

Answer: In our opinion, Satyanarayan Sinha is an agent of the British and probably of the American intelligence. During the two years from 1932 to 1934, Sinha was in the USSR, where he was treated with distrust. In 1934, Sinha moved out of the USSR to Germany. He was close to the Americans and the reactionary Germans in Berlin at the time when he was there in 1947 and 1948. In 1950, he was detained by Czechoslovak authorities when he photographed military sites. His statement that he served in the Red Army and was sent to Abyssinia in the rank of a captain is a lie.

2. Moscow’s opinion about the recent behaviour by the Indian communists during the parliamentary debates, and the assessment of Nehru’s talk on the subject of India’s external policy.

Answer: a) The information we possess about the performance by the communist MPs is far from being complete, but the information that we have allows us to believe that the communist MPs act in a right way when they use the parliamentary tribune for criticizing government on such specific issues the budget proposal and the military spending that it foresees, the agrarian policy by the government, as well as for exposing the dualism of the external policy of the Indian government.

b) Nehru’s talk on foreign policy issues during the parliamentary debates, in our opinion, does not contain such statements that would provide grounds for changing the assessment of Indian government’s external policy that has been given in Indian CP’s programme. Such circumstances as Nehru’s half-criticism of the NATO pact, expression of displeasure with the actions by the Security Council on Tunisia, and references of disappointment towards Li Syn Man’s regime, given at the same time with his assurances of the unbreakable [78] friendship between England, America and the Indian government, only confirms the correctness of characterizing Indian government’s external policy as that of suspicious game in between of the two camps.

However, it is necessary to fully use those statements by Nehru which can serve the cause of peace; at the same time, of course, in every case, the discrepancies between the actions and declarations of Nehru’s government must be exposed.

3. About the help by the Soviet labour unions to the starving region of Rajasthan.

Answer: In case an appropriate Indian social organization from the region of Rajasthan addresses the Soviet labour unions about helping the hungry population of that region, the question of help will be considered in a positive way.

4. About the possibility of long-term loans to the Indian trading firms which will purchase goods in Moscow, and about the possibility of establishing a Soviet trade institution in India.

Answer: In view of the fact that your message does not contain specific data on this issue, we have difficulty in answering this question. It is not known to us what trading companies of India and what loans your message refers to. In India, there exists the Trading Agency of the Soviet Union, which can conduct trade negotiations with Indian firms.

RGASPI Fond 82 Op 2 delo 1206 LL 48-54

Translated from the Russian by Vitaly Pershin

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