The following memo drafted by SA Dange and letter of RP Dutt to PC Joshi show the divergence in the perception of CPGB and CPI on the question of the demand for Pakistan made by the Muslim League despite their common views on the regressive role of Wavell the then viceroy. Commonality of views also prevailed over the need to build a campaign in Britain to honour the commitments to Indian freedom and not link it to diversity or disagreements in India. (EB, RD)

To discuss the failure of the CPGB to make clear the political problems in India today and to suggest the steps that should be taken.

This is in no way a political analysis covering the details of the present situation in India. All that will be attempted is a brief statement, necessarily simplified, of the main questions involved.

"What are :main questions involved? There is first the central question of the Muslim League, the character of the Leaguer its demand for Pakistan and of the attitude of Congress, in particular .to this democratic demand.

It is correct to say that although the CPI since ;1942 have placed squarely before nationalist opinion the necessity for recognising the right of self-determination without qualification as expressed in the slogan of Pakistan, the British Party has failed both to understand the new developments and to present and explain to the Labour Movement as a whole the correctness of this slogan. In England it is broadly true that R.P. Dutt’s formulation of the ‘one-ness’ of India holds the field. Adhikari’s theoretical analysis, presented to the O.C. of the CPI in Sept. 1942, and published-in England under the title ’Pakistan and Indian National Unity’ was incorrect in one or two of the formulations, as, for example, when he wrote (p. 24) of the English Edition: “To the Muslim masses, our explanations must be such as to disillusion them about Pakistan’’; and such statements allowed B. Bradley to write in his foreword to the pamphlet “The slogan of Pakistan is used by Mr, Jinnah to mislead the Muslim masses who strive for freedom.” The Indian Party in the development of its analysis corrected these mistakes but in England no such correction has been forthcoming. Today, therefore, in spite of isolated examples (the Jinnah interview to the D.W.) there is still lacking a full analysis of the CPI’s appreciation of and policy towards the League and its demand for Pakistan. The result is that the British Party is understanding the Indian situation in terms which are not far removed from the standpoint of a Left Nationalist in the Congress camp. This has led to serious mistakes, especially with regard to the central problem of Congress-League unity: as for example in the Simla article by the D.W. political correspondent published on July 16th. (This is discussed in more detail in Appendix II ).

There is a further point which must be considered. The end of the war has placed on the agenda the question of permanent settlement. The advent of the Labour Party to power has opened up very favourable opportunities for a truly democratic settlement provided that the Labour movement and more especially the progressive sections within the Labour movement are themselves clear about the correct policy, to be pursued. Since the British party has failed to give a clear lead, those groups inside the Labour Party (Sorenson, etc), which have always stood for Indian independence, are still dominated by ideas which correspond to the period of Congress Ministries. Their attitude to the League is, like the majority opinion inside Congress, a hostile one; their work in England, in relation to the urgent necessity for Congress-League unity is therefore harmful and injurious; and the CPI's propaganda for such unity is made correspondingly more difficult precisely because of this mistaken support for Congress policies in England among influential sections of the Labour movement. (For instance Aneurin Bevan's attack on the League and support for the Congress line after the failure of the Simla Conference.)

What must be done? The first essential step is a very thorough discussion in the theoretical journals of the British Party, of the new approach to the problems of nationalities and minorities which the CPI has been discussing since 1942. The pre-1939 idea of the League and the incorrect estimation of the Indian National problem as expressed in R.P. Dutt's book must be sharply corrected. Side by side with such discussion must develop a widespread educational campaign not only within the Party itself but also among the wider Labour movement. In particular, it is a matter of great urgency that the Sorensen - Dobbie - Laski groups are drawn into discussion on the basis of our general line that Congress-League settlement is the essential pre-requisite for the final struggle against imperialism.

It is felt that it is not simply a question of reprinting articles and notes from People's War. In many instances such articles presuppose a knowledge of Indian conditions which is not sufficiently widespread in England to allow of complete understanding. The theoretical discussion in England must start with the assumption that the understanding and appreciation of the national question in India, among the rank and file even of the CPGB is not far removed from zero. Only when the basis for such understanding has been laid will it become possible to include in our journals articles and reprints from the Indian party press. There is a further point in this connection which is discussed more fully below. The question of presentation and emphasis is very different for the British Party than for the Indian Party. But this will be dealt with in more detail in a later paragraph.

It is suggested that the following are required to be published as soon as possible, (1) Adhikari’s pamphlet in the English edition should be withdrawn immediately and the Indian edition substituted. The usefulness of the pamphlet would be greatly enhanced if additional notes were added for the benefit of English leaders, e.g. p. 9 (English edition), a note explaining the Khilafat movement would be useful, p. 27 a clarification of the abstention of, the Pathan delegation on the vote on Rajaji’s resolution at Allahabad is required for British leaders.

(2) Sajjad Zaheer's “A Case for Congress-League Unity” and in particular the first article which gives a very clear historical survey, easily understood by British students.

(3) A pamphlet on Pakistan, which we understand is being/prepared at the moment.

(4) An historical review of the development of Congress-League relations with special reference to the war years and in particular to the Gandhi-Jinnah talks and the failure at Simla.

(5) Lastly, it is important to stress the weakness and mistakes of the League and in its own understanding of the Pakistan issue – the Pan-Islamic revivalists, the emphasis upon Muslim nationality rather than nationalities, failure to emphasise and define the democratic essence of Pakistan, etc.

The problem of Congress and its policy in regard to the Central problems of unity will be dealt with in the analysis of the national problem. Since however the end of the war has brought the question of the final settlement to the forefront, a sharp criticism dispelling the ’romantic’ and 'sentimental’ approach which dominates the Labour Party groups, must be developed. In particular, the ideological confusion inside Congress before August 9, the lack of clarity on the new world situation (Shanker Rao Dec’s "We are not glad that Japan has been defeated”) and the growing and vigorous anti-Communist movement – all these must be dealt with in details.

The most important problem for the British Party, once they have overcome their shameful lethargy in relation to Indian problems, is the question of presentation and approach. Here the emphasis will be quite different from that of the Indian Party. The problem of approach is a two-fold one. (A) While not shirking or abstaining from criticism of both Congress and League in relation to the urgent problems confronting the Indian people, the emphasis must be on the role of the third party as the main enemy, both to the development of Indian freedom. This difference in approach can be well illustrated by the treatment of the Simla Conference.

Whereas in India, the party has apportioned the blame equally upon the Congress and the League at the same time pointing out the disruptive tactics of Wavell– in other words, emphasising that unity can defeat the disruption from above – in England, our emphasis must be first and foremost on the reactionary, sabotaging role which Wavell played in the substitution of Hindu-Muslim Parity for Congress-League in Parity (agreed upon in the Desai-Liaquat Pact), and in the subsequent playing off of one nationalist organisation against the other. (See Chari's feature article P.W. .July 29th).

And in general, our emphasis must be that Indian disunity, itself the fruit of imperialist tactics, must not be used as an excuse for failure to grant immediate independence.

(B) The second aspect of our Party’s line in Britain is the necessity for a much greater emphasis than we have yet developed, upon Indian independence as a matter of vital concern for the British people. We have always said in the past that Indian independence is in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the British people. The time has come when it is necessary to define in much more precise terms exactly what we understand of interest of both India and Britain in Indian independence; and as the volume of opposition by the imperialists grows, we shall have to show, concretely and in detail, the necessity for, inter alia, Indian independence as the only way for Britain to achieve a rising standard of living and for the world to realise the abolition of the threat of future war.

(Prepared by SA Dange)

P.C. Joshi
Communist Party of India,
Raj Bhuvan
Sandhurst Road,
Bombay, 4.

Dear Joshi,

The memorandum which you sent by Mirajkar has now been discussed by the Political Committee with Dange. Unfortunately Mirajkar was away in Brussels on the day of the meeting, but we have been able to have a full talk with both before they left. These two comrades will be-able to give you a more detailed account of our various talks and of our views on questions raised.

I understand the memorandum itself was prepared by some British comrades after discussion with you. We have also had several letters from comrades making the same points of criticism as appear in the memorandum. We appreciate the sincerity of these comrades and their anxiety to help the Party here in its Indian work. But it is quite clear that their isolation from the day-to-day work of the Party’s India work in this country does not enable them to appreciate the problem in its correct perspective or the character of our main tasks. The result is that the memorandum contains many and unfounded criticisms. Nevertheless, it will be useful to deal with the main points which they raise, in order to make our position quite clear.

1. Charge of Neglect. (“Shameful Lethargy”) in relation to work on India.

This charge bears no relation to the facts and some surprise was expressed that loose and exaggerated charges of this nature can be made by comrades who are obviously not aware of the time, attention and activity that our Party gives to the Indian situation.

The complaint is made that in the period since 1942 less has been done than previously. In the first place, the comrades deem to forget that it is entirely due to the work of our Party that both the Labour Party end the Trades Union Congress within this period have passed resolutions on India in terms of our campaign, and as a result of the energetic work of our trades union comrades. This has created an excellent basis for the extension of our work in the Labour Movement. Secondly, the comrades appear to forget that this period covers the campaign for the Second Front, the biggest campaign the Party has ever run. One of the issues which formed an integral part of our whole general campaign during this period was the demand for the release of Indian leaders and the formation of a National Government, so the quantity of our propaganda must not be judged by the number of articles whose title mentions India. Nevertheless, in looking through the propaganda on India for the past period, I can say at once that as compared with other international issues, India has received more attention than any other issue – and this at a time when the national liberation movements in Europe, and a whole variety of international and domestic issues were also demanding we give far more attention for winning the support also of the British Labour Movement for these demands.

In saying this we would have no wish to encourage complacency. We know how much remains to be done and especially to win the Labour Movement to honour the pledges which it has now made to the Indian people.

2. Political Line of our Party’s Campaign on India.

Here we come to graver questions since we are of opinion that the Memorandum makes in certain respects a wrong political estimation.

Our campaign on India is centred on the demand for the recognition of India’s right to independence. We place in the forefront the right of India to self-determination and call on the Labour Government to take immediate concrete steps to enable them to exercise that right through their own elected representatives on the basis of! universal suffrage. You will no doubt have seen the recent resolution of our Executive Committee and the short resolution adopted at our Congress, as well as the passages in my Political report to the Congress.

We reject emphatically the imperialist argument that the main problem in India is the problem of the divisions of the Indian people and that until the various organisations, especially Congress and the Moslem League agree, there can be no question of freedom for India. While explaining in our propaganda the real character of the issues involved in -these divisions expressing the multi-national character of India and the way in which they can be solved, we declare that the existence of these problems must not be allowed to bemade an alibi by the British people for refusing independence to India and that these Indian problems will be solved by the Indian people.

It is in the light of this general line, that we must comment on the character of the political line presented in the Memorandum.

(a) Presentation of Pakistan and Moslem League as "central question” for the-campaign on India in Britain.

The memorandum charges the Communist Party in Britain with ”failure to make clear the political problem in India today”. It then proceeds to ask “What are the main questions involved?” It answers this by declaring “the central question" to be "The Moslem League, the character of the League, its demand for Pakistan and the attitude of Congress to this demand". The rest of the Memorandum contains a whole series of proposals, publications, pamphlets and articles which we should put forward on this question and criticises our publications and presentation on the grounds that it does not put forward this question in the forefront of our campaign.

We consider that such a presentation of the supposed "Central question" of India for the British public would be the greatest disservice that we could do to the cause of Indian freedom and would play straight into the hands of the India Office and its intensive propaganda campaign in this country.

It is in the interests of the India Office and reactionaries in this country to emphasise in every way and place in the forefront the religious, and political divisions of the Indian people as the obstacle to their freedom. If the main emphasis in our propaganda was to place in the forefront the divisions and the failure of agreement between the main political organisations, this would in practice assist precisely these currents in the Labour Movement which draw the conclusion that it is necessary in the first place for the Indian organisations to reach agreement amongst themselves before anything can be done about the independence of India. We feel that for us to raise the question of Pakistan and to campaign in its favour means in effect that we set ourselves to win the Labour movement and the Labour Government to impose a settlement upon India favourable to those who wish for Pakistan, We do not consider that this is the democratic method, especially in view of the fact that there is not at present an agreed demand of the Indian people as a whole for Pakistan, nor are the national boundaries as yet clearly defined. We do not feel that Mr. Jinnah's demands in this respect for some kind of outside arbitration or award favourable to his conception of Pakistan are democratic, and for the same reasons we have incorporated in our Congress Resolution the demand for more than one Constituent Assembly. In our opinion, the national questions of India can only be solved by the Indian people themselves without outside interference or arbitration, and the only democratic method through which the Indian people can express their wishes in this matter is in the democratic sovereign constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

These are the general lines on which we hold that our campaign should continue. That is not to say that errors in presentation have not been made as, for example, the Daily Worker’s reference to Wavell’s "sincerity”. But it is worthwhile pointing out in this connection that our first reaction to the Amery-Wavell Plan, namely one of welcoming the end to the deadlock in spite of weaknesses, was not very different from yours as contained in a cable sent to us and published in full in the Colombo Forward, June 22nd.

(b) Publication of Adhikari’s report of 1942

As soon as Adhikari's report of September 1942 appeared, we recognised it as a valuable theoretical contribution which threw further light on conditions of Indian national problems and explained the developing multi-national consciousness which resulted in the growth in strength of the Moslem League and the demand for Pakistan, while at the same time it correctly presented the demand for the right of national self-determination of different national communities within India and sharply differentiated these from Pakistan. Recognising the value of this contribution, we immediately re-published it and gave it wide circulation in Britain so as to enable our Party members and all interested in Indian questions to be aware of these new developments and the political conclusions to be drawn from them.

Since then we have noted that in the recent period the Communist Party of India has revised its position and made a number of changes so that the statement presented in 1944 as being Adhikari’s report in 1942 bears little resemblance to the report published in 1942. We are of course aware that the position of the Indian Party on this question has gone through a number of stages:

1. The view put forward by yourself in February 1942 (before the Adhikari report) and re-published by us in September 1942 in the pamphlet THE INDIAN C.P., that “Mr. Jinnah’s dreamland of Pakistan leads nowhere except to stalemate",

2. The position of Adhikari’s report of Sept. 1942 recognising the claim of multi-national self-determination and going against this slogan of Pakistan, "to the Moslem masses our explanation must be such as to disillusion them against Pakistan".

3. The revised position of 1944, accepting the slogan of Pakistan, treating the Congress as the Hindu organisation and the Moslem League as the organisation for Moslems over India as a whole, and involving the Party in a considerably closer degree of association with the Moslem League and opposition to the body of national sentiment following the Congress.

We would not of course wish to judge from here the tactics pursued by the Indian C.P. on the basis of their judgment of the situation on the spot with the fullest information which we cannot pretend to have. While we feel certain queries with regard to certain aspects of the policy and tactics pursued, which we have communicated to Comrades Dange and Mirajkar, we should not wish this tactical question of controversy to stand in the way of the campaign which requires to be conducted and above all we are concerned to do everything in our power to assist and strengthen the position of our brother Party in India in the present situation, when it has to face the offensive of the right wing leadership of the Congress and all other elements opposed to the development of a strong Party of the Indian masses. At the same time we are responsible for the character of the campaign conducted in this country and it is not through unawareness of new developments in the Indian situation, that we strive to maintain the campaign in this country on the basis of the general line indicated above and to prevent issues of Indian division within Indian politics disrupting the strongest united campaign for Indian independence in this country.

In view of the character of Tory propaganda about Hindu-Moslem disunity and the presentation of the Congress as a Hindu organisation, we feel that it would be politically incorrect to present the question of Indian nationalities as one of Hindu nationalities versus Moslem nationalities, or to create the impression that the Congress is the organisation of Hindus in the same sense that the Moslem League is a communal organisation.

(c) Dyakov article.

We noted with some surprise the suggestion that we should enter into polemics against the Dyakov article on India in "New Times”. We are in general agreement with the line of Dyakov’s article and would certainly have no wish to enter into polemics against it in “New Times”.

We believe that comrades in India may be in danger of under-estimating the significance of this article. An article published in “New Times” reflects the carefully thought out opinions of comrades who do not speak lightly or without intimate political knowledge of their subjects.

Wo hope that these considerations will be of assistance to you in understanding the character of the campaign which we are conducting here for Indian independence and which we pledge ourselves to do everything in our power to strengthen. In conclusion we would like to express our appreciation of the services and assistance given to us by Comrades Dange and Mirajkar during their stay in Britain, and we hope it will soon be possible for us to reciprocate them.

Source: Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester,  CP/IND/DUTT/11/06

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