CHINA’S STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

By
Mao Tse-tung

People’s Publishing House
Bombay
# CONTENTS

Introduction  
I. On Coalition Government  
   By Mao Tse-tung ................................................................. i  
II. Strategy of the People Or of Fascism  
   By Chu The ........................................................................ ix  

I. Final Victory For China .......................................................... 1  
II. Choice: Neither Defeat Nor Quick Victory............................. 11  
III. War of Long Endurance ...................................................... 19  
IV. Politics Is Bloodless War ...................................................... 28  
V. It Will Be A World War! ........................................................ 33  
VI. Strategy For China .............................................................. 38  
VII. Mobile And Guerilla Warfare ............................................. 49  
VIII. How To Strike ................................................................... 55  
IX. Victory to People’s Army! .................................................... 60  
X. Perspectives ........................................................................ 64
PUBLISHER’S NOTE

The main part of this book consists of a series of lectures given by Mao Tse-tung, leader of China’s Communist Party, in May-June, 1938. Mao in his lectures outlines the strategy and tactics of fighting a people’s war against Japanese invaders.

In the book, however, these lectures are preceded by summaries of two important, reports delivered at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held at Yenan in April 1945. These reports—the first by Mao Tse-tung and the second by General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies—show how successfully the strategy and tactics outlined by Mao in his lectures were implemented and with what results. They also sharply pose today’s main problem facing the Chinese people, both militarily and politically and point the way forward.
INTRODUCTION

I

ON COALITION GOVERNMENT

Political Report by Mao Tse-tung at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

[In the latter half of April was held at Yenan the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China (Kungchantang). Below we give a summary of the political report of the Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman and veteran leader of the Party.

Since its foundation in 1921, the Kungchantang has held six National Congresses—July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, January 1925, April 1927 and July 1928. Because of the long period of war and intense struggle, seventeen years passed before this, the Seventh Congress, could be convened.

The Seventh Congress showed that the Kungchantang has become a major force among the Chinese people. From a small band of intellectuals it today has grown into a mighty revolutionary organization with a membership of over 12 lakhs, mainly workers and peasants. By its consistent indomitable determination to resist Jap enslavement and its heroic leadership of the guerilla armies, today it has liberated from Japan’s rule nineteen Liberated Areas distributed over 19 provinces in Manchuria, North, Central and South China, with a population of 9½ crores (a little less than the combined population of Bihar and Bengal) and covering an area of over 353,000 square miles (more than the total area of Bengal, Bihar, U.P. and the Punjab.

In doing this, it has built up under its leadership the great Eighth Route, New Fourth and other anti-Japanese regular armies whose total strength is today over 9 lakhs (in 1937 it was less than 50,000) with an additional force of 22 lakh people’s volunteers who guard their localities. And these figures are not standing still, they are steadily increasing as the war of the Liberated Areas, led by the Communists, steadily develops in scope and intensity.

The Congress gathering together 752 delegates, representatives from this vast area with its lakhs of soldiers and people, had important tasks before it—of rallying all China on the eve of the final counter offensive against Japan against the dictatorial policy of the present Kuomintang ruling clique which had led lo great military defeats and suffering for the Chinese people; it had to put before the people the path which would lead to the thorough defeat and annihilation of the Japanese aggressor and the emergence of an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China.

To its presidium, the Congress elected the tried veterans of the Communist movement—Mao Tse-tung who had guided the Party ever since the Kuomintang clique launched its offensive against it eighteen years ago; Chu Teh, beloved Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Ho Lung, famed over all China for his heroism in the days when a few thousand guerillas held at bay lakhs of Kuomintang soldiers;
Chou En-lai, always the representative of the Liberated Areas in key negotiations with the Kuomintang; Lin Tsu-han, Chairman of the Border Region, leading Chinese revolutionary from the early years of this century; Lin Shao-chi, outstanding policy-maker of the Party, and other leaders.

The Congress marks a new stage in the history of China’s great revolutionary movement. It marks the emergence of the Communists and their democratic allies into the forefront of their country’s life; for in their increasing strength and determination to defeat Japan and to unify and democratize all China alone rests the certainty that out of the sacrifices and suffering of the Chinese people there will arise a united, free China which no foreign imperialism will be able to exploit and dominate. And as Mao’s speech shows, it is only with their success that China, democratic, unified and strong, will play is rightful role as a great free nation in securing freedom for all its neighbours in Asia.—Editor.]

“On Coalition Government” was the title of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Kungchantang (the Chinese Communist Party) to the Seventh Congress of the Party.

Mao Tse-tung began by pointing out:

“Unification of all parties and groups and non-party representatives to form a provisional democratic Coalition Government so as to carry out democratic reform, to overcome the present crisis, to mobilize and unify the national forces of the war of resistance, to effectively collaborate with the Allies in the war and to defeat the Japanese aggressors, to secure the thorough liberation of China are basic demands of the Chinese people at present.”

And more than this China needs a Coalition Government not only during the war but also after it.

“After victory in the war of resistance, a National Assembly based on broad democratic foundations should be called to form a regular democratic Government of a similar coalition nature embracing more broadly all parties and groups and non-party representatives. This Government will lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build up an independent, free, unified, prosperous, and strong new country…. After China has had democratic elections, the Government should be a coalition, working on the basis of a common recognized New Democratic programme, no matter whether the Kungchantang is a majority or a minority party in the National Assembly.”

WHY COALITION GOVERNMENT?

Mao Tse-tung repeatedly urged the necessity for the immediate formation of a Coalition Government. One-party dictatorship—dictatorship of the anti-popular group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tse-tung, is not only a “fundamental obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the strength of the Chinese people in the war of resistance” but also a “calamitous embryo of civil war.”

If such a dictatorship is not abolished and replaced by a democratic Coalition Government, then “not only will it be impossible to carry out any democratic reform within the Kuomintang-controlled areas and mobilize all the people and army there
effectively to collaborate with the Allies and thoroughly to defeat the aggressors, but it will also lead to a calamitous civil war.”

Mao Tse-tung went on:

“The principal ruling clique within the Kuomintang is still upholding the reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. They have been, and especially now are, preparing to launch a civil war and are only waiting till Allied troops have driven the Japanese from certain parts of China. They also hope that the Allied commanders in China will enact the role of General Scobie in Greece. They hail and welcome the work of slaughter committed by General Scobie and the reactionary Greek Government.”

TOWARDS A CONFERENCE OF LIBERATED AREAS

Speaking of the Kuomintang authorities who talk of “convoking the National Assembly,” “of returning the reins of government to the people” and yet refuse a Coalition Government, Mao called this a “mockery” of democracy. He exposed the dark designs of the reactionary clique within the Kuomintang as that of “being bent on convoking a so-called “National Assembly” which will be entirely under its thumb and which will pass the anti-democratic so-called “constitution,” maintaining the dictatorship.

The appointment of several dozens of Kuomintang members to this so-called National Assembly will enable it to put up a show of “returning the reins of government to the people” through giving the cloak of legality to the illegal “National” Government which has no popular support and has been clamped on the Chinese people. There will then be plenty of pretexts created in order to issue punitive orders against any one who disagrees.

Seriously warning against such actions of the Kuomintang authorities, Mao Tse-tung said: “Anti-popular ‘heroes’ face the danger of pushing themselves into the blind alley”. At the same time, he also declared that “whenever the Kuomintang Government abandons its erroneous policy and consents to democratic reform, we are willing to resume negotiations with it. But such negotiations must be based on the general policy of the war of resistance, of unity and of democracy. We can never agree with any measure, proposition or other empty talk which departs from this general policy, no matter how well it may sound.”

In order to promote the setting up of a Coalition Government Mao Tse-tung made the following proposal to the Liberated Areas:

“conference of people’s representatives of Liberated China should be called in Yenan as soon as possible to discuss the unification of action of all Liberated Areas, to aid the anti-Japanese democratic movement of the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the underground movement of the people in occupied areas, and to promote the unity of the entire nation and the formation of the Coalition Government.”

TWO PATHS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

In analysing the concrete conditions in China’s anti-Japanese war, he pointed out that for a long time there have obviously boon two paths in China. These are, he
said: “the path of the Kuominlang Government which oppresses the people and passively carries on armed resistance, and the path of the Chinese people who have awakened and united together to carry out the people’s war.”

In order to explain clearly these two diametrically opposed paths Mao Tse-tung vividly compared and contrasted the Liberated Areas and the areas under the Kuomintang rule. He said:

“The Liberated Areas of China now extend to over 906,000 square kilometres with a population of 95,500,000. In these vast Liberated Areas, all essential policies of the anti-Japanese national united front have been put into practice and popularly elected governments through co-operation between members of the Kungchantang and representatives of other parties and groups have been set up or are in the process of being set up. These are really local coalition governments which have mobilized the entire people.

“The Liberated Areas of China have become the democratic pattern for China and the centre of gravity for co-operation with our Allies to drive out the Japanese aggressors and to liberate the Chinese people. The troops in the Liberated Areas have expanded to 910,000 and the people’s volunteers to over 2,200,000. These troops have become the main force in the war of resistance” and “as soon as they receive modern equipment they will become still more invincible and able finally to defeat the Japanese aggressors.”

In areas under the Kuomintang rule on the contrary, as a consequence of the anti-popular and antidemocratic policies of the Kuomintang authorities. “there were military defeats, loss of huge territories and economic as well as financial crisis.” “These gave rise to a serious crisis among the people who were reduced to living the hardest life, to the people complaining loudly and insistently and even to people staging revolts. The Kuomintang troops also have been reduced by more than half of their strength.”

**KUOMINTANG SUPPORTS JAP PUPPETS**

As to the conditions on the battlefronts in Kuomintang-controlled areas and in Liberated Areas, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that since 1939 the Japanese aggressors’ bayonets have mainly been pointed at the Liberated Areas. In 1943, sixty-four per cent of the Japanese forces invading China and ninety-five percent of the puppet forces in China were opposed by the troops of the Liberated Areas. In 1944, the Japanese aggressors launched a campaign for getting under their control the North-South through continental railway line and found the Kuomintang troops devoid of power of resistance. It was only at this period that some changes occurred in the proportion of the share in armed resistance of the two battlefronts. However, even at present, the troops in Liberated Areas are still opposing fifty-six per cent of the Japanese troops invading China, while there is absolutely no change in proportion of puppet troops they are opposing.

Mao Tse-tung also pointed out that among the 800,000 puppet troops, the majority were composed of either entire units that went over to the Japs with their Kuomintang officers or were organized by Kuomintang officers who had gone over. The reactionary elements of the Kuomintang are supporting these puppet troops
morally and organizationally in order that they may co-operate with the Japanese aggressors to attack the Chinese Liberated Areas.

Besides, these reactionary elements mobilized a large number of troops to blockade and attack the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and other Liberated Areas. These troops reached the number of 797,000 and even now they have not been reduced. Chinese and foreigners have never heard of such a serious situation in China because of the Kuomintang policy of strict censorship of news. “Many people only know that there is a Mihailovich in Yugoslavia but they do not know that there are scores of Mihailoviches in China.”

Concerning these two paths, Mao gave the following conclusions: “One is the course of victory in spite of the fact that it is carried on under such adverse conditions as in the Liberated Areas absolutely without outside help. The other is the course of defeat even though it is carried on under such extremely favourable conditions as in the Kuomintang-controlled areas with foreign supplies.”

AGAINST KUOMINTANG COMPROMISE WITH JAPS

In his report, Mao Tse-tung brought forward the programme for the defeat of Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a New China. This programme is divided into two sections, namely, general and specific, and it furnishes answers to many important wartime and post-war problems. Concerning the need for the thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and the rejection of any half-way compromise Mao Tse-tung called the people’s attention to secret understandings and dealings between pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang Government and Japanese secret emissaries. “The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang Government must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and reject any compromise.” At the same time “the Chinese people should expand the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and other people’s armies. Moreover, wherever the enemy has trodden, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to co-operate directly with our Allies in fighting.” To the reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resistance to Japanese aggressors from them, “the Chinese people should in self-defence resolutely deal counter-blows after remonstrances have proved futile.”

With regard to the people’s freedom, he pointed out that “in their struggle for freedom at present, the first and main effort of the Chinese people is directed against the Japanese aggressors. But the Kuomintang Government has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, rendering them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors”; he said that “the people in China’s Liberated Areas have gained their freedom and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom. The more the Chinese people have gained of freedom the greater is the organised democratic force and thus the greater is the possibility of a Coalition Government.”

UNIFY CHINA ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS

With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that “divided China
must be transformed into a unified China.” But what the Chinese people want is not “tyrannical dictatorial unification by dictators” but “democratic unification by the people.” “The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy, and Coalition Government is actually a movement for unification.”

With regard to the people’s armies, Mao pointed out that without an army which stands on the side of the people, a Coalition Government cannot be formed, and the Eighth Route and the New Fourth are armies that stand wholeheartedly on the side of the people. Mao also pointed out that the many Kuomintang troops which frequently suffer defeats, oppress the people and discriminate against other troops, should be reformed. He declared: “as soon as the New Democratic Coalition Government and a United High Command are formed in China, the troops in China’s Liberated Areas will at once be handed over to them. But all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.”

Mao Tse-tung went on to say that the Kungchantang in the entire period of New Democracy approves the development of private capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, namely, to carry out the principle that “the tillers should own their land” and to guarantee that private capitalism “can not control the life of the people in the country.”

With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in Liberated Areas, reduction in rent and interest has been carried out, so that landlords and peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance. Mao also declared: “If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to carry out this policy after the war. First of all, reduction of rent and interest will be carried out throughout the country, and then appropriate means will be found to systematically implement the principle that ‘tillers should own their land’”. Mao also pointed out that mutual aid organisations based on peasants’ private property have been widely organised throughout the Liberated Areas, and “henceforth this system should be popularized as much as possible.”

With regard to the problem of industry, Mao pointed out that “in the New Democratic State, the policy of readjustment of interests between employers and employees will be adopted.” On the one hand, “the worker’s interests will be protected” while on the other hand, “the guarantee will be given to fair profits from proper commercial enterprise.” He declared that in this New Democratic state, “facilities will certainly be given for the widespread development of private capitalistic economy” apart from the economy of State-owned business and co-operatives. Mao Tse-tung welcomed foreign investments in China. He said that industrialization of China “will absorb a very great amount of foreign investments.”

With regard to culture and education, Mao pointed out the need of respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made achievements. He also pointed out various tasks such as the need for liquidation of illiteracy and the popularisation of public hygiene. He further pointed out that ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be “absorbed critically.”

Concerning the problem of national minorities Mao Tse-tung pointed out that
“national minorities should be helped... to attain liberation and development politically, economically and culturally. Their language, literature, customs, habits and religious faith should be respected.”

With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that “according to the principle of freedom of belief, China’s Liberated Areas allow every school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists and other religious believers, provided they obey Government laws and decrees, will be protected by the Government.”

FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON EQUALITY

Mao Tse-tung in his report dwelt in detail on “diplomatic problems.”

“The basic principle of the Kungchantang in diplomatic policy,” declared Mao Tse-tung, “is the establishment and consolidation of diplomatic relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and post-war problems, such as co-operation in fighting, the Peace Conference, commercial intercourse, investments, etc. on the basis of the thorough extermination of the Japanese aggressors, the upholding of world peace, the reciprocal respect for equal and independent status of nations, and the mutual improvement of the interests and friendship of nations and peoples.”

As to the Atlantic Charter and the resolutions passed in the international conferences held at Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, and Crimea, Mao Tse-tung said that the “Kungchantang agrees with the resolutions of these international conferences.” With regard to safeguarding post-war international peace and setting up of a security organisation, the Kungchantang “fully agrees with the suggestions of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the decisions of the Crimea Conference on this question.” The Kungchantang “welcomes the United Nations Conference at San Francisco and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in order to express the will of the Chinese people.”

Mao Tse-tung stated that the Crimea line accords basically with the policy held by the Kungcharitang on the settlement of Chinese and Oriental questions. He was also of the opinion that a policy similar to that of Crimea should be adopted in the Orient and China.

“Firstly, Japanese aggressors must lie ultimately defeated and Japanese Fascism, militarism and causes producing them thoroughly exterminated. There should be no half-way compromise.

“Secondly, the last vestiges of Fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to remain.

“Thirdly, domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not allowed to recur.

“Fourthly, the Kuomintang dictatorship rule must be abolished. After abolition, it should at first be supplanted by a provisional democratic Coalition Government fully supported by the whole nation. After the lost territories have been recovered, a regular Coalition Government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unrestricted elections.”
SOVIET PARTICIPATION NECESSARY

Speaking of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, Mao Tse-tung said:

“We are of the opinion that the Kuomintang Government must reverse its attitude of enmity towards the Soviet Union and swiftly improve Sino- Soviet diplomatic relations.” On behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tse-tung expressed thanks for the help which has always been rendered China by the Soviet Government and people in China’s war of liberation, and “welcomed Marshal Stalin’s speech last November rebuking the Japanese aggressors and the recent denunciation of the Soviet-Japonesec Neutrality Pact by the Soviet Union.”

Mao Tse-tung added: “We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.”

Regarding Sino-British and Sino-Amcrican diplomatic relations, Mao Tse-tung said: “The great efforts by the two Great Powers, America and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors, and the sympathy and aid rendered by their Governments and peoples to China deserve our thanks.”

Here Mao Tse-tung declared: “We request the Governments of the United Nations especially the Governments of America and Great Britain to pay attention seriously to the voice of the widest masses of the people, and not let their diplomatic policy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign Government helps China’s reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.”

Speaking of the abrogation of unequal treaties with China by many governments and the establishment of new treaties with China on the footing of equality, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people welcome “such measures which treat the Chinese people on a footing of equality” but pointed out that China “definitely cannot rely simply on equality being given through the good will of foreign governments and peoples. A real and actual relationship based on equality must, in the main, flow from the efforts of the Chinese people to build up politically, economically, and culturally a New Democratic country which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong.

“China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality through the present policy of the Kuomintang Government.”

FREEDOM FOR INDIA AND THE COLONIES

Finally Mao Tse-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to countries in the Far East:

“After the defeat and unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors ... all democratic forces of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people thorough extermination of Japanese Fascism and militarism would not be possible, and it would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific....
“The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to attain liberation.

“America has already granted independence to the Philippines. We hope that Great Britain will also grant independence to India, because an independent, democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people but also needed for world peace.”

With regard to Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Indo-China, Mao Tse-tung said:

“We hope that Great Britain, America, France, and Holland after helping the local peoples to defeat the Japanese aggressors, will grant rights of establishing independent and democratic regimes to the local people in accordance with the stand of the Crimea Conference, regarding liberated areas in Europe.” With regard to Thailand, Mao Tse-tung said that it “should be dealt with according to measures dealing with Fascist satellite countries.”

II

STRATEGY OF THE PEOPLE OR OF FASCISM?

Military Report by General Chu Teh
at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the 18th Group Army, gave a military report at the 7th Congress of the Kungchantang (Chinese Communist Party) held in the latter part of April in Yenan, on behalf of over 900,000 troops serving in the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Brigade, and over 2,000,000 People’s Volunteers. The main points of the report are as follows: China is on the eve of a big counter-offensive and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies must be closely united with every friendly anti-Japanese army including the Kuomintang armies, local troops and other armed forces. A united high command which can’ really act as a unified command should be set up according to the democratic principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the people’s armed forces developed and old troops reformed so as to collaborate with the Allied armies quickly to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build up an independent, free, democratic, unified strong and prosperous new China.

FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

General Chu began by summing up the anti-Japanese War of Resistance in the past eight years.

He pointed out that the first stage of the War of Resistance lasted from the July 7th 1937 outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident to the October, 1938 fall of Wuhan. During this stage the Kuomintang authorities changed their non-resistance policy adopted since the Mukden Affair in September, 1931 and put up armed resistance. The Kuomintang authorities had then adopted some progressive measures and part of the Kuomintang troops did resist gallantly.

But because the Kuomintang ruling clique did not mobilise and unify the people’s forces to carry out a total people’s war, but instead, persisted in an anti-
popular political system, so militarily it failed to capitalise on the Japanese strategic weakness, namely, troops dispersed over wide areas and mobilised batch by batch. Instead the weaknesses of the Kuomintang armies were made use of by the Japanese, which was a great help to the Japanese advance. In the 15 months of this stage the Japanese took Canton, Wuhan, pocketed a large slice of land in North and Central China, as well as strategic places in South China.

But during the same 15 months the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies penetrated into the enemy’s rear, launched counter-attacks and successively won many battles, starting with the battle of the Pingshing Pass in 1937. These armies diverted large Japanese forces, set up many Liberated Areas, opened a front in the enemy’s rear, shielded the Kuomintang battle-front and bolstered up the war morale of the entire nation, which enabled the war to be sustained.

SECOND STAGE—ENDURANCE

After the fall of Wuhan, the war of resistance entered a second stage, namely, the stage of the war of endurance. General Chu said: “The so-called stage of the war of endurance means that the Liberated Areas are battling with the Japanese.” “A special feature of this stage is protracted and repeated warfare of a sanguinary character between the Liberated Areas and the enemy.”

At this stage the Kuomintang authorities changed their policy. They abolished all progressive measures, took up a passive attitude towards the war and opposed the Kungchantang and the people in China, regarding this as their principal task. The Japanese also changed their policy. The Japanese stopped attacking the Kuomintang battle-front, tried to induce the Kuomintang authorities to capitulate and massed their troops to “mop up” the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in the Liberated Areas. During this stage there was no important battle on the Kuomintang battle-front and such a stage existed until 1944, over a period of five and a half years. According to the statistics of 1943, sixty-four per cent of the Japanese troops in China and ninety-five per cent of the puppet troops were opposed by the armies and people of the Liberated Areas.

One would have expected that the Kuomintang Government could very well have devoted these five years and a half to strengthen their armed resistance forces and prepare for a counter-offensive. But instead they had secret dealings with the Japanese aiming at a compromise and launched three anti-Communist drives in China.

In 1944, however, the Japanese launched an attack of a strategic nature on the Kuomintang battle-front with a view to establishing a north-south continental route. The Kuomintang armies proved incapable of resisting the attack and within a short time large areas in Honan, Hunan, Kwantung, and Kwangsi Provinces were lost to the Japanese. In the jyime period, the armies and people of the Liberated Areas, after having surmounted serious difficulties in 1941 and 1942, launched a counter-attack against the enemy.

As General Chu said, “The new situation since 1944 is: attacks on the enemy in the Liberated Areas battlefront while enemy troops were attacking the Kuomintang battlefront. This is a feature in the last phase of the stage of the war of endurance.”
General Chu remarked, “The Chinese war is on the eve of the stage of the counter-offensive. At present, the centre of gravity of armed resistance is the battlefront of the Liberated Areas and not the Kuo-mintang battlefront.” The gallant struggle and the measures adopted by the people in the Liberated Areas have really laid the foundation and made the greatest preparation for the counter-offensive. No one should under-estimate the contribution and role of the armies and people of the Liberated Areas in the cause of Chinese liberation and in the common task of the Allied nations against the Japanese aggressors.

**HOW LIBERATED AREAS AROSE**

General Chu, in the second part of his report, recounted the creation of the Liberated Areas battle-front and the course of the war of resistance. He said that after the Mukden incident, the Chinese Red Army—disturbed at the national territory being overrun by the Japanese aggressors—made the Long March from the south to the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region with the object of fighting against the Japanese. At the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the Red Army was reorganised into a national revolutionary army and marched to the front behind the enemy lines in North and Central China. With the help of local underground organisations of the Kungchantang, patriots and anti-Japanese armed forces, such as the Peiping and Tientsin student evacuees, the National Emancipation Vanguards, the National Salvation Sacrifice League, Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps and anti-Japanese Moslem detachments, universal guerilla warfare was launched against the Japanese, thus recovering much national territory lost by the Kuomintang armies. The battlefront of the Liberated Areas was thus formed and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies became the main fighting force in China’s war.

The fighting on the battlefront of the Liberated Areas passed through three periods.

The most difficult period was from Autumn 1940 to Autumn 1942. At that time because they were dealt severe blows by the famous One Hundred Regiment Campaign of the Eighth Route Army and because they also wanted to prepare for the Pacific War, the Japanese brought forward the slogan of converting North China into a “military base of the Great Asiatic War.” They concentrated powerful forces to carry out total political, economic, cultural and Special Service war against the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines. They constantly employed some 10,000 men in repeated “mopping up” operations lasting three to four months each time.

Thus, with the collaboration of Kuomintang troops with the enemy to carry out converging attacks on the Liberated Areas, an unprecedentedly serious situation arose. From 1941 to 1943 vast numbers of Kuomintang troops went over to the Japanese reaching 500,000 men, led by 60 to 70 oITicers with the rank of general. But putting into effect the ten great policies of the Kung-chantang, the universal organisation of the People’s Volunteer Corps, and adopting a new strategy of “when the enemy advances, we advance,” the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies together with the people smashed the Japanese attacks.
ACHIEVEMENTS OF COMMUNIST-LEAD ARMIES

“In the course of protracted warfare the tribulations and sacrifices suffered by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the South China Anti-Japanese Brigade and the people in the Liberated Areas, are incalculable,” said General Chu Teh. But brilliant war achievements, he said, have been the fruits of these great sacrifices.

During the seven years from 1937 to 1945, Kungchantang-led troops fought over 115,000 major and minor engagements against the Japanese, killed or wounded over 960,000 Japanese and puppets, took prisoner over 280,000 Japanese and puppet troops.

Over 100,000 Japanese and puppets came over to the Kungchantang-led troops while Japanese and puppets suffered a total loss of over 1,360,000 men.

The war trophies of the Kungchantang-led troops include: 1,028 pieces of cannon, over 7,700 machine-guns, 430,000 rifles and carbines.

Over 34,000 Japanese blockhouses and over 11,000 Japanese strong-points were captured, thus creating 19 Liberated Areas embracing North, Central and South China and liberating 95.5 million population.

This great achievement of the people’s war in the battlefront of the Liberated Areas stands in sharp contrast to the routs on the front of the Kuomintang armies.

“The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Brigade are short of weapons, especially new weapons, and are without foreign aid. How is it that despite extremely ruthless warfare, in addition to the attacks of the Kuomintang reactionaries, they can still grow and expand daily?”— asked General Chu Teh.

He attributed this to the fact that “the Liberated Areas under the leadership of our Party according to Mao Tse-tung’s policy of the people’s war, have realised the policies of the New Democracy. Hence, the general mobilisation of the whole people in the Liberated Areas has been realised, democratic coalition governments of the Liberated Areas set up and the unity of all classes in the Liberated Areas has been realised. Because of this, unified leadership in the war of resistance has also been realised. Without all these there would be no all-out people’s war in the Liberated Areas and without such a people’s war there would be nothing. Without upholding of the war of resistance on the battlefront of the Liberated Areas the whole war situation is unthinkable.”

THE TWO MILITARY STRATEGIES IN CHINA

In the third section of his report, General Chu Teh reviewed the military strategies followed in the war. He said that there were two military strategies in China. One is the strategy followed by the Kuomintang reactionaries. It is an anti-popular, defeatist, and solely defensive military strategy. The other strategy is Mao Tse-tung’s military strategy of people’s war. The two different strategies produce different results. Implementation of the first strategy caused the Kuomintang armies to suffer defeat after defeat, while implementation of the second strategy constitutes the essential factor of victory in the battlefront of the Liberated Areas.

The first strategy is based on protecting the interests of a small group of big
landlords, compradores and bankers. It retains the old system, habits, and tactics of Chinese armies and refuses to make any reform on the basis of new conditions arising from the anti-Japanese war. Hoping that the Allies, perhaps joined by the Soviet, will win the anti-Japanese war for them, it passively watches, preserving its own forces ready for civil war.

Strategically it would like a quick victory and yet it carries out the passive strategy of mere defence. It carries out forced conscription, and tactics of buying, kidnapping and roping together into gangs in order to get recruits for its armies. It does not understand how to treat soldiers and only knows how to exploit the people and soldiers.

Also under the pretext of “feeding the army” it extorts from the people and contracts huge foreign loans, while the greater part of war expenses are embezzled by officers and officials. It regards the soldiers as slaves and encourages flogging and scolding of soldiers, keeping them under the surveillance of the secret political police, even murdering them.

It trains the soldiers under the principle of blind obedience and coercion, thus even when equipped with modern armaments, the soldiers are not well-trained and do not fight well. The way it employs its troops is foolish and there are no distinctive rules for punishments and rewards. Disharmony exists between officers and men, and deceit is practised among various ranks. Officers who had gone over to the Japs were assigned high positions after they had been sent back by the Japs, while officers who held cities against great odds were court-martialled.

FASCIST STRATEGY OF KUOMINTANG

The political work in its army is the work of the secret police. There is no propaganda for armed resistance but only anti-Communist propaganda aimed at turning the troops into Fascist troops.

Its command is irrational. All troops are under the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek and many commanding officers above divisional rank are actually doing nothing. When fighting commences, all sorts of contradictory orders are given.

It relies on foreign help to supply equipment for its troops, including uniforms, food and fodder, and never knows how to develop production of armaments. It tries to destroy all non-Kuomintang troops, assimilates local troops and forbids armed resistance against the Japanese invaders by the people. Thus its troops lose the support of local armies and the people, and fight as isolated armies.

It never tries to demoralise the Japs and puppet troops by propaganda but instead secretly instructs its troops to go over to the enemy through a “crooked-line-save-the-country” propaganda (by which the Kuomintang leadership tells its troops; if hard-pressed, surrender to the Japs, join their puppet armies, fight the Communists; after the Allies have defeated the Japs, you can rejoin us, we shall go on with the anticommunist war. The logic is—fighting the Communists even under Jap orders is saving the country.—Ed.) Among the 800,000 puppets opposed by the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Brigade, 500,000 are former Kuomintang troops.
Contrary to the above military strategy is the military strategy of people’s war propounded by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The starting point of this military strategy is the protection of our homeland and people’s interests and the collaboration with our Allies against the Japanese. It aims at realising the principle of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, “the merging of armed forces with the people, making them the people’s armed forces.” It has confidence in the people’s strength. It needs outside help but does not depend on the latter and strives for victory through reliance on its own strength. It upholds protracted war, and prior to- the big counter-offensive, puts into effect the active strategy of offensive defence.

It carries out the voluntary recruitment to the army, under which the people join the army of their own free will. It sees that soldiers are satisfied with their food, clothing and dwellings and pays attention to their education in armed resistance and in their attitude to the civil population. Its troops produce their own food and other necessities of life, supplying all or part of their own needs, so as to lighten the people’s burden.

It regards the soldiers as conscious fighters and opposes flogging and scolding. As individuals, officers and men are completely on an equal footing—the only difference is in their duties; but at the same time there is very strict military and civil discipline. It trains the soldiers through conscious volitional means under which officers and men teach themselves and each other. It aims at developing intelligence, physical strength and high technique among the rank and file, and as a result many men of ability among them have been discovered.

It employs its troops according to the initiative, capacity for action, flexibility and adaptability of officers and men. There is excellent political work among its troops which raises the consciousness and fighting strength of officers and men, rallies friendly troops and people, and brings about demoralisation and desertion in the Japanese and puppet armies. There is a proper system of command and authority and solidarity within the army and unification in the orders of its command.

Its troops are blockaded by the Kuomintang and have extreme difficulties in supply of arms. At present, this problem of equipment is solved by seizing arms from the enemy and setting up small scale arsenals using local materials for manufacturing some of the required armaments.

Troops in Liberated Areas are divided into main forces, local forces, and People’s Volunteer Corps. Local forces are assigned the task of defending one or several countries while the People’s Volunteers, totalling over two million, effectively back the main forces and local forces. All three categories of troops are inter-linked and inter-connected.

General Chu Teh pointed out that the military strategy of the Kuomintang reactionaries is decided by their political strategy. This Kuomintang strategy is steeped in German, Italian and Japanese Fascist ideology, which entails that troops oppress the people and officers oppress their men, resulting inevitably in defeats in war. He said that all anti-Japanese troops must throw out such anti-popular
elements and adopt the line of the people’s war and people’s army.

**Basis For United High Command**

General Chu Teh in the fourth part of the report put forward the military task before the people of the entire nation. He said that the task before China is close unity between the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the Kuomintang local armies, and all other armed forces to defeat the Japanese aggressors in coordination with the Allied armies. In order to fulfil this task, it is most urgently required that the High Command of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship must be reformed and a united High Comnriand which is able to carry out the unified command on the basis of the democracy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen must be set up.

After the formation of this United Command, the defeatist and pro-Japanese elements among the higher ranking Kuomintang officers must be dismissed; all anti-popular and corrupt practices must be stopped; military and political strategies which originally are in disharmony with the anti-Japanese war of resistance and the people’s interests must be changed; unequal treatment to different troops must be abolished; all activities that lead to mutual friction must be stopped.

Allied supplies must be really and equitably distributed among armies fighting at the front; a democratic system must be established in the army; military training strengthened, the conscription system reformed, and the treatment as well as the remuneration to officers and men improved. Only thus can Chinese troops develop their fighting capacity in the anti-Japanese war.

In Jap-occupied areas, lessons must be learnt from how the underground army in France liberated their country. The organisational work and the work of winning over the puppet army and police must be strengthened. An underground army must be organised in cities, so as to rise up when the moment is ripe to attack the enemy from within and without in co-ordination with the Anti-Japanese forces to drive away the Japanese aggressors.

To expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the Jap-occupied territory, the central task in Liberated Areas is the concentrating of comparatively large forces and the launching of widespread offensive against places occupied by the enemy—which it is possible to capture no matter whether they have been under enemy occupation for long or only since recently.

At the same time, attention, however, must be paid to smashing enemy attacks and the work of consolidating Liberated Areas. The people’s armed forces must be expanded, and the training of the regular army, local forces, and People’s Volunteers strengthened to raise their military technique, especially artillery technique. Production and economy must be practised, food and material resources accumulated, and the internal unity and unity with friendly troops effected, to prepare for the strategic change from anti-Japanese guerilla warfare to anti-Japanese regular warfare during the counter-offensive.

In conclusion, General Chu Teh said:

“Victory will very soon light up the whole world and all China. The great work resulting from eight years’ striving of the Chinese people is approaching the period of decisive victory.
“The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other people’s forces are the flower of the Chinese people’s strength and have infinite prospects.

“The Kungchantang has in the course of fighting for national liberation of the people, not only forged a powerful political strategy, it has also forged a powerful military strategy, which alone can solve the question of China’s revolutionary war. Any one who ignores the great achievements and strength of the armies and people of the Liberated Areas will be committing a very great mistake. We want to unite with all friendly troops and collaborate with Allied troops to defeat the Japanese aggressors.”
Chapter One

Final Victory for China

I. Statement of the Problem

The first anniversary of the great anti-Japanese war, July 7, is approaching. It is now almost one year since the entire nation combined its efforts for the united front and the war of resistance and in heroic combats against the enemy. This war is unprecedented in the history of the Orient: it will be a great war in world history: and it is the concern of the peoples of the entire world. Every Chinese who is suffering from the calamities of the war and fighting for the survival of his own nation is longing for victory day and night.

But what will be the course of the war? Will it end in victory or in defeat? Will the victory be a quick or a delayed one? The war of long endurance is on many people's lips, but what kind of war is it? How to carry it on? Many are talking about the final victory, but why will there be a final victory? How to realize this victory?

These problems have been answered neither by all nor the majority of the people. Hence the advocates of the defeatist theory of national extermination warn the people that the Chinese nation will be exterminated and that the final victory will not belong to China. And certain impatient friends of ours also harangue the people that China will win the war very soon and that great efforts are not required. Which of these opinions is correct?

We Communists have always maintained that neither of these views is correct. But our stand was not completely understood by the majority of the people. This was partly due to the lack of a broad pro-paganda and education and partly to the fact that the development of objective events did not reveal sufficiently the nature of our stand before the people, who were thus unable to see the entire trend and perspective and to map out a complete programme of action accordingly.

Now the situation is different. With ten months of war experience the unfounded theory of national extermination can be easily refuted and our impatient friends who are advocating a theory of quick victory can be persuaded to change their opinion. Under such conditions many people demand a conclusive statement. This is especially necessary in view of the still rather vague understanding of the war of long endurance as well as of the opposing views on this subject. “Since the Lukow Ch’iao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident the united effort of four hundred millions means the final victory for China”—this has become a popular formula. It is a correct one. But it must be substantiated.

The fact that both the anti-Japanese war and the united front have been maintained is due to many reasons. All the parties and factions in the country, from Kuomintang to the Communists; our entire people, from the capitalists to the workers; the armies of the entire country, from the main forces to the guerillas; the foreign nations, from the democracies to the socialist state; and the enemy country, from its anti-war people to its anti-war soldiers in the front; have all contributed
more or less to our war of resistance. All of them should be paid due respect by every conscientious person. We Communists, together with other pro-war parties and factions and the entire people, have been working towards one direction: uniting every force to vanquish the monstrous Japanese aggressors. This has been our consistent effort in the past as well as in the present.

July 1 will be the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. This will also be the time when our war of resistance will be one year old. To enable each and every Communist to devote better and greater effort in future for the war it is also necessary to pay greater attention to the study of the war of long endurance.

Therefore the theme of my lecture will be a study of the war of long endurance and may it be an appropriate gift to the two great anniversaries. I shall deal with a number of problems connected with the war of endurance, though many will of necessity be left out, as it is impossible to deal with everything in a lecture.

Every experience in ten months of war has repudiated the alternative views of China’s inevitable extermination or China’s quick victory. The former leads to compromise while the latter to underestimating the enemy. The method of approach of both is subjective and one-sided—in a word, unscientific.

A number of theories of national extermination existed before the war. For example: “China’s weapons are inferior and she will be inevitably defeated in a war”; “In case of a war of resistance, there will be another Abyssinia.” Open and frank theories of national extermination have disappeared since the war, but there are still many disguised ones. This is witnessed by the frequent recurrence of an atmosphere of compromise; the advocates of compromise basing their view on “inevitable (national) extermination in further fighting.” A student wrote from Hunan:

“There are obstacles everywhere in the country-side. Engaged single-handedly in propaganda work, I can only do it by picking up conversations wherever there is an opportunity. My contacts are none too ignorant but are people with more or less understanding. The talks have been interesting. However, whenever I come across my relatives, all of them have this to say: ‘China cannot win in a war. She will be destroyed.’ They are certainly detestable. Fortunately they are not engaged in propaganda. Otherwise there would be disaster. The peasants naturally have greater confidence in these people.”

Such advocates of the theory of China’s inevitable extermination are the social root of the compromising tendency. They are everywhere in the country. Hence possibilities of compromising proposals may not disappear from the anti-Japanese front till the end of the war. As at present Hsuchow has been lost and the situation in Wuhan (Wuchang and Hankow) is critical, I think it will be of some help in dealing a telling blow to the extermination-ists.

Ten months of war have also witnessed the emergence of impatient views. For instance, the groundless optimistic tendency of a number of people, who underestimate Japan and even hold that Japan could not penetrate into Shansi.
There are others who belittle the strategic role of guerilla warfare in the anti-Japanese war, and are sceptical towards the proposition “On the main front, mobile warfare should be the main form while guerilla warfare the auxiliary; on small sectors, guerilla warfare should be the main form while mobile warfare the auxiliary.” They disapprove the following strategic directive of the Eighth Route Army: “Basically guerilla warfare, but seizing upon every favourable situation for mobile warfare.” They regard this as a “mechanical” view.

During the Shanghai battles many of them said: “Fight only for three months and the international situation will change, the Soviet Union will join us and the war will soon be over.” Thus the future of the war was to be determined chiefly by foreign aid. After the T'ai-erh Chuan victory a number of people thought retrospectively that the Hsuchow campaign should have been a “quasi-war of decision” and that this was the time to discard the directive of a war of long endurance. They also said: “This engagement has been the last struggle of the enemy,” and “Our victory has deprived the Japanese militarists of their spiritual ground. The only thing for them to do now is to wait for their last day of judgment.” The P'inghsin Kwan victory had already dazzled some people; the T'ai-erh Chuan victory dazzled some more. Hence it has been doubted that the enemy would advance toward Wuhan. Many thought “it is hard to tell;” many others thought (the Japanese would) “definitely not.”

Such scepticism (toward the enemy’s strength) may affect air major issues. Take for example the problem as to whether or not the anti-Japanese forces are sufficiently strong. The answer would be in the affirmative if our present strength were held sufficient to prevent the enemy’s further advance. This in turn would create doubt as to the necessity of augmenting our power. Take also the problem as to whether or not the slogan of strengthening and broadening the anti-Japanese national united front is still correct. The answer would be in the negative if it were held that the present status of the united front is strong enough to repulse the enemy. A negative answer would be similarly given to the problem as to whether or not our foreign policy and international propaganda should be intensified.

In the same way all the following measures would become unnecessary: military and political organisational reforms, development of mass movement, intensified education in national defence, suppression of traitors and Trotskyists, promotion of military industry, improvement of the people’s livelihood, etc., etc. Slogans for the defence of Wuhan, Canton and the North-West would all be rejected. There are even people ready to intensify the friction between Kuo (Kuomintang) and Kung (Kungchantang or Communist Party) whenever there is a favourable turn in the war situation and thereby turn our attention away from the enemy and towards internal struggle. This happens every time when we are victorious in a major engagement or the enemy temporarily halts his advance.

We shall label these people as “militarily and politically short-sighted.” Their arguments are superfi- cially convincing, but actually groundless, pious fraud. The sweeping away of such fraudulent talks ought to be helpful for a victorious conclusion of war against Japan.
The problem now is: Will China be exterminated? The answer is: No, the final victory belongs to China. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, the anti-Japanese war is a war of long endurance.

The main issues in these problems have already been pointed out by me in a general way two years ago. In my interview with an American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, which took place five months prior to the Sian incident and twelve months prior to the Lukow Ch’iao incident, on July 16, 1936, I gave a general estimation of the Sino-Japanese War and proposed a number of directives for our victory. Lest we forget, the following excerpts are presented:

**QUESTION:** Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?

**ANSWER:** Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves.

**QUESTION.** How long do you think such a war would last?

**ANSWER:** That depends on the strength of the Chinese People’s Front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese People’s Front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organised horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China considerable from, those Governments which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated [and China will win] only the sacrifices will be extensive [and there will be a very painful period].

1 Snow’s English version of the interview appears in his Red Star Over China, Random House, New York, 1938. The following is taken from the 4th printing of this book, pp. 85-92, and is therefore neither a literal translation of Mao’s version not consistent with the style or phrasing of the present translation of Mao’s work. There are, however, some necessary changes and additions as noted. Omissions from Snow’s text are based on Mao’s version which is only an excerpt, and are not indicated. – Editor.

2 In Mao’s Chinese version “the oppressed people” included explicitly the people of Japan proper. – Editor.

3 Literally “China’s Anti-Japanese United Front” in Mao’s version. When Mao’s lecture was being delivered, controversies were going on in China regarding the “People’s Front” in Spain, France, etc. “National Front” or similar expressions are used to indicate the broader scope of China’s unity in comparison with that of France or Spain. – Editor.

4 This word is added to Snow’s version in line with Mao’s. – Editor.

5 This is added to Snow’s according to Mao’s version. It is repeated in the conclusion of Mao’s whole treatise. – Editor.

6 The clause following the word “extensive” in Snow’s version is: “and it will be a painful period for the whole world.” The present clause is substituted in line with Mao’s version. – Editor.
QUESTION: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

ANSWER: Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making economic, political or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the advance of Japan, are only indulging in utopian fancy.

But we know well enough that even the Lower Yangtze Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental programme. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese Navy aspires to blockade the China Seas and to seize the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and the Dutch Bast Indies. In the event of war, Japan will try to make them her strategic bases, cutting off Great Britain, France and America from China, and monopolising the seas of the southern Pacific. [In such a period China will definitely be in a very difficult situation, but the majority of the Chinese people believe that the difficulty can be overcome. Only the rich men in the big commercial centres are defeatists because of their fear of property losses.]7

Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue her fight, against Japan once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast and enforced its blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army.

In the anti-Japanese war the people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilized. China is a very big nation. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as one hundred or even two hundred million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have left a great force to fight against Japan, who would also have to fight a heavy and constant rearguard action throughout the entire war.

Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China’s economy also presents advantages in a war against Japan. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of America. Moreover, it is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China: China’s northwest, southwest and west cannot be blockaded by Japan.

Thus, once more the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization and unification of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a United Front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party long ago.

QUESTION: If the war is considerably prolonged without completely routing the Japanese, will the Communist Party agree to a peace and recognize Japan’s role in the northeast (Manchuria)?

ANSWER: No, the Chinese Communist Party as well as the people of entire China will not permit Japan to retain one inch of China’s territory.8

QUESTION: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy to be followed in this

---

7 These two sentences are added to Snow’s version in line with Mao’s. – Editor.
8 This entire section of the question and answer is added to Snow’s according to Mao’s version.
“war of liberation”?  
ANSWER: The strategy should be that of [the employment of our main forces in] a war of movement over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in wide theatres of war and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of manoeuvre10 rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines and heavy fortifications.

This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be a war of manoeuvre. Positional11 warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary strategic importance.

Geographically, the theatre of war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a slow-moving war-machine like Japan’s cautiously feeling its way in front of fierce actions [of our forces].12 Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defence of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerilla detachments among the peasantry What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the [vast]13 latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the revolutionary peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death.

It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communications [against guerilla raids],14 and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, War-machines, and so forth. A point -will

---

9 This is added to Snow’s in line with Mao’s version. – Editor.
10 Mao points out parenthetically that several Chinese translations from Snow’s English text mistook this form of warfare for “guerilla warfare”. Elsewhere in the present translation of Mao’s work “war of movement” or “mobile warfare” is used consistently instead of “war of manoeuvre. – Editor.
11 “Fortified warfare” instead of “positional warfare” in Snow’s version. – Editor.
12 Snow’s version is: “…in front of fierce rear-guard actions. Deep-line…” – Editor.
13 This qualifying word, missing in Snow’s version, is added here in line with an emphasizing clause in Mao’s.—Editor.
14 A phrase missing in Snow’s, is here added in line with Mao’s. – Editor.
be reached where it, will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign help. Japan’s economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines.

All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan’s army of occupation from China.

Japanese officers and soldiers captured and disarmed by us will be welcomed and will be well-treated. They will not be killed. They will be treated in a brotherly way. Every method will be adopted to make the Japanese soldiers stand up and oppose their own Fascist officers. Our slogan will be: Unite and oppose the common oppressors.

Ten months of war have proved and the future will continue to prove the correctness of the above.

On August 19, 1937, a little over a month after the Lukow Ch’iao incident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly pointed out the following in its “Resolutions on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party”:

“The Lukow Ch’iao battles and the occupation of Pep’ing and Tientsin are but the beginning of Japan’s wholesale attack on China Proper. The Japanese aggressors have begun their nation-wide military mobilization. Their allegation ‘to refrain from extended operation’ is but a smoke-screen to shield their advance.

“The resistance at Lukow Ch’iao has become the starting point of a nation-wide war of resistance on the part of China.

“A new stage has begun in China’s political situation—a stage of actual war of resistance. The stage of war preparation has passed. The central task for the present stage is: Mobilize every force for victory in the war.

“The pivot of victory lies in the development of the war, which has already been started as a total war of resistance of the whole people. Only through such a war may victory be finally won.

“Because of the presence now of serious weaknesses in the war, frequent defeats, withdrawals, internal disention and treachery, temporary and partial compromise and other unfavourable conditions may occur in the course of the fighting. The loss of Pep’ing and T’ientsin is the most serious lesson we learned since the loss of the four eastern provinces (Manchuria and Jehol). Hence the war must be looked upon as a difficult and trying war of long endurance. But we believe that the war already started will, with the endeavour of our entire people, break through all obstacles, develop and march forward.” (Chaifan—Emancipation—No. 15, p. 6.)

The correctness of the above has been proved by ten months of war and will

---

15 The word is substituted for “oppressors” in Snow’s version, in line with Mao’s. – Editor.
16 By the context of this Treatise, “China Proper” includes Manchuria but excludes Mongolia, Tibet, Chinghai and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). – Translator.
continue to be proved by future developments.

Idealist and mechanistic tendencies are the source of all erroneous approaches and methodology. People with such tendencies approach a problem subjectively and one-sidedly, arguing without any basis except their pure imagination. Sometimes they take hold of a single or temporary phenomenon and exaggerate it, treating it as an entity, thus giving rise to erroneous arguments. But such people fall into two categories; the one errs fundamentally and consistently and is difficult to correct while the other errs only occasionally and is easy to correct. Both, however, must be corrected since both tendencies are erroneous. Correct conclusions can be reached only through an objective and comprehensive point of view in contrast to idealist and mechanistic tendencies in dealing with war problems.

II. THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM

Why is the anti-Japanese war a war of long endurance? Why will the final victory come to China? What are the bases for these opinions?

The basis of the whole problem lies in the fact that the Sino-Japanese War is none other than a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan in the fourth decade of the Twentieth Century. The following contrasting features may be observed in the way of an analysis:

In the case of Japan, first, she is a powerful imperialist country, ranking first in the Orient and counted as one of five, or six outstanding imperialist countries in the entire world in military, economic and political organizational power. This is the basic condition for Japan’s invasion of China and the reason why the war is inevitable and China cannot win a quick decision.

But, secondly, the imperialistic social-economic character of Japan gives rise to the imperialistic character of her war, which is retrogressive and barbarous, Japanese imperialism in the fourth decade of the Twentieth Century has been forced by its internal and external contradictions to engage in an unprecedented large scale war of adventure as well as to approach the eve of its final collapse. Viewed from the course of social evolution Japan is no longer in a stage of growth. Her war will not lead to a state of prosperity as desired by her ruling class but to its opposite—the death of Japanese imperialism. This is what is meant by the retrogressive nature of Japan’s war. Coupled with this is the military-feudal character of her imperialism which gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of her war, rousing class antagonism within her own country and the opposition of the Chinese nation (the opposition of the entire Chinese people to the rulers of Japan) as well as the enmity of the majority of the states and peoples of the world. The retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan’s war constitutes the main basis for its sure defeat.

Thirdly, although Japan’s war is fought on the basis of her strong military, economic and political-organizational power, it also proceeds on a basis niggardly gifted by nature, as despite the strength of Japan’s military, economic and organizational power, the country is comparatively small and her human, military, financial and material resources are far from enough. Seeking replenishment through war,
the Japanese rulers will also reach the opposite of their aim, i.e., the war will increase their difficulties and exhaust what they already have had.

Fourthly and lastly, although Japan may obtain aid from the Fascist countries, she will also bring about a greater opposing force on an international scale. This opposing force will grow eventually, countering her supporting forces and finally bring pressure to bear "upon Japan itself. This is the law of diminishing aid for the forces of reaction which ensues from the very nature of Japan’s war.

To summarize: Japan is favoured by her strong forces for war. But she is handicapped by the retrogressive and barbarous character of her war, by her deficient human and material resources and by the dearth of international support. These are Japan’s characteristics.

In the case of China, we are, in the first place, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. All revolutionary movements to liberate us from this status—starting from the Opium Wars, the T’aip’ing Rebellion, the Reforms of 1898, the Revolution of 1911 to the Great Revolution of the Northern Expedition (1925-27)—have been seriously disrupted and we remain a semi-colonial, semi-feudal and weak country. We are far inferior to our enemy in our military, economic and political-organizational power. This, again, is the basis of the inevitability of the war and the impossibility for China to win a quick victory.

But, secondly, the accumulative movements for liberation during this past century have made the China of today different from that of any historical epoch as they have steed the Chinese despite the disruption by antagonistic forces both within and without. Though militarily, economically, politically and culturally China is still weak in relation to Japan, yet there are today more progressive factors as compared with any period of her past. The possibility of long enduring and ultimately victorious war in China’s present fight for liberation lies precisely on this progressive basis. China is rising as the morning sun, in contrast to the decadence of Japanese imperialism. Her war is a progressive one. From this progressive character ensues the just character of the war. Because of the justness of the war it is possible to unify the nation, arouse the sympathy of the people in the enemy country and rally the support of a majority of the nations in the world.

Thirdly, China is a very big country—big territory, rich resources, enormous population and large armies—and is capable of keeping up a long war in contrast to Japan.

Fourthly and lastly, the broad international support for China resulting from both the retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan’s war and the progressiveness and justness of China’s war is again in contrast to Japan’s dearth of support.

To summarize: China is hampered by the weakness of her war power, but her asset consists in the progressive and just character of her war as well as her bigness and her abundant international support. These are characteristic of China.

The strength of Japan’s military, economic and political-organizational power as contrasted with the retrogressive and barbarous character of her war, the deficiency in her man and material resources and her unfavourable international situation on
the one hand and the comparative weakness of China’s military, economic and political-organizational power in contrast to her progressive epoch and the progressiveness and justness of war as well as her being a big country capable to keep up a war of long endurance coupled with the support of the majority of the nations and peoples of the world on the other hand—these constitute the basic, characteristic contradictions in the Sino-Japanese War. These characteristics have conditioned and are conditioning the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the opposing sides. They have conditioned and are conditioning the long enduring nature of the war and China’s ultimate victory. The war is a contest of these characteristics. They will evolve in the course of the war, each according to its own nature and give rise to all future developments.

These characteristics exist in reality and are not fictitiously created to mislead people. They together constitute the total basic elements of the war and are not merely incomplete fragments. They run like a red thread through all the big and small problems and all stages of operations of both sides and are not something which can be dispensed with. Wrong conclusions would be drawn in regard to the Sino-Japanese War if these were forgotten. Opinions thus conceived may seem correct at a certain moment, but the course of the war will eventually prove their fallacy. We shall now proceed to examine all the problems brought forward on the basis of these characteristics.
CHAPTER TWO

CHOICE: NEITHER DEFEAT NOR QUICK VICTORY

I. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL EXTERMINATION

The national extermination-ists, having observed the enemy’s relative strength and our weakness, advocated in the past: “War of resistance means [China’s] extermination.” Now they say: “Further fighting means extermination.” These people cannot be convincingly refuted by merely stating that the enemy’s country is small despite her strength and China is big despite her weakness. They could point to the Mongols’ destruction of the Sung and the Manchus’ destruction of the Ming dynasties to prove that a small but strong country can destroy a big but weak country as well as backward country can destroy an advanced one. If we refused to accept proofs from ancient history, they could again point to India’s subjugation by Great Britain as evidence that a small but strong capitalist country can destroy a big but weak and backward country. Hence other bases must be presented to silence all national extermination-ists and to convince them to their heart’s content, as well as to supply sufficient arguments to all those engaged in propaganda work for the winning over of the ignorant, wavering elements and for the strengthening of the latter’s faith in the war of resistance.

What should be the basis to be brought forward? It should be the characteristics of the epoch, the concrete manifestation, of which is Japan’s retrogression and dearth of support and China’s progress and abundance of support.

Our war is none other than a war fought between China and Japan in the fourth decade of the Twentieth Century. In the case of our enemy, he is first of all a dying imperialistic power in a period of retrogression, differing from England during the period of her subjugation of India when her (England’s—Ed.) capitalism was advancing, as well as from the Japan of the European war of twenty years ago. The present war has been started on the eve of the general collapse of imperialism, first of all of Fascism, and it is precisely in anticipation of this that the enemy ventures upon this war as a last desperate attempt to escape death. Thus what will be destroyed as a result of the war will not be China but the ruling group of Japanese imperialism. This will be an inevitable necessity. Moreover, Japan’s war has been started in a period in which nations of the world are either in the midst of war or are preparing for a war against barbarous aggression while China’s interests have been intimately interlocked with those of most of the nations and peoples of the world. This is the root of the situation in which Japan has aroused and is intensifying the opposition of these nations and peoples.

Now take China into consideration. She can no longer be compared with any epoch in her history. A semi-colonial and semi-feudal society is characteristic of her and thus she is termed a weak country. But meanwhile she is in an advancing era of history which is the main basis for her eventual victory over Japan. The progressiveness of the anti-Japanese war implies neither merely progress in
general, nor the degree of progressiveness of Abyssinia, in her war against Italy, nor the progressiveness of the T’ai-P’ing Rebellion or the 1911 Revolution; it implies the progressiveness of today’s China.

Wherein lies this progressiveness? It lies in the fact that China is no longer a completely feudal country, that in China there is already capitalism, that there, are already a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, that there are already broad masses who have awakened or are awakening, that there are the Kuomintang and the Communist Parties, that there are politically advanced armies, and that there are decades of revolutionary traditions, especially those of the last fifteen years. These traditions have educated both the Chinese people and their political parties which have brought about today’s unity against the enemy. If it can be said that without the experience of 1905 there could be no victory of 1917 in Russia, then it can be said that without the experience of the last fifteen years there would be no victory for China’s war against Japan. So much for China’s internal situation.

The international situation frees China’s war from isolation and this is also unprecedented in history. Both China’s and India’s wars in past history were fought single-handedly. It is only today that we are met by unprecedentedly broad and deep people’s movements throughout the world. These movements have already given and are giving support to China. It was international support which contributed to Russia’s victory in 1917, but the scale of that support cannot compare with either the breadth or depth of today’s world-wide people’s movement. Meanwhile the existence of the Soviet Union constitutes also a very important factor in present-day international politics and the Soviets will definitely support China with all their enthusiasm. This is something which was completely non-existent twenty years ago. All these have constituted and constitute today indispensable conditions for China’s ultimate victory. Though direct and large-scale aid to China is yet to come in the future, China’s own condition of being a progressive and big country can prolong the duration of the war to promote as well as to await international aid.

In addition to the above, Japan is a relatively small country with smaller territory, fewer resources, fewer people, fewer troops—while China is a big country with bigger territory, more resources, more people and more troops. These contrasting factors add to the contrast of strength and weakness—a contrast of smallness, retrogressiveness and dearth of support on the one hand and bigness, progressiveness and abundance of support on the other. This is the basis for the proposition that China definitely will not be exterminated. The contrast of power has preconditioned Japan’s ability to overrun China to a certain extent for a definite period and the inevitability for China to toil through a stage of hardship, as well as the impossibility of a war of quick decision making inevitable a war of long endurance; yet the three pairs of contrasting factors of a small country, retrogressiveness and dearth of support on the one hand, and a big country, progressiveness and abundance of support on the other, have also preconditioned that Japan’s overrunning of China will not be unhampered but will meet its ultimate defeat while China definitely will not be exterminated but will be finally
victorious.

Why has Abyssinia been subdued? *Firstly*, she is not only weak but also small. *Secondly*, she has not been as advanced as China; she has been a country emerging from ancient slavedom into serfdom without either capitalist development or bourgeois political parties or a Communist Party; there has been no army as advanced as China’s armies, comparable either to China’s Eighth Route Army or the Central Armies. *Thirdly*, she has not been able to wait for international help and her war has been isolated. *Fourthly* and most important of all, there have been errors committed by the leadership of the anti-Italian war. These have been the reasons for Abyssinia’s extermination. But as there still exists in Abyssinia sizable guerilla warfare, the fatherland of the Abyssinians may be recovered later under changing international conditions if these operations can be tenaciously kept up.

If the national extermination-ists point to the failures of China’s liberation movement in the history of her recent past to prove their propositions of “war means extermination” and “further flighting means extermination,” the gist of our answer will also be found in the difference of time. The situation in China, Japan or the world now is in each case different from the past.

Japan is stronger than before while China’s semicolonial and semi-feudal status has not yet been changed and she is still a weak country. This is a serious handicap for her. The reality remains that Japan can still control her own people as well as take advantage of international conflicts for her invasion of China. But in the long course of the war there will be changes in the opposite direction. These changes have not yet come about in reality, but they will take place in the future. This is a point which the national extermination-ists refuse to face.

In China, new personnel, new political parties, new armies and a new anti-Japanese policy different from the policy followed for over a decade, are not only in existence but will also develop progressively. Though China’s liberation movements in past history have been frequently disrupted, depriving her of a possibility today of greater accumulation of strength to carry on the present war against Japan (which fact serves as a painful historical lesson which should restrain us from any further mutual destruction of our own revolutionary forces), yet with whatever forces we have to serve us as the basis for our greater exertion, we will be able to forge ahead to increase our war strength. The great anti-Japanese national united front indicates the general direction in which to exert our efforts.

In respect of international aid to China, it can be said that although it is still unavailable either in direct form or on a large scale, direct and abundant aid to us is being contemplated as the international situation to-day is fundamentally different from the past.

There have been peculiar subjective and objective factors responsible for the failure of each and every one of the liberation movements in the recent past, but none of these is applicable to the present situation. Today, despite the presence of many difficult conditions—such as the enemy’s strength and our weakness, the fact that the enemy is only beginning to meet his difficulties while our progress is still far from being satisfactory, etc., etc.—which have pre-conditioned the difficulties of
our war against Japan; there are considerable favourable conditions for our victory. Our difficulties will be overcome and victory will be assured if we would only exert ourselves. These favourable conditions have no similar precedent in any period of our past history. This is why the anti-Japanese war shall not meet with the same fate as any of the past liberation movements.

II. COMPROMISE OR WAR? DEGENERATION OR PROGRESS?

That there is no ground for a theory of national extermination has now been explained. But there are many people who are not national extermination-ists but are patriots who are pessimistic about the current situation. They have two problems in mind: the possibility of compromise with Japan and the improbability of political improvement. These have aroused anxiety and discussion among a large number of people and so far no pivotal point of adequate answers has been found. Let us study them now.

It has already been pointed out that there are social bases for compromise [with the enemy], the presence of which is inevitable as long as these bases exist. But attempts at compromise will not succeed. This can be proved by an examination of the present Japanese, Chinese and international situations.

First, let us take Japan. At the very start of the war we already anticipated the emergence of an atmosphere of compromise if and when the enemy had occupied northern China and the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang, as he could then induce us to surrender. This did happen. However, the crisis was soon over. One of the reasons for this was that the enemy adopted a policy of widespread barbarity and carried out a campaign of open plunder. The consequence of China’s surrender would make each and every Chinese a slave in a subjugated nation.

The enemy’s policy of plunder, which is equivalent to a policy of exterminating our nation, has a material and spiritual aspect, both of which are indiscriminately applied to all Chinese people, irrespective of social status. The upper clashes are of course treated with more politeness in contrast with the lower classes, but this is only a difference in degree and not in principle. Generally it is the extension of the enemy’s programme already applied in the three eastern provinces (i.e. Manchuria) to the interior. Materially it is the plundering of the cloth and food of the general population, driving large masses of the people to hunger and exposure; the plunder of the means of production, destroying and enslaving China’s national capital funds. Spiritually it is the robbing of the national consciousness of the Chinese people, forcing every Chinese to become a submissive subject and reducing his or her status to that of a cow or a horse and permitting the retention of not even a tiny bit of Chinese character.

This is the barbarous policy which the enemy is going to extend to the interior of China. His appetite is insatiable and he has no intention to stop the war. The programme announced by the enemy’s Cabinet on January 16 is still being firmly carried out and cannot but be carried out. This situation has exasperated all classes of the Chinese people. This is the inevitable outcome of the retrogressive and barbarous character of the enemy’s war. China’s inescapable fate has brought about her stand of absolute opposition [to Japan].
It may again be anticipated that at a certain moment in the future the enemy will once more try to induce us to surrender and certain national exterminationists will renew their activity. It is very probable that they would even engage in an international conspiracy, as they would be able to find their kind in England, America and France, and especially among the upper classes in England. But the general trend of the times shall frustrate their attempts to surrender China. The unrelenting character and the extraordinary barbarity of Japan’s war has conditioned one aspect of the problem.

Secondly, let us consider China’s case. There are three uncompromising factors for war in China. One is the Kuomintang whose history, leadership, and majority of members are all possibilities for a firm execution of the war. Another one is the Communist Party whose firmness in the war is not even doubted by the enemy. Still another is—all the other parties and groups and the people of the entire nation, as they all realize that compromise means slavery and national extermination. An absolute majority of them is opposed to compromise and supports the war of resistance. These three, while uniting with each other, also keep a vigilant watch on each other. Whoever resorts to compromise becomes a traitor condemned to popular capital punishment. Anyone unwilling to be labelled a traitor would have to join solidly with all for a determined war of resistance. Thus compromise can hardly succeed.

Thirdly, let us consider the international situation. Excepting Japan’s allies and certain elements in the upper strata of the other nations the entire world situation is disadvantageous for China’s compromise with Japan but favourable to her war against the Japanese. This factor gives rise to hope in China, as everyone in the country now expects an increasing amount of international aid. This is not an empty hope. The existence of the Soviet Union has especially encouraged our war effort. The Soviet Union, never so strong as now, has always linked her fate with China’s. Moreover, in line with the teachings of Lenin, the Soviet Union feels duty-bound to render aid to all revolutionary wars of the oppressed nations. This is in direct contrast to the intentions of those elements of the upper strata in all the capitalist countries whose only purpose is to make profit. The non-isolated nature of China’s war comes from international support in general as well as Soviet aid in particular.

The geographical proximity of China and the Soviet Union is a factor which increases Japan’s peril and facilitates China’s conduct of the war. But the proximity of China and Japan also increases China’s war difficulty and differentiates the Sino-Japanese War from the American War of Independence in relation to England. However, it must not be overlooked that the advantage to China due to Smo-Soviet proximity is much greater than to America due to the geographical situation that obtained in the American war.

Now we may conclude: The danger of compromise is present, but it can be overcome, because though the enemy’s policy may undergo certain partial change, it cannot be altered fundamentally. There are social bases for compromise within China itself, but the majority of the people are opposed to compromise. There is also
a part of the international forces in favour of our compromise with Japan, but the main forces are on the side of our war. The sum total of these three factors forms a greater power against compromise and for war.

Now let us take up the second problem which is China’s political progress, a factor indispensable for the prosecution of the war. Greater political improvement will reinforce our firmness which in turn will result in greater political improvement. But firmness in the war remains the basic factor. Serious defects do exist in the party, Government, army, and the people. These are historical accumulations of irrationalities which are worrying and upsetting broad sections of our patriots. But the experiences in the war have proved that the reforms in the last ten months are equal to those of many years in the past. Thus there should be no basis for pessimism. Though historically accumulated corruption is impeding the growth of our war forces, handicapping our chances of victory, and increasing our war casualties, we are not permitted to stand still by conditions within our country as well as those in Japan and the world. The presence of impediments, or corrupt practices, slows down our progress. Thus progress on the one hand and its slowness on the other are characteristic of the present situation. Hence a gap is created between the urgent requirements of the war and the actual achievements, much to the distress of our patriots. But we are in a war and the war will overcome corruption and degeneration.

A revolutionary war is an anti-toxin, sweeping out one’s enemy’s venom as well as cleansing one’s own stains. The power of a war is tremendous, capable of transforming everything. The Sino-Japanese War will bring about a reconstruction of both China and Japan. As long as China holds fast to the united front and the firm execution of the war, a new Japan will surely arise out of the old Japan and a new China out of the old China. Both the men and materials of China as well as of Japan will be transformed during and after this war.

It is therefore correct for us to link up the tasks of war and national reconstruction, when we say that Japan will also be transformed we mean that the war of aggression on the part of her rulers will end in defeat and may possibly give rise to a revolution of the Japanese people. The victory of this revolution would mean the reconstruction of Japan. This is closely linked to China’s war and it is a contingency to be borne in mind.

To repeat: *war alters everything*. This should be our firm conviction from which should ensue our determined efforts.

**III. THE THEORY OF NATIONAL EXTERMINATION IS WRONG; THE THEORY OF A QUICK VICTORY IS ALSO WRONG**

We have made a comparative study of the basic contradictions between ourselves and the enemy in the matter of strength, size, progress or retrogress and support. We have refuted national extermination-ism and explained why compromise is difficult and why there are possibilities for political improvement.

The national extermination-ists so emphasize the contradiction in strength as to make it the entire basis of their argument, ignoring all the other contradictions. It is their one-sidedness that brings forth only the contrast in strength and their
subjectivity that inflates this one aspect into the whole. It is from the point of the whole that their arguments are erroneous and groundless.

To those who are neither national extermination-ists nor pessimists but are only confused and disheartened temporarily and partially by the relative strength of ourselves and the enemy or by the corruption within our country, we wish to point out that the source of their opinion is also a one-sided and subjective tendency. But they can be easily corrected once they are reminded of it, as they are patriots who err only occasionally.

However, the theory of a quick victory is also wrong. Its advocates either completely forget the contradiction in relative strength while remembering only the other contradictions, and in the meantime often exaggerating China’s advantages beyond recognition; or substitute the relative strength at one time and one place for the whole, hiding a mountain from view, by a leaf. In a word, they lack courage to face the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. Their frequent ignoring of this fact covers up one aspect of the truth. Meanwhile they also lack the courage to recognize the limitations of our own advantage—either through bluffing or through timidity—thus covering up another aspect of the truth.

The result of all this is the commission of big or small mistakes. This also is to be blamed on subjectivity and one-sidedness. These friends are nevertheless good-hearted and their aspirations are patriotic. But Sirs, your aspirations are certainly lofty, yet your estimations are wrong and you will hit your head against a stone wall by following your plan. Because estimates not in conformity with reality will not lead actions to the desired end. Insistent attempts along this line will end in the defeat of the army and extermination of the nation—consequences identical to defeatism—and must therefore be rejected.

Do we deny the danger of national extermination? By no means. We recognise liberation and extermination as alternate perspectives confronting China. The two are engaged in violent battle. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert extermination. The basic condition for liberation is China’s own progress, supplemented by the enemy’s predicaments and international aid to us. We differ from the extermination-ists in that we recognize the co-existence of the possibilities of extermination and liberation from an objective and comprehensive point of view, while emphasizing the greater possibility of and the conditions for liberation and trying our best to secure these conditions. The extermination-ists recognise subjectively and one-sidedly only the possibility of national extermination, while denying the possibility of liberation and refusing to point out the conditions for liberation as well as refraining from doing anything to secure these conditions. We, too, recognise the presence of compromising tendencies and corruption and degeneration. But we also see the presence of other tendencies and phenomena and discern the superiority of the latter over the former as well as the violent conflict between them. We point out the conditions for the continuance of both and we try our best to overcome compromising tendencies and degenerating conditions. Because of this we are not pessimistic, in contrast to the pessimists.

We do not dislike a quick victory. Anybody would like to clear out the “devils” by
the next morning. But we point out that without definite conditions a quick victory exists only in their subjective imagination but not in actual reality. It is because of this that we take an objective and comprehensive estimation of the situation between us and the enemy, point out that the only way to our ultimate victory lies in a strategy based on a war of long endurance, and reject the groundless theory of a quick victory. We stand for throwing our entire effort to secure all the conditions required by our final victory. The greater and quicker our achievement in securing these conditions the greater will be the guarantee for our victory and the shorter will be the time we will take to achieve success. We think this is the only way to quicken the process of the war and the cheap empty theory of a quick victory must be rejected.
CHAPTER THREE
WAR OF LONG ENDURANCE
I. WHY A WAR OF LONG ENDURANCE

We now come to the problem of the war of long endurance. A correct answer to this problem can only be derived, by a comparison of the total basic factors between ourselves and the enemy. For example, a mere statement that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country may lead to the pitfall of national exterminationism. Because it is neither reasonable nor practical to envisage a war of endurance by simply pitching the weak against the strong. The same conclusion would result by looking merely into the factor of size or progressiveness and retrogressiveness, or the amount of outside support. It is just as commonplace for a small country to annex a big one as for a big country to conquer a small one. An advanced but weak country or entity has often been destroyed by a big yez backward country or entity. The amount of support is an important, but auxiliary factor, its extent being determined by the conditions of basic factors within both ourselves and the enemy. “Heaven helps those who help themselves” is a scientific truth. Therefore, when we say that the anti-Japanese war is a war of long endurance we have in view the entire inter-relationship of the factors between us and the enemy. The enemy’s strength and our weakness points to the possibility of our extermination. But the enemy is not favoured while we are by other factors. The enemy’s advantages may be decreased and his disadvantages increased through our efforts. While on the contrary, our advantages may be increased and disadvantages reduced through the same. That is why we can win our final victory and escape extermination while the enemy will hardly be able to avoid either defeat or the collapse of his entire imperialist system in the end.

Since there is only one advantage on the side of the enemy and only one disadvantage on our side, why is it that with all the enemy’s remaining disadvantages and our remaining advantages, there is not resultant parity but instead a superior position for the enemy and an inferior position for us? But evidently the problem cannot be approached in such a formalistic way. The fact is that the difference between our strength and the enemy’s is too great at present. For the time being his disadvantages have not been and cannot be developed to the extent that will reduce his advantage to the necessary degree and our advantages have not been and cannot be developed to such an extent as to make up for our disadvantages. Therefore the result has not been parity but disproportion.

Though the enemy’s superior strength over us has been affected by our efforts in maintaining the united front and keeping up the war, the basic relation has not been altered. Hence during a certain stage of the war the enemy will be victorious and we will be beaten to a certain extent. However, both we and the enemy are confined to certain degree of defeat or victory in a certain stage, but there will be no complete defeat or victory. Why? Because, in the first place, the status quo ante of enemy strength and our weakness was a relative but not an absolute one. Secondly,
a relative situation is further maintained by our efforts in consolidating the united front and, keeping up the war. In contrast with the status quo ante, the enemy’s strength has been reduced by other unfavourable factors, but not to the extent that would eliminate his superiority; while our weakness has been made up by other favourable factors, but not to the extent as would alter our inferiority. The result now is the 'enemy’s relative strength and superiority and our relative weakness and inferiority. Neither of these is absolute. Hence each is confined to a definite degree of victory or defeat in a definite stage and a long enduring war is thus made possible. This situation is also created by a change of the original relation of strength between ourselves and the enemy into a relative strength and superiority for the enemy and relative weakness and inferiority for us through our effort in maintaining the united front and in keeping up the fighting in the course of the war.

But the situation is changing continuously. As long as we make use of correct military and political policy, avoid basic mistakes and exert our best in the course of the war, the enemy’s disadvantages and our advantages will both continue to develop and react on the relative position until a new stage is reached in which there will be a major change in the situation, leading to the enemy’s defeat and our victory.

For the time being the enemy can still make use of his strength which has not been fundamentally weakened by our fighting. The deficiency in his human, military, financial and material power is still unable to halt his advance which may yet be pushed to a certain limit. The factor of the retrogressiveness and barbarity of his war which gives rise to class antagonism in his own country and the opposition of the Chinese nation has not yet brought about a situation fundamentally impeding his further penetration. The factor of his international isolation is in the process of development, but has not yet placed him in complete isolation. Therefore there can be no quick victory for our war and a war of long endurance is thus conditioned.

In regard to China, her weaknesses as manifested in military, economic, political and cultural aspects have witnessed certain improvements in the ten months of war but these are far from sufficient to halt the enemy’s advance and to enable us to become ready for the counter-offensive. Moreover, the improvements have been necessarily quantitatively impaired. Though all of our favourable conditions are playing an active role, it will yet take us a great deal of effort to stop the enemy and to launch our counter-offensive, by overcoming our corruption and accelerating our progress, which is not an immediate reality as yet. This fact, again, rejects the possibility of quick victory and preconditions a long enduring war.

II. THREE STAGES OF WAR OF LONG ENDURANCE

The war of long endurance between China and Japan will be concretely manifested in three stages. The first stage is the enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defence. The second stage is the enemy’s strategic defence and our preparation for the counteroffensive. The third stage is our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic withdrawal. It is impossible to predict the
concrete situation in the three stages. But certain main tendencies of the war may be indicated by the present conditions. The course of objective reality will be exceedingly rich, tortuous and variable and nobody can write a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese War. But the outlining of the general trend is necessary for strategic directives. Hence despite the fact that an outline may not agree with, but shall be amended by, ensuing realities, the task is still necessary for firm and purposeful strategic directives in the war of long endurance.

The first stage has not yet been concluded up to date. The enemy’s intention is the occupation of Canton, Wuhan, and Lanchow and the linking up of these three points. To accomplish this the enemy would have to despatch an army of at least fifty divisions or a million and a half men in a period of from one and a half to two years and at the expense of over 100 billion dollars. The enemy will encounter immense difficulties in such deep penetration and the consequences will be unthinkable. His attempt to occupy the entire line of Canton-Hankow Railway and the Si-an-Lanchow Highway would be confronted by the most perilous battles and he may not succeed.

But our war plan must envisage the possibility of the enemy’s occupation of the three points and even certain regions beyond for the disposition of our forces in this war of long endurance so that even if and when the enemy succeeds we would be able to cope with him.

The chief form of fighting in this stage shall be mobile warfare, supplemented by guerilla and positional warfare. During the first period of this stage positional warfare played the chief role as a result of subjective mistakes* but it remains a supplementary form when the entire stage is taken into consideration.

In this stage China has achieved a broad united front and the country has been united as never before. Though the enemy has tried to induce us to surrender and will continue to try, hoping thereby to realize his plan of a quick decision in subjugating the whole of China at little cost, he has failed in the past and will hardly succeed in the future. Considerable progress has been made by China in this stage, despite her great losses. The progressive achievements will become the main basis to continue the war in the second stage. Direct international aid on a mass scale has not been rendered to China in this stage, but such aid has begun to come, especially from the Soviet Union.

In this stage, the morale of the enemy forces has begun to show signs of decline. The edge of an attacking enemy army has been blunted in the middle period of this stage as compared to the initial period; and it will be worse in the concluding period. There are already indications of financial stringency on the part of the enemy. His people, is beginning to become war- weary, and within his high command “war worries” are raising their head, giving rise to pessimism regarding the outcome of the war.

Owing to the enemy’s insufficient forces and our stubborn resistance, the enemy will be forced to set a limit to his strategic offensive in the second stage, ending the offensive after having reached the limit and entering a stage in which his task will be the retention of territories already occupied. This object of his in the new stage is
to be brought about through the superficial organisation of puppet regimes and the exhaustive plundering of the possessions of the Chinese inhabitants. But he will be confronted by stubbornly-fought guerilla warfare.

Guerilla warfare will have been developed during the first stage, taking advantage of the enemy's unguarded rear, and many bases will have been set up, fundamentally menacing the defence of his conquest. Hence there will be large-scale fighting in the second stage. But the main form of warfare will be guerilla supplemented by mobile warfare. At this stage China will still be able to maintain a large regular army. But since on the one hand the enemy will be on strategic defensive in the big cities and main lines of communications under his occupation, and on the other hand China will not be ready to launch a strategic counteroffensive due to the yet uncompleted technological equipment; large numbers of the regulars, except those defending the front lines, will have to be switched to the rear of the enemy in a more dispersed disposition. With the backing of all the regions not yet reached by the enemy and in co-ordination with armed people's groups, these regulars shall launch a broad and violent guerilla warfare against the enemy occupied regions and, wherever possible, engage him in mobile warfare to destroy him, such as is now taking place in Shansi province.

Fighting in this stage will be ruthless. The country will be seriously devastated. But if victories can be achieved by the guerillas in the most efficient way, it is possible to restrict the enemy's occupation to only one-third of our territory with the remaining two-thirds in our hands. This will be a great defeat for the enemy and a major victory for us. By then the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into three categories: enemy bases, guerilla bases, and guerilla areas contested by both.

The duration of this stage will be conditioned by the relative decrease or increase in our or the enemy's strength and by changes in international situation. In general, we should be prepared for a much longer duration [than what might be the actual case] to enable us to pull through an exceedingly trying journey. This will be a very painful period for China. Economic hardships and treacherous conspiracies will become rather outstanding twin features. The enemy will plunge into large scale activities to destroy China's united front. The various traitors' regimes in the occupied territories will merge into a so-called "unified Government." The loss of great cities and economic privations will prompt wavering elements to air their compromising proposals. Pessimism will spread threateningly. To cope with these the task shall be the mobilization of the people of the entire country to unite with one heart and to support the war unhesitatingly. The united front should be broadened and reinforced. Pessimism of all shades and every proposal for compromise must be rejected. The country must be urged to struggle on unflinchingly and to carry out new war policies. This trying journey must be completed by all means.

In this stage the entire country must be rallied to-support determinedly a unified government of the nation and dissensions and secession movements must be opposed. Technological improvements, army reform, people's mobilization, and preparations for the counter-offensive shall all be planned well in advance.
In this stage the international situation will become more unfavourable for Japan. Proposals along the lines of Chamberlain’s “realism” to accommodate “accomplished facts” may still be brought forward, but the chief international forces will advance a step further in giving aid to China. Japan’s threat to the South Seas and Siberia will be increased, and war may even break out as a result.

As far as the enemy himself is concerned, scores of his divisions will be inextricably bogged in China. This tremendous force will be worn out by widespread guerilla warfare and the people’s anti-Japanese movement it will suffer from attrition and become increasingly homesick and war-weary. It will be spiritually disintegrated. Though it must be conceded that Japan will make certain gains in its plundering activities, the deficiency in its capital fund and the activities of the guerillas will frustrate its attempt at quick and sweeping robbery. The failure of the enemy’s attempts in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) is a good illustration.

This second stage is the transitory as well as the most trying stage of the entire war. But it is also the pivot of China’s future. Whether she will become independent or sink further into a colonial status is not conditioned by the retention or loss of the great cities in the first stage but will be determined by the amount of the entire nation’s effort in the second. If the united front is maintained, fighting is continued and a war of long endurance is insisted upon, China will grow in power in this stage and change from a weak into a strong country. This will be the second act of the three-act play of China’s war of resistance. The diligence of the entire cast will create a chain of superbly thrilling scenes in the final act.

The third stage is the stage of counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. This depends mainly upon China’s own preparations in the preceding stage and her continuously growing forces in the present. But it is not enough to depend merely upon her own strength. International support and changes within the enemy country must also be counted upon. Otherwise there can be no final victory. Hence China’s international propaganda and diplomacy must be emphasized. These tasks are not to be accomplished in short order. Bloody battles must be fought to recover extensive occupied regions.

This will be no more a stage of strategic defensive, it will be now changed into strategic counter-offensive. The offensive will take the form of strategic advance. The strategy of inner lines will disappear, gradually changing into one of outer lines. The war will not be concluded until the army has fought to the bank of the Yalu River (boundary between Manchuria and Korea).

However, if a revolution should break out in Korea and our aid should be solicited, the war thus occasioned would be outside the limit of the present one.

The third stage is the last stage of the war of long endurance. What is meant by “war to the last” is to go through the entire course of this stage.

The chief form of fighting in this stage will remain mobile warfare. But positional warfare will become more important. If the existing conditions render positional defence in the first stage unimportant, then the changed conditions and the requirements of war tasks will accord a very important role to positional attacks in the third stage. Guerilla warfare will now again become supplementary to mobile
and positional warfare in a co-ordinated strategy, in contrast to its being the chief form in the second stage.

The long duration and the ruthlessness of the war is thus made obvious. The enemy will not be able to conquer all of China, but he will be able to occupy many areas for a relatively long period. China will not be able to clean out Japan in short order, yet the greater part of the territory will remain intact. Ultimately the enemy will be defeated and we will become victorious, but our course will be trying and difficult.

In the course of such a long and ruthless war, the Chinese people will become well-trained. The parties participating in the war will also be trained for collaboration as against mutual antagonism, which leads to national extermination. The united front; must always be maintained, as it is the only way to keep up the fighting, to assure final victory. Unity and uninterrupted fighting will overcome all difficulties. When we leave the trying path behind us we will be marching on the smooth road to victory. This is the natural logic of war.

Changes in the relative strength between us and the enemy will take place through the three stages in the following manner. In the first stage the enemy is superior and we are inferior. Our inferiority changes in opposite directions between the pre-war period and the end of this stage. The one is a downward change. China’s original inferiority will be furthered by the war losses in this stage which means a decrease in territory, population, economic assets and cultural institutions. Relatively greater decrease may be witnessed towards the end of the stage, especially in the economic aspect. This fact will be utilized as the basis for their line by the national extermination-ists and compromisers. But the other direction must be noticed —the upward change. This consists of war experiences, military and political improvement, people’s mobilization, new directions of cultural development, emergence of guerilla warfare and increasing of international aid. What moves downward in the first stage is old qualities and quantities, especially quantities. What moves upward consists of new qualities and quantities, especially qualities. The upward change affords us a basis for our war of long endurance and its final victory.

There are also two kinds of changes for the enemy. The downward one consists of hundreds of thousands of casualties, destruction of weapons and ammunition decline of military morale, discontent of the home population, shrinking trade, expenditure of over a hundred billion dollars and condemnation by international opinion. This gives us another basis for the long-endurance war and final victory.

But we must also keep in sight the enemy’s change in the upward direction—extension of territory, population and resources. This then becomes a basis of our long war, ruling out the possibility for a quick victory. It also affords a basis for the extermination-ist and compromising agitation.

But we must understand the non-permanent and partial character of this kind of the enemy’s change. He is an imperialist power on the eve of collapse and his occupation in China will be temporary. The stubborn resistance of China’s regulars and the violent development of guerilla warfare will restrict his occupation to
practically narrow strips of land and this will in turn give rise to conflicts between Japan and other foreign countries. Moreover, on the basis of the experience in the three eastern provinces, Japan will have to expand her capital fund over and above profits from her investment for a long time to come.

All these constitute the bases both to reject extermination-ist and compromising proposals and to confirm the war of long endurance which will end in victory.

The above-mentioned opposite changes will continue to develop in the second stage though their concrete shapes cannot be foreseen. But it may be generally surmised that Japan will continue to decline while China will continue to rise. For example, Japan’s military and financial power will be spent in enormous quantities in coping with China’s guerilla warfare, her home population will become more discontented, the morale of her troops will decline further, and her international position will become more isolated. In the case of China, there will be greater political, military, cultural reforms and improvements in people’s mobilization; guerilla warfare will be further developed; there will be a certain degree of new economic development in respect of small-scale industries in the interior and agriculture over extensive areas; international support will increase gradually until it reaches a new phase entirely different from today.

The second stage may require a longer period to complete. The relative strength between us and the enemy will be radically altered. China will gradually rise and Japan will gradually sink, until China leaves behind her inferiority and Japan is forced to part with her superiority, both reaching a state of parity. A still further development will reverse the original positions of the two. By this time China will have generally completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will emerge on the stage actually to launch it to drive out the enemy.

It should be repeated here that what is said about the change of inferiority into superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive, shall include the growth of China’s own strength, the growth of Japan’s difficulties and the increase of international support. It is the sum total of these that will consummate China’s change and counter-offensive.

On account of the unevenness of China’s political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage in the initial period will not appear in a neat and uniform fashion throughout the country, but will be local, irregular, and undulating. The enemy will not refrain from attempts to break China’s united front by all means. Therefore China’s internal consolidation will have to be given even more attention so that the development of the strategic counter-offensive may not be disrupted by internal dissensions. In this period the international situation will become immensely favourable to China. China’s task will be to utilise this for her complete liberation and the establishment of an independent democratic state. This will in the meantime help the anti-Fascist movement of the world.

From inferiority to parity and then to superiority on the part of China and from superiority to parity and then to inferiority on the part of Japan; from defensive to stalemate and then to counter-offensive on the part of China and from offensive to defensive and then to withdrawal on the part of Japan—this will be the course of
the Sino-Japanese War and its inevitable trend.

Now the problem of its conclusion is: Will China be exterminated? Answer: No. The final victory belongs to China. Can China win a quick victory? Answer: No. The war must be of long duration. Are these conclusions correct? I think so.

However, the national extermination-ists and the compromisers will dash forward and say: For China to shift from inferiority to parity her military and economic power must be equal to Japan; from parity to superiority her military and economic power must be greater than Japan; but this is impossible. Hence the above conclusions are wrong.

This is the so-called “weaponism” which is a mechanistic view of war and a subjective and one-sided approach to problems. We are different. We see weapons as well as men. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor which is man and not material. The relation of forces is not merely a relation of military and economic power, but also one of the power of man and his mind. Military and economic power must be controlled by man. If the majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the peoples of the world are on the side of the anti-Japanese war, then where is the superiority of the military, and economic power forcibly controlled by a minority in Japan? If this is not superiority, then will not China possess the superiority despite her control of only an inferior military and economic power?

There is no doubt that China’s military and economic power will be gradually increased as long as the united front is maintained and fighting is continued and that the present military and economic power of the enemy will change in the opposite direction as it will be weakened by the long war and his internal and external contradictions. Under such conditions will not China be able to change to a position of superiority? Moreover, though we still cannot openly count upon large amounts of foreign military and economic power as our own, shall we necessarily be prevented from doing so in the future? If Japan’s enemies are confined not only to China, and if in the future there would be some country devoting a relatively large amount of its military and economic power to conduct an open defence or launch an open attack on Japan as well as to give open aid to us, will not the superiority become more definitely ours? As Japan is a small country fighting a retrogressive and barbarous war in an increasingly isolated international position, and as China is a big country fighting a progressive and just war with increasing international support, will not the present status of superiority and inferiority be definitely altered in the long run?

There is also no basis of a quick victory as the advocates ignore the fact that war is a contest of power and that a strategically decisive engagement cannot be fought and the road to liberation cannot be shortened before definite changes have taken place in the relative fighting strength of the opponents. When translated into practice, their ideas will hit against a stone wall. Perhaps they talk only for the sake of self-satisfaction, not for practical action. Reality will finally step forward and chill these spellbinders with cold water, condemning their empty talk as a lazy man’s desire for a priceless gain. Such spellbinders are already in existence, but
their number is still small. However, it will increase when the war develops into the stages of stalemate and counter-offensive. Meanwhile, if China should incur a larger loss than expected in the first stage and if the duration of the second is unusually prolonged, national extermination-ist and compromising theories will be in vogue. Therefore we should direct our main fire at extermination-ism and compromise while aiming at quick victory advocates only as a secondary target.

The long duration of the war is pre-conditioned. But it cannot be predicted as to exactly how many years and months it will last. This will be entirely conditioned by the degree of change in the relation of forces between us and the enemy. Those who wish to shorten the duration should do nothing else except to exert their utmost to increase our own strength and to reduce the enemy’s. Concretely speaking, it is to try our best to seek more engagements with the enemy and to fight more victorious battles, to wear out the enemy armies, to develop guerilla warfare to reduce enemy occupation to the minimum, to strengthen and broaden the united front until the forces of the entire nation are consolidated, to form new armies and develop new military industries, to hasten political, economic and cultural improvements to mobilize the workers, farmers, merchants, students and all sections of the population, to disintegrate the enemy troops and win over their soldiers, to engage in international propaganda and struggle for foreign support and to win the support of Japan’s own people and the nations oppressed by her. The duration of the war will be shortened only if these are done. There can be no other magic, easy way.
CHAPTER FOUR
IT WILL BE A WORLD WAR!

I. A JIGSAW WAR

It can be foreseen that the long enduring war against Japan will appear as an outstandingly glorious page in the war history of mankind. The jigsaw form of the war is one of the outstanding features. This is the result of the contradictory factors of Japan’s insufficient strength and barbarity as well as China’s progressiveness and extensive territory. Jigsaw wars did occur in past history as illustrated by Russia’s three-year civil war after the October Revolution. But what is outstanding with China’s jigsaw war lies in its particularly long duration and great extension which will break the record in history. This jigsaw war appears in the following forms:

Inner and outer lines—The war against Japan as a whole is fought in inner line operations. But as far as the relation between the main force and the guerillas is concerned, the former is in the inner line while the latter on the outer, a peculiar form of pincer attack on the enemy. The same can be said of the relation between different guerilla areas. Each area alone is in inner line while the other areas are on the outer line, forming numerous firing lines of pincer attack.

With and without rear—It is the main forces which rely upon the general rear of the country and extend their front to the extreme limit of the enemy’s occupation. It is the guerillas who leave our general rear and carry the front to the rear of the enemy. But each guerilla area has its own miniature rear in which unfixed operating lines are established. In contrast with this is a guerilla force despatched from a guerilla area to engage in temporary operations in the rear of the enemy forces located in that area. Such a force has neither a rear nor operating lines. Operations without a rear is a peculiar feature in the revolutionary war under the conditions of a new era, of extensive territories, and of a progressive people with an advanced political party and an advanced army. It ought not to be looked upon with scepticism but should be encouraged. There is nothing horrible in it. On the other hand it has great advantages.

Encirclement and counter-encirclement—Looking at the war as a whole, we are undoubtedly being encircled by the enemy in view of his strategic offensive and outer line operations and our strategic defence and inner line operations. This is the first category of our encirclement by the enemy. However, when we devote a numerically superior force to outer line operations in a campaign or battle in which several enemy columns are advancing upon us from strategic outer lines and encircle each separate enemy column, there is the first category of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Looking now at the guerilla bases in the rear of the enemy, each single base is encircled by the enemy from four sides as in the case of Wutai Shan region or three sides as in the case of north-western Shansi. This is the second category of our encirclement by the enemy. But, if the guerilla bases together with the war fronts of the regulars are viewed as constituting an entire
system, many enemy forces will be in our encirclement. For instance, we have encircled Tat'ung-Pukow Railway Zone from three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern terminal of the railroad) and the city of T'aiyuan from four sides. A number of similar encirclements are also found in Hopei and Shantung provinces. This is the second category of our encirclements of the enemy.

Thus there are two categories of encirclements for each side of the contestants in the war. It looks rather like a game of encirclement chess. The campaign and battle engagements between us and the enemy look like moves to eliminate each other’s chess-pieces while the enemy’s strongholds such as T'aiyuan and our guerilla bases such as Wutai Shan are like the “eye” [or escapements] on the chess-board. However, once such an escapement is formed on the chess-board, it cannot be destroyed any more. This constitutes the mechanics of encirclement chess. The escapement in war may be destroyed. This is the dialectics of war.

If an encirclement chess contest of a world-wide scale is taken into consideration, then there will be a third category of encirclement between us and the enemy which is the contest between the aggression and peace fronts. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, etc., with the former while we counter-encircle Germany, Italy and Japan with the latter.

But our encirclement is like the palm of Buddha which will transfigurate into Mount Sumi lying across the entire universe, ultimately entombing the modern Monkey Monsters of the Fascist aggressors under its bottom, never to lift its load. Therefore, if we can form an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific through our diplomatic efforts, with China as one of the strategic units, with the Japanese people’s movement as another strategic unit, thus knitting a cosmic net from which the Fascist Monkey Monsters can find no escape, then it will be the doomsday for our enemy. In fact, the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism will occur no later and no sooner, than the moment when the framework of this cosmic net is completed. This is not merely an amusing analogy hut the natural trend of the war.

Big and small areas—There is the possibility that the territories occupied by the enemy may amount to the greater half of the area of China Proper while China retains an intact section constituting only the smaller half. This is one situation. But even if this happened the greater half occupied by the enemy might in practice consist of only the big cities, main lines of communications and certain flat lands with the exception of the three eastern provinces. These are of course regions of the first importance, but in point of area they constitute only a smaller half of the occupied territory, the greater half of which would become widely established guerilla areas. This is another situation. If we we beyond China Proper and count in Mongolia, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) Chinghai (Koko Nor) and Tibet, then the unoccupied sections would amount to a greater half in point of area, while the territory under enemy occupation would amount to a lesser half, including the three eastern provinces. This is all another situation.

The section kept intact shall be the general rear of our country in which our Central Government and command is situated and whose importance is of the first order. Great efforts should be concentrated on its development, politically,
militarily, economically, as well as culturally. As the enemy has already transformed our cultural centres into culturally backward regions, we must transform the hitherto culturally backward regions into cultural centres. Meanwhile the development of the extensive guerilla areas is also important and it should proceed along several lines, including cultural development. In general, great rural areas in China will become progressive and enlightened regions while small areas of enemy occupied regions, especially the big cities, will temporarily become dark, backward regions.

Thus it can be seen that the prolonged and extensive war against Japan is a jigsaw war in its military as well as its political, economic and cultural aspects. It will be a wonder in the history of war, a splendid feat of the Chinese people that will excite the heaven and the earth. This war will not only affect China and Japan, impelling both to advance in great strides, but will also affect the entire world, inspiring each nation to march forward, first of all the oppressed nations such as India. Every citizen of China should consciously throw himself or herself into this jigsaw war, which is the shape and form of the Chinese nation’s selfeffort of liberation and the peculiar shape and form of the liberation war of a great semi-colonial country in the fourth decade of the Twentieth Century.

II. FIGHTING FOR PERMANENT PEACE

The enduring nature of China’s war against Japan cannot be separated from a fight for a permanent peace for China and the world. There has been no historical epoch like today when war is approaching permanent peace. The life of mankind has passed through two eras in the past hundreds of thousands of years—man’s peaceful living and his warring living. The first era lasted the longest in history. During that time man’s production was extremely deficient and he fought only against nature. There was neither the necessity nor the possibility for war between groups of men. The second era began probably with the decay of the clan society and lasts till this day. Man’s warring life began as a result of productive development and social differentiation. Though the duration of this era has been only a few thousand years, each nation has engaged in numberless war—wars within nations and between nations. The fighting has become especially extensive and brutal when carried into the imperialist stage of capitalist society. The first imperialist war of twenty years ago was then unprecedented in history, but it will not be unprecedented in the entire history, [if the future is taken into consideration].

Only the war which has now begun can be considered as historically unprecedented, [past, present and future.] And it is also approaching the last war, in other words, approaching a permanent peace of mankind. One-third of the world population is now at war. Look! there is Italy and then Japan; there is Abyssinia, then Spain, and then China. The total population of the belligerents now amounts to almost 600 million or one-third of the world population. Meanwhile, the peculiar feature of the present war is its continuity and its proximity to permanent peace.

Why is it continuous? After the Italian-Abyssinian War, the Italian-Spanish War followed with the participation of Germany. Then followed Jahan’s war with China. What will follow then? There is no question that Hitler will war with the Great
Powers. “Fascism needs war”—this is perfectly correct. Though it cannot be said that there would be no more wars after the wars between Fascism and anti-Fascism have reached a decision and though new wars will probably follow, yet there will be no interruption between the present war and the coming Second World war. Mankind’s war calamity cannot be avoided.

Why is the present war approaching permanent peace? Because it ensues from the general crisis of world capitalism. This crisis compels the capitalist countries to war, first of all compelling, the Fascist countries into war adventures. However, because of the general crisis we are enabled to foresee the result of the war. It will not be the salvation, but the collapse of capitalism. This war will be more extensive and brutal than twenty years ago, and all nations will be inevitably involved. The duration will be very long. It will be a settling of all old accounts. There will be very great suffering for mankind. But, owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the increasing awakening of the peoples of the world, a gigantic revolutionary war will undoubtedly emerge from this war to interfere with all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a war for permanent peace. Even if there should be another warring period after this, it will not be far from the era of permanent world peace.

Once mankind has reached the era of permanent peace, war will never again be desired. Then neither armies, nor warships, nor military planes, nor poison gas will be wanted. Thereafter there will emerge the third era of mankind—an era of eternally warless, peaceful living. Our descendants will not see war for millions of years. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are a part of the war for permanent peace. The Sino-Japanese War involving a total population of over 400 million will occupy an important position in this war. The liberation of the Chinese nation will come from this war. The liberated new China in the future will be inseparable from the liberated-new world in the future. Hence our war against Japan partakes the character of a fight for permanent peace.

There are two kinds of wars in history—revolutionary and counter-revolutionary wars. All progressive wars are revolutionary and all wars impending progress are counter-revolutionary. We Communists are opposed to all counter-revolutionary wars impeding progress but are not opposed to progressive, revolutionary wars. Not only that, we Communists participate actively in the latter. An example of the former is the First World War in which both sides fought for imperialist interests and were therefore equally and firmly opposed by the Communists. The way to oppose this kind of war is to prevent it by all means before it is started and, after it is started, to oppose this war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, whenever and wherever possible.

Japan’s war is a counter-revolutionary war impeding progress which should and is beginning to be opposed by the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people. In the case of China, all sections of our nation, from the Government to the people, from Kuomintang to the Communist Party, and from the regulars to the guerillas, have unfurled their banner of justice in unison, carrying on an anti-aggression, national revolutionary war. Our war is sacred, just, progressive and
peace-seeking. We seek peace for our own country as well as for the world, transient as well as permanent peace.

In order to achieve the above objectives a war giving no quarter must be fought. We must be prepared to sacrifice everything and fight to the last until our aim is reached, despite the immensity of the scale of sacrifice and of the duration of the war, a permanent peace and a permanently brilliant new world has been clearly placed before us. Our faith in the war is based upon such a struggle for permanent peace and a permanently brilliant new world. Fascism and imperialism attempt to prolong the war indefinitely, but we wish to conclude it in a not too distant future.

This can be achieved only with the greatest effort of the majority of mankind. If the 450 million people of China who constitute one quarter of the world’s population can firmly maintain their united front and continue to fight until Japanese imperialism is overthrown and a new China of freedom and equality is created, they will undoubtedly contribute a very great share to the world’s struggle for permanent peace. This is not an illusion. The social-economic processes of the entire world are leading to this point which will be ultimately reached with the efforts of the multitude of mankind in a few decades.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICS IS BLOODLESS WAR
I. MOBILITY IN WAR

We have so far dealt with the reasons why the war is a long, enduring one and why the final victory belongs to China. They generally answer the question of “what is” and “what is not.” Now we are turning to the questions of “how to do it” and “how not to do it.” In other words, we are going to answer the questions of how to carry on the long enduring war and how to fight for our final victory. For this purpose the following problems will be treated in order: mobility in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the resistance war, war objective, offensive in defence, quick decisions in a prolonged war, outer lines in inner lines, initiative, agility, planning, mobile warfare guerilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, possibilities to take advantage of the enemy’s soft spots, the problem of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, a people’s army, the foundation of victory, and conclusion. Now let us first tackle the problem of mobility.

Our opposition to subjective approach to a problem means that individual ideas not based upon and in disagreement with objective facts are illusions or falsities which if carried out in practice will lead to failure, hence It must be opposed. But nothing can be accomplished without individual efforts and the long enduring war and final victory will not be realized without human endeavour. Successful endeavour requires first ideas, reasoning, opinion, planning, directives, policies, strategies and tactics. These are subjective matters while action or practice is the manifestation of the subjective in objective and it belongs to the peculiar mobility of human beings. We term such mobility “conscious mobility”, a characteristic distinguishing men from other beings or things. All ideas based upon objective facts are correct ideas and all actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must promote this kind of ideas and actions or conscious mobility. Our war against Japan is to drive out an imperialist power to transform old China into a new China. We must mobilize the entire people of China and develop the conscious anti-Japanese mobility of everyone of us to achieve our objective. If we sat still without motion we would be exterminated; there would be neither a long enduring war nor final victory.

Conscious mobility is man’s speciality and particularly his speciality in war. His mobility is nowhere more vigorously manifested than in his war actions. Victory or defeat in a war is decided by the military, political, economic, and geographical conditions of both sides and their respective characters of war and their international support. But these are not all. They constitute only the possibilities of victory or defeat but do not determine its definite outcome. Subjective efforts must be added to decide the issue. This means the direction and prosecution of the war which is the war’s conscious mobility.

Commanders of war shall not strive for victories beyond the limit allowed by
objective conditions, but they can and must strive for them within that limit. The theatre of movement for a war director must be constructed on the basis of conditions afforded by objective reality, but with such a theatre he can stage many lively, dramatic acts of grandeur and splendour. Upon a preconditioned objective material foundation, commanders of the anti-Japanese war should exercise their authority, leading their army to crush the enemies of our nation and to transform our society and state of suffering under invasion and oppression into a new -China of freedom and equality. For this our subjective power of command shall and must be utilized. We do not approve of any anti-Japanese commander departing from objective conditions and becoming a blind, headlong crasher. But we must urge everyone Of them to become a daring and intelligent general. ThOy should possess an audacity overwhelming the -enemy as well as an ability to manipulate the changes and developments of the entire war. Swimming' in a big ocean, the commanders must keep themselves from sinking and reach the shore determinedly and programmatically. The tactics and strategy governing the conduct of a war are a swimming manual in a war- ocean.

II. WAR AND POLITICS

“War is the continuation of politics.” In this respect war is politics, and war itself, is political action. Never has there been a war in history devoid of its political character. The war against Japan is a revolutionary war of a whole nation Whose victory cannot be separated from the general directive of maintaining the united front and continuing the fighting: it cannot be separated from mobilization of the entire people, the harmony between officers and men and between the army and the people, the disintegration of the •enemy forces and similar political principles; it is inseparable from a correct prosecution of the united front policy, from cultural mobilization, or from the winning of the support of international forces as well as of the people of Japan. In a word, war cannot be separated from politics for a single moment. Any tendency among anti-Japanese fighters to belittle politics and isolate war and to become war absolutionists is erroneous and must be corrected.

But war has its peculiar characteristics and in this respect it is different from politics. War is a peculiar political means to reach a political objective. When politics has developed to a certain stage from which it cannot proceed any more, war breaks out to open a way for politics. For instance, the semi-independent status- of China is an impediment to the political development of Japanese imperialism. Hence Japan started her war of aggression to clear up the handicap. As to- China, imperialist oppression has been a handicap to* her bourgeois-democratic revolution for a long time. Hence there have been a number of liberation wars to' clear the way. Now Japan is using war as a pressure to stop completely the advance of China’s revolution,, and China is therefore forced to resort to anti-Japanese war in her determination to clear the way for her forward march. When the way is cleared politics will reappear and war will be concluded. If the obstacles are not completely cleared out the war must be continued to the end. For instance, anyone who desires compromise before the accomplishment of the anti- Japanese tasks will not succeed as war will recur despite certain factors which may effect a temporary compromise,
since the broad masses will not condense and will continue the war until the political objective is achieved; it can therefore be said that politics is bloodless war while war is bloody politics.

The peculiar character of war gives rise to peculiar systems of war organization, method and procedure. The peculiar organization is the army and everything connected with it. The peculiar method is the tactics and strategy for the conduct of war. The peculiar procedure is the peculiar form of social activities for defence or attack utilized by the opposing armies for tactics and strategies favourable to one's own side and unfavourable for the opposite side. Hence war experiences are peculiar and, in order to achieve victory, all participants in war must part way with ordinary habits to accustom themselves to war.

III. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Victory is impossible for a gigantic national revolutionary war such as ours without universal and deep-going political mobilization. The absence of political mobilization for the war in China before its start has been a big handicap. Political mobilization since the war has been far from broad and even less deep-going. The great majority of the people learned about the war from the enemy's shelling and air bombing. This also constituted a form of mobilization, but it was done by the enemy instead of ourselves. Those who are too far away to hear the guns remain undisturbed. This situation must be changed, otherwise there can be no victory for our life-and-death struggle.

We shall not again fall behind the enemy in another move. On the contrary, we shall develop this move extensively to checkmate him. This move is vital, more so than the improvement of our inferior " weapons. The mobilization of the lao peising (common people) of the entire country will create a boundless sea to drown the enemy, prepare conditions to eliminate our inferiority in arms, and make available for us the prerequisites to overcome every difficulty in the war. Victory depends upon the maintenance of the united front and the continuous prosecution of the war. But neither of these can be separated from the mobilization of lao peising. Neglecting political mobilization while aiming at victory means "driving a cart southward over northward tracks" which would liquidate victory.

What is political mobilization? First, it is the popularization of the political objectives of the war among the army and the people. Every soldier and every citizen must understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The objectives consist of "ousting of Japanese imperialism and establishment of a new China of freedom and equality" which must be explained to all the people and armed forces. Only then can an upsurge of war sentiment be created and the hearts of the hundreds of millions united to devote their all to the fight.

Next, it is not enough simply to explain the objectives, but the steps and policies for their realization must also be made clear. In other words, there must be a political programme. Now we already have "A Programme for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction." This, should be popularized among all armies and the people, who shall be mobilized to carry it out. They cannot be completely mobilized for a war to the last without a clear, concrete political programme.
Next, how to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by news sheets, pamphlets and books, and through schools, mass organisations, and* cadres. What we have already done represents only one drop in a vast ocean and is not adapted to the taste of the people. It is spiritually isolated from the people. This must be effectively improved.

Next, it is not enough to mobilize only once. Political mobilization for the anti-Japanese war must be routine. However, this does not mean reciting our political programme before *lao peising. Nobody will listen to it. It must be linked with the development of the war situation and the life of the soldiers and *lao peising. It is the transformation of war-time political mobilization into a daily movement. This is a matter of extreme importance, the first condition for victory.

IV. WAR OBJECTIVE

What is meant here is not the political objectives of a war which for the anti-Japanese war is “ousting Japanese imperialism and the establishment of a new China of freedom and equality” as already mentioned. It means the fundamental aim of a war as man’s bloody politics and the mutual slaughter of opposing armies. This objective is none other than “self-preservation and enemy annihilation” (the annihilation of the enemy implies only his disarmament, or “depriving the enemy of his power of resistance,” but not his physical annihilation.) The spear and the shield were used in ancient warfare. The spear was used for attack to annihilate the enemy while the shield was used for defence to preserve one’s self. This is continued even to the present. The bombing plane, the machine-gun, the long-range gun and poison gas are the developments of the spear. The air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete works, the gas mask are the developments of the shield. The tank is a powerful weapon combining the two. The attack is the chief means to, annihilate the enemy, but it cannot be entirely dispensed with in defence. Attack is directly employed to annihilate the enemy, but it is also used for self-preservation, as one’s self would be annihilated without annihilating the enemy. Defence is used directly for self-preservation, but it is also a means to support attack or to prepare to change to attack. Withdrawal is a form of defence—a continuation of defence. Pursuit is the continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that in war objective enemy annihilation occupies the chief position while self-preservation is secondary. Because effective self-preservation must depend upon large-scale enemy annihilation. It follows that attack to annihilate the enemy is the chief war objective while defence is one of its auxiliary means as well as a means of self-preservation, which is a secondary war objective. Though in practice, defence may often become the chief war objective while at other times attack plays the chief role; attack remains the main factor if the war is considered as a whole.

How to explain the fact that courageous sacrifices are urged in war? Does this contradict “self-preservation”? No, there is no contradiction, or, to put it more accurately, it is the unity of contradictions. War is bloody politics which demands a price, sometimes an enormous price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is aimed at permanent preservation of the whole. This is the explanation when we say that the attack as a means to annihilate the enemy
contains at the same time the element of self-preservation. It also explains that
defence cannot be pure and simple and must be accompanied by attack.

The objective of the war for self-preservation and enemy annihilation constitute
the essence of war and the basis of all war actions—it permeates the war from
technical to strategic operations. War objective is the basic principle of fighting,
which cannot be separated from any technical, tactical, campaign or strategic
principle. What do we mean by the principle of “cover the body and develop the
firing power” in target practice? The former is self-preservation while the
latter, enemy annihilation.- Because of the former, the technique for the utilization
of the forms of nature and the works of man in a terrain, of rushing movements, of
dispersion, etc., is developed. Because of the latter, the technique of sweeping
clear, the fire range, the organization of a net of fire, etc., is developed. The assault,
holding and reserve forces in tactics mean that the first is for enemy annihilation,
the second for self-preservation and the third for either purpose according to
changing conditions—either for the reinforcement of the assault force or for pursuit,
both for enemy annihilation; or for reinforcing the holding forces or to cover the
rear, both for self-preservation. Thus all technical, tactical, campaign and
stragetical actions are inseparable from the war aims which spread over all sections
of a war and run through it from beginning to end.

Commanders of all ranks of the anti-Japanese war should not direct the fighting
by departing either from the basic contradictions between China and Japan or from
the objective of war. The contradictions develop in the course of war activities and
there ensues a struggle for the preservation of each side and the annihilation of the
other. Our war shall proceed to seek victory in each and every big or small
engagement, disarming a section of the enemy and inflicting casualties or damage
on a part of the enemy forces or instrument.*: until he is finally driven out of our
territory, until our fatherland is successfully defended and until the political
objectives for the establishment of a new China are achieved.
CHAPTER SIX

STRATEGY FOR CHINA

I. OFFENSE IN DEFENSE, QUICK DECISIONS IN A LONG WAR, AND OUTER LINES IN INNER LINES

Let us now come to the concrete strategic directives of the anti-Japanese war. As already mentioned, the directive is to fight a war of long endurance. This is perfectly right. But this is only a general instead of a concrete directive. What we are going to study now are the concrete directives for a war of long endurance. Our dictum is: In the first and second stages of the war, or the stages of the enemy’s offensive and defensive our directives should be campaigning and battle offensives in a strategic defence, campaigning and battle quick decisions in a strategy of a long war, and campaigning and battle outer line operations in an inner line strategy. In the third stage the strategy should be the counter-offensive.

On account of Japan being a strong imperialist power and ours a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, Japan adopts an offensive strategy while we are placed in a defensive position. Japan also adopts a strategy of quick decision. We should consciously adopt a strategy of long war. Japan encircles and blockades China from both land and sea with several tens of her rather powerful army divisions (now the number of divisions has reached thirty) and a part of her navy while bombing us with her air force. Her army has by now occupied a long front stretching from Paotao, Suiyuan, to Hanchow, Chekiang, and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces, thus carrying on outer line operations on a gigantic scale. We are placed in inner line operations. These are due to the strength of the enemy and our weakness. This is one aspect of the situation.

But the contrary is true in another aspect. Despite Japan’s strength her forces are insufficient. Despite China’s weakness her territory is extensive, her population enormous and her troops numerous. These give rise to two major situations.

First, with his relatively small force invading a big country, the enemy can occupy only a number of the big cities, highways and certain flat lands. The result will be that in the so-called occupied territory large areas will remain unoccupied, affording gigantic theatres of operation for China’s guerillas. Taking the country into consideration, despite the enemy’s possibility of occupying Canton, Wuhan, Lanchow and their environs, regions beyond these he will hardly be able to reach. This will afford bases for China’s general rear and her Central Command in carrying on the endurance war until final victory.

Secondly, matching a small number of troops against a big one, the enemy is thus placed in the encirclement of the big number. It seems that, as the enemy attacks us from several directions, he places himself in strategic outer lines, allots inner line operations to us, and takes up the strategic offensive in contrast to our strategic defensive. The situation looks rather unfavourable for us. However, we can take advantage of our large territory and bigger forces if we avoid steadfast positional warfare while conducting agile mobile warfare by pitching several
divisions against one division, scores of tens of thousands of men against ten thousand, and encircle and annihilate a single enemy column by surprise marches from several routes on the outer line of the theatre of war.

Thus the enemy’s strategic outer line operations and attacks are forced to be transformed into inner line operations and defensives in campaigns and battles and our strategic inner line operations and defences will become outer line operations and attacks in campaigns and battles. We shall deal with the remaining columns of the enemy just as we have done with the first column.

Both the first and second situations will result from the peculiar feature of the contrast in size between us and the enemy.

But there is a third situation. It arises from the fact that though the enemy’s force is relatively small, it is strong in equipment and training while our bigger force is weak in equipment and training (but not in morale). Therefore, in campaigning and battle operations, we should aim at quick decisive engagements in addition to matching a greater force against a smaller one and attacking from the, outer line of the enemy. In order to effect quick decisions we should generally avoid attacking a stationary enemy force but instead, attack it while in motion. Concentrating our main force under cover, on the flanks of a route the enemy is surely to pass through, we should advance by surprise, encircle him and launch our assault, giving him neither opportunity to deploy, nor employ his heavy arms, nor summon his air force. Such an engagement should be generally concluded in half a day or in one day, or at most, in one day and one night.

If the plan is well executed, we may annihilate the entire enemy force, or the greater part of it or at least a considerable portion. Otherwise we may still be able to inflict big casualties upon him. When such engagements are repeated, a minimum of one sizeable victory each month, such as the P’inghsin Kwan and T’ai-eh Chuan campaigns, would greatly impair the enemy’s morale, elate our own spirit and rally world support for us. Thus our war of long duration in strategy becomes battles of quick decisions on, the battlefield. The enemy’s strategy of a war of quick decision will be changed into one of long duration after repeated defeats in campaigns and battles.

To put the above discussions on battle and campaigning directives into a nutshell, it is “outer line, quick decisive attacks.” This is contrary to our strategic directive which is “inner line, prolonged defence” but the former exactly and necessarily complements the latter. If the directive for campaigns and battles were also to be “inner line, prolonged defence,” as what took place at the beginning of the war, it would not be able to answer the needs of the contradictory situation of our bigness and the enemy’s smallness on the one hand and our weakness and the enemy’s strength on the other. Such a directive will definitely not achieve for us our strategic objective and our war of long endurance as a whole, but will lead to our defeat.

That is the reason why we have always advocated the organization of a number of large corps for field operations, the size of each should be two, three or four times that of its opposing enemy field corps. Each should adopt the above directive and
engage the enemy in extensive theatres of war. The lessons of the first period of our war having been learned since the loss of Nanking, the above directive and corps organization have been taken up, though they were not skilfully managed. However, outstanding feats have been scored; in the southern Shantung and southern Shansi engagements are repeated, a minimum of one sizeable victory each month, such as the P'inghsin Kwan and T'ai-erh Chuan campaigns, would greatly impair the enemy’s morale, elate our own spirit and rally world support for us.

Thus our war of long duration in tempo becomes battles of quick decisions on the battlefield. The enemy’s strategy of a war of quick decision will be changed into one of long duration after repeated defeats in campaigns and battles.

To put the above discussions on battle and campaigning directives into a nutshell, it is “outer line, quick decisive attacks.” This is contrary to our strategic directive which is “inner line, prolonged defence” but the former exactly and necessarily complements the latter. If the directive for campaigns and battles were also to be “inner line, prolonged defence,” as what took place at the beginning of the war, it would not be able to answer the needs of the contradictory situation of our bigness and the enemy’s smallness on the one hand and our weakness and the enemy’s strength on the other. Such a directive will definitely not achieve for us our strategic objective and our war of long endurance as a whole, but will lead to our defeat.

That is the reason why we have always advocated the organization of a number of large corps for field operations, the size of each should be two, three or four times that of its opposing enemy field corps. Each should adopt the above directive and engage the enemy in extensive theatres of war. The lessons of the first period of our war having been learned since the loss of Nanking, the above directive and corps organization have been taken up, though they were not skilfully managed. However, outstanding feats have been scored; in the southern Shantung and southern Shansi campaigns, proving the directive to be the only correct one. It is a directive which is not confined to regular warfare, but is generally applicable to guerilla; operations as well, and even throughout the entire course of the war.

While our technological conditions may be strengthened in the state of strategic counter-offensive and the contrast in strength between us and the enemy may entirely disappear, our employment of a greater force operating in outer lines for quick decisions would yet yield us greater spoils and captives. For instance, we would be more certain to annihilate one enemy motorized division if we match against it two of ours. It is much easier for several big and strong fellows to knock out one of their peer. This is common sense. But the truth is evident.

If we take up resolutely “outer line, quick decisive attacks” on the battlefield, we would be able not only to alter the relative strength between us and the enemy on the battlefield but would eventually bring about a general shift of relative superiority. As we are on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive in the battlefield; as we operate with a greater force from outer lines and the enemy with a smaller force in inner lines; and as we seek quick decisions while the enemy, who must await reinforcements, is deprived of his initiative and forced to take up the
fight against his will: the consequence is that the enemy becomes the weak instead of the strong, the inferior instead of the superior; the opposite becomes true for us; we become the strong instead of the weak, the superior instead of the inferior. After repeated victorious engagements the general relative position between us and the enemy will begin to shift. That is to say the accumulation of a number of victorious outer line, quick decisive attacks in field operations will gradually strengthen us and weaken the enemy and this will necessarily affect the general relative strength and superiority. When that happens we shall achieve first parity and then superiority over the enemy, if other conditions in ourselves, internal changes within the enemy and favourable international conditions as well have developed correspondingly. That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive to drive the enemy out of our country.

War is a contest of power. But power changes its original status in the course of the war. The decisive factor here will be subjective efforts, the scoring of a maximum number of victories and the commission of a minimum number of errors. Objective factors afford possibilities for the change, but correct directives and subjective efforts are required to realise the possibilities. Here the subjective factor becomes the decisive factor.

II. INITIATIVE, AGILITY, AND PLANNING

The core of outer line attacks of quick decision in campaigns and battles as discussed above is the attack, while outer line describes the scope and quick decision of the duration of the operation. It is the best directive to carry on a war of long endurance and it may also be designated as mobile warfare. The indispensable elements in executing this directive are initiative, agility, and planning. Let us now proceed to discuss them in order.

We have already dealt with conscious mobility, why should we talk about initiative now? As we have said, by conscious mobility we mean conscious activities and efforts, which are peculiar qualities distinguishing man from other animals and which are particularly manifested in war. By initiative here we mean an army’s freedom of movement in contrast with a passive position the army may be compelled to take.

Free movement is the life line for an army. Its loss means that the army is approaching defeat or annihilation. If a soldier is disarmed, it must be attributed to the loss of his freedom of movement and his being forced into a passive situation. The same can be said of a defeated army. Hence both sides in a war strive for the initiative and avoid passivity. Our proposals for outer line attacks of quick decision as well as for agility and planning in launching such attacks can be regarded as ways and means to secure the initiative and to force the enemy into a passive situation for our self-preservation and his annihilation.

But initiative or passivity can be separated neither from the superiority or inferiority or relative fighting strength nor from correct or erroneous subjective command. In addition, the enemy’s mistaken notions and non-preparedness for surprises may also be utilized to secure our initiative and force him into passivity. The following is an analysis of these points.
While initiative is inseparable from superiority in fighting strength, passivity is inseparable from inferiority in strength. Thus superiority or inferiority in fighting strength becomes the objective basis for initiative or passivity. It is natural that strategic initiative can be better handled and developed through a strategic offensive, but the presence of initiative everywhere throughout the war, or absolute initiative, is possible only with absolute superiority over absolute inferiority. In a contest between a strong and healthy person and a dying invalid, absolute initiative belongs to the former while absolute passivity to the latter. If there were no insoluble contradictions with Japan, if, for instance, she could despatch at the same moment a force of from several million to ten million men, if there were no antagonism of her own people or the nations of the world and if there were no opposition of the Chinese people aroused by her barbarous policies, then she would be in the position of absolute superiority with absolute initiative everywhere throughout the war.

But such absolute superiority has seldom existed at the beginning of a war or campaign in history. It has been found only at the conclusion. For instance, in the last European War, the Allies became absolutely superior while Germany absolutely inferior on the eve of the latter’s surrender. The result was German defeat and Allied victory. This is an example of the existence of absolute superiority and inferiority at the conclusion of a war. Again, on the eve of the victory at T'ai-erh Chuan the isolated Japanese forces had been placed in an absolutely inferior situation after bitter fighting while our forces had achieved absolute superiority. This is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority at the conclusion of a campaign. Wars or campaigns may also be concluded under a situation of relative superiority or inferiority. Then it would result in a compromise in the case of a war or stalemate in the case of a campaign. But victory or defeat is more often than not decided by absolute superiority or inferiority. However, it happens only at the conclusion of a war or campaign, not at the beginning.

It can be foretold that at the final conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, there will be absolute inferiority and defeat for Japan and absolute superiority and victory for China. But the present situation on either side is relative instead of absolute: The favourable factors of Japan’s strong military, economic and political-organizational power in contrast to our weak military, economic and political-organizational power result in her superiority, the basis of her initiative. But this superiority is curtailed by her own contradictions such as the smaller quantity of her military forces, etc. together with other unfavourable factors. It is further curtailed when she is confronted with China’s larger territory, population and military forces as well as her stubborn national resistance. Hence taking the situation as a whole, Japan’s superiority becomes relative and the maintenance and development of her initiative becomes restricted.

In the case of China, her forces are inferior and this results to a certain degree in her passivity. But she is quantitatively superior in territory, population and troops as well as her people and army’s determination and morale. These, together with other favourable factors, help to reduce her inferiority in military power, etc., and
change her strategic inferiority into a relative one. Her passivity is thereby decreased, becoming a relative one from a strategic point of view.

Passivity is nevertheless disadvantageous under any circumstances and it must be done away with. In the military respect, this is to be done by the resolute adherence to outer line attacks of quick decision and the spreading of guerilla warfare in the rear of the enemy. This is tantamount to the securing of a maximum, overwhelming, "though partial, superiority and initiative over the enemy through mobile and guerilla warfare in campaigning engagements. This will gradually; result in strategic superiority and initiative, leaving behind strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the inter-relation between initiative or passivity and superiority or inferiority.

Now it will be easy to understand the inter-relationship between initiative or passivity and subjective command. As stated above, we can get rid of our strategically relative inferiority and passivity. This is to be accomplished by the creation through human effort of a series of partially superior and initiative-commanding positions in the course of depriving the enemy of a series of partially superior and initiative-, commanding positions and placing him in a position of inferiority and passivity. The sum total of these partial positions will result in our strategic superiority and initiative and the enemy's strategic inferiority and passivity.

But such a change can be effected only through correct command. Why? Because we and the enemy both strive for superiority and initiative. Looked at from this angle, war may be considered as a contest of the subjective ability between the commands of opposing armies struggling for superiority and initiative with their respective military forces as the material (objective) basis. The result of the contest will be victory for the one and defeat for the other. Apart from the relative strength of the objective, material factor, the victor will have to rely upon the correctness of his subjective command and the vanquished will have to place the blame on the errors of his subjective command.

It must be admitted that war conditions are more volatile and less certain than any other social phenomenon, in other words, they belong more to the realm of “probability.” Yet war is no myth. It is a fact in the world of to-day. Hence Sun Wu’s (the most outstanding strategist in Chinese history) law of “to know both ourselves and the enemy means to win one hundred times in one hundred engagements” (Chih pi chi, pei chan pei sheng) remains a scientific truth. Error results from lack of knowledge about ourselves and the enemy. The peculiarity of war lies in the impossibility under most circumstances for one to know everything about one’s self and the enemy. This in turn results in the uncertainty of war conditions and actions and in errors and defects. But it is possible to know the general and essential aspects of any war condition or action. It is possible to give generally correct commands by scouting and intelligence work and the intelligent reasoning and judgment of the commander.

With “a generally correct command” as our weapon, we will be able to score a maximum of victories, to transform our inferiority into superiority or passivity into
initiative. Such is the inter-relation between initiative and passivity and correct and erroneous command.

The defeat of a big and strong army by a small and weak army which often happened in Chinese and foreign history should convince us of the effect of correct or erroneous command on superiority-inferiority and initiative-passivity changes. Examples in China were found in the battle of Ch‘engp‘u between the states of Chin and Ts‘u (632 B.C.), the battle of Ch‘enkao between Ts‘u and Han Sing (203 B.C.), the destruction of the Chao state by Marshall (204 B.C.), the battle of K‘unyang between Sing dynasty and the Han restorationists (230 A.D.), the battle of Kuantu between Yuan Shao and Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (200 A.D.), the battle of Ch‘iehpi between the states of Wu and Wei (208 A.D.), the battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu (222 A.D.) and the battle of Feishui between the states of Ch‘in and Tsin (383 A.D.). In foreign countries there were the instances of most of Napoleon’s battles, Hindenburg’s East Prussia campaign and Russia’s Civil War after the October Revolution. In each of these the small force defeated the big and inferiority overwhelmed superiority. Each scored the first victory with partial superiority and initiative over the enemy’s partial inferiority and passivity and theri repeated the process against the rest of the enemy’s forces individually culminating in the transformation of the whole situation into one of superiority and initiative. The opposite was true in the case of each of the opponents with original superiority and initiative. Each of them lost completely his immense or greater superiority and initiative as a result of subjective errors and internal contradictions and became either a general with a routed army or a sovereign with an exterminated state.

Thus it can be seen that although the superiority or inferiority of fighting power itself is an objective basis to condition initiative or passivity, it does not thereby constitute initiative or passivity in actuality. There must be a struggle and a contest of subjective ability before either initiative or passivity becomes a matter of fact. The correctness or erroneousness of subjective command in the struggle may turn inferiority into superiority or passivity into initiative, or vice versa. The Monster King Cow did not win over the Buddhist Monkey; all ruling dynasties were powerless before revolutionary armies. This shows that superiority alone could neither determine initiative nor final victory. Initiative and victory may be snapped from an opponent possessed of superiority and initiative by his inferior and passive foe’s active subjective endeavour.

Mistaken notions and non-preparedness for surprises may result in the loss of superiority and initiative. Hence misleading the enemy through careful planning accompanied by an unexpected attack on him is a means, and an important one, to seize superiority and initiative. What are mistaken notions? An example is found in “trees and plants all become soldiers on the crest of Pakung Shan (Mountain)” “Making noise in the east and attacking in the west” is a way of creating mistaken notions among the enemy. Under conditions of good mass work which is sufficient to blockade the enemy’s information, all kinds of measures to mislead him can be adopted to drive him into a predicament of mistaken judgments and actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative. This is what is meant by “war is
insatiable cheating” (*Ping pu yen cha*).

What is unexpectedness? It means unpreparedness. Superiority without preparedness is not actual superiority, hence there is no initiative. Understanding this point, an inferior but prepared force can often attack a superior enemy unexpectedly and defeat him. When we say that it is easy to attack an array on the march or in movement we mean that it is in a state of unexpectancy or unpreparedness.

The creating of mistaken notions for the enemy and attacking him unexpectedly is tantamount to transferring war uncertainties to the enemy and securing the greatest possible certainties for ourselves to bring about our superiority, initiative and victory.

The prerequisite for the above is well-organized masses. Hence it is imperative to stir up and mobilize all lao peising who are opposed to the enemy to carry on widespread raids against him as well as to blockade his information and shield our own forces to the end so that the enemy has no way to find out when and where we are going to attack him, thus laying the basis for his mistaken notions and unexpectedness. In the Civil War period, the [Chinese] Red Army, relying upon organized and armed people, won repeated victories with weak and small military forces. A national war should as a rule win greater mass support than a civil war. But because of historical mistakes our people have been disorganised. They cannot respond readily to our appeal for support in an emergency. Moreover, they may often be utilized by the enemy. Only broad, resolute rallying of the entire people, on the basis of the general directives to maintain the united front and keep up the fight, can avail limitless support to each and every war requirement. Remarkably mistaken notions and unexpectedness can then be created for the enemy to help win our fight.

We are not Duke Siang of the state of Sung and we have no use for his foolhardy virtue of honesty and mercy [in war]. We shall try our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy to make him blind and deaf. We shall create the greatest possible confusion in his mind to drive him insane and assure our victory. This also concerns the inter-relation between initiative or passivity and subjective command which is indispensable for Japan’s defeat.

It is likely that in her offensive stage Japan’s general position is one commanding initiative on account of her military strength and utilization of our past and present subjective mistakes. But because of her inherent unfavourable conditions and the fact that she also has committed certain mistakes in the fighting (to be discussed later) on the one hand and our inherent favourable factors and the fact that some (only some) of our mistakes have begun to be corrected, Japan’s initiative is beginning to be partially undermined as may be evidenced by her T’ai-eh Chuan defeat and Shansi predicament. The broad development of our guerilla warfare in her rear has driven her garrisons in the occupied territories into complete passivity. Although her initiative is still being maintained in strategic offensive, it will end when the offensive is concluded.

The insufficiency of troops and hence the impossibility to carry oh an offensive
indefinitely is one the reasons why the enemy cannot maintain his initiative. Our offensive in campaigns and guerilla warfare in his rear together with other conditions is another reason why he must stop his offensive after having reached a certain limit where he will no longer be able to maintain his initiative. The third factor lies in the existence of the Soviet Union and the changing international situation. The enemy’s initiative is evidently limited and liable to be eliminated.

We were in a rather passive position at the beginning of the war, the subjective factors being the lack of people’s mobilization and the inadequacy of positional warfare. The directive of mobile warfare has begun to be adopted in the second period of the fighting, but it is still regrettable that only a small proportion of the people has been aroused. But we will be able to assume increasingly greater initiative when offensive tactics are firmly maintained for our main forces in campaigns and battles, when guerilla warfare is developed behind the enemy, and when politically the people are broadly mobilized.

Let us now discuss the matter of agility (Linghousin). What is agility? It is the concrete realization of initiative in fighting, the agile employment of our armed forces which is the central task of a war command—a none too easy task. Besides the organisation and training of the army and the people, war as a profession has a single purpose—to win the fight. It is of course not easy to organize an army, etc., but its employment is even more difficult, especially under the conditions when we are weak and the enemy is strong. It requires exceedingly great subjective ability to overcome confusion, darkness and uncertainties, which are peculiar to war, and to find order, light, and certainty. Only thus can agility in command be realized.

The basic directive for field operations in our war against Japan is outer line attacks of quick decision. To carry this out there are methods or tactics of dispersion and concentration, separate advance and converged attack, surprise attacks and holding operations, encirclement and envelopment, offensive and defensive, advance and retirement, etc., etc. It is easy to understand these tactics; but it is not easy to employ and manipulate them with agility.

Here there are three controlling points. There can be no victory unless the timing, location, and the assignment of task forces are well done. For instance, in an attack on an enemy force in motion, we would give it a chance to get prepared through our exposure if the action were taken too early; if it were taken too late, the enemy may have come to a halt in close formation and we would be cracking a hard nut. This is the problem of time. Another example: if we selected the left wing of the enemy for our assault, we may come into contact exactly with his weak point and would score an easy victory; if we selected the right wing, we might fail by hitting our head against the enemy’s nail head. This is the problem of place. Still another example: we might win by assigning a certain force under command to a certain task and lose by assigning another force. This is the problem of proper assignment according to the specific qualities of the forces.

Tactics should be employed as well as manipulated or shifted. Attack may have to be changed to defence, and vice versa, advance into retirement and vice versa, holding into assaulting operations and vice versa, and the shifting between
encirclement and envelopment, etc., etc. It is an important task for an agile command to effect timely and proper changes of tactics according to the qualities of the forces and conditions of terrain between us and the enemy. Such would be the manner of command whether in battle, campaigning or strategy.

The “skill” (Miao) referred to in an ancient strategist’s dictum: “the skill for manipulation is housed in a mind,” (Yun yung chih miao tsun hu yi sin) is our idea of agility, which is the product of an intelligent commander. Agility does not imply needless motion. It is a quality with which an intelligent commander; adopts a timely and appropriate measure by “studying the time and sizing up the conditions” (Shih¹ Tu Shih²) (which includes our and the enemy’s conditions as well as the conditions of terrain) based upon a given objective situation. It is the “skill of manipulation” (Yun yung chih miao). On the basis of this “skill of manipulation” we will win more victories by outer line attacks of quick decision, alter the relative superiority-inferiority between us and the enemy, realize our initiative over him, and overwhelm and smash him. The final victory will then belong to us.

Now let us come to planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is more difficult to plan for war than for any other line of activity. But “all matters stand on preparedness and fall on lack of preparation” (Fan shih yu tse li, pu yu tse tei). A war cannot be won without planning and advance preparations. There is no absolute certainty in war, but there is a certain degree of relative certainty. We are more certain of our own side and much less certain of our enemy. But even with the enemy there are signs which can be observed, threads which can be traced and antecedents and after-effects which can afford a basis for our thinking and deliberation. These give us a degree of relative certainty, affording an objective basis for war planning. Modern technological development (communications, radio, airplane, automobile, railway, steamship, etc.) further increased its possibility.

However, owing to the low degree and short duration of certainties in war, war planning is rarely complete and fixed. It moves with the movement (or fluxion or shift) of the war and differs in degree according to the scope and extent of the latter. Tactical plans, such as attacking or defence operations for a small corps or detachment, often undergo a number of changes in a single day. A campaigning plan or plan of action for a big corps is likely and capable of lasting until the conclusion of the campaign in its general aspects, but partial changes often take place and there may be complete changes occasionally. A strategic plan is based on the total situation of both sides and its fixity is therefore increased. But it is only applicable in a definite strategic stage and the plan must undergo changes when the war shifts to a new stage.

Changing and fixing of tactical, campaigning and strategic plans according to the respective scope and specific conditions of each are important steps for a war command. They are the concretization of agility in war, or the skill of manipulation in practice. They are indispensable for a victory. Commanders of all ranks in the anti-Japanese war must bear this in mind. The fluxion of war leads many people to

¹ “Shih” meaning “time”—TRANS.
² “Shih” meaning “conditions” or “situation.”—TRANS.
deny fundamentally the relative fixity of a war plan or directive, regarding its confirmation as "mechanistic. This is wrong. We have just stated that it is perfectly right to concede only a relative fixity to a war plan or directive as war conditions are only relatively certain and war itself fluxes forward (or moves or shifts) at great speed and therefore timely changes in whole or in part must be made according to the changing conditions and fluxions of war, otherwise we would be mechanistic. However, there can be no denial of a relatively fixed war plan or directive for a given period. To deny this we would have to deny everything, including war itself and the very person who denies.

Because of the presence of relative fixity of both the conditions and actions in war, relative fixity must also be given to a war plan or directive which arises out of the conditions and actions. For example, because of the fixity of both the fighting conditions in northern China and the dispersed operative activities of the Eighth Route Army in a definite stage, the strategic operative directive for the Eighth Route Army to carry on "basically guerrilla warfare but seizing upon every favourable situation for mobile warfare" becomes relatively fixed in that stage. This is perfectly necessary. A campaigning directive is applicable for a shorter duration than the above strategic directive, and the duration for a tactical directive is still shorter. But each has its fixity within a definite period of time. There would be no way to carry on the war if this were denied and the result would be a complete lack of purposeful action—either that no action could be right or that any action would do—a war relativism.

No one denies that even a directive applicable in a given period is in a flux without which the abandonment of one directive and the substitution by another would never happen. But the fluxion is limited. It is confined within the scope of various war activities designed to carry out the directive. It is not a flux of the directive of a fundamental nature. This fundamental nature never fluxes and this is what we mean by a relative fixity within a given period. In the great river of war as a whole, which is in a permanent flux, there is relative fixity in each specific section of its course—this is our idea regarding the fundamental nature of a war plan or directive.

To summarize our foregoing discussions on our prolonged inner-line, defensive war strategy, and outer-line attacks of quick decision in campaigning and battles, as well as on initiative, agility and planning: The anti-Japanese war must be planned. A war plan is the application of strategy and tactics which must be agile to be adaptable to fighting conditions. In mapping out a war plan we should always bear in mind the task of changing the relative position between us and the enemy by transforming our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is to be manifested in outer line attacks of quick decision in campaigns and battles as well as in the inner line defensive strategy of our long enduring war.
CHAPTER SEVEN
MOBILE AND GUERILLA WARFARE

I. MOBILE, GUERILLA AND POSITIONAL WARFARE

The strategy of inner line war of long endurance, and the outer line of quick decision attacks in campaigns and battles for strategic defence, both of which constitute together the substance of our war, is manifested in the form of mobile warfare. Thus mobile warfare is the form of outer line attacks of quick decision in campaigns and battles on the part of regular corps, carried out along an extensive front and a vast theatre of war. Meanwhile, it also includes the so-called mobile defence conducted under certain necessary occasions to facilitate the prosecution of such offensive operations as well as positional attacks and defence of a supporting nature. It is characterized by the employment of regular corps, by superior forces in campaigns and battles, and by offensive and mobility.

Under the conditions of China’s vast territory and enormous forces but lack of adequate military technique and training, together with the enemy’s insufficient but well-equipped and trained forces, the main form of fighting should undoubtedly be offensive and mobile, with other forms as auxiliary, constituting together a war of movement. In this respect both permanent withdrawal, or flightism, and permanent advance, do or die-ism, should be combated.

One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is mobility, which permits as well as requires a field army to move back and forth in great strides. But this has nothing in common with Han Fuch’u’s (late governor of Shantung, executed by order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) flightism. One basic demand of war is the annihilation of the enemy; another is self-preservation. The latter is also aimed at the annihilation of the enemy, which in turn is the most effective means for self-preservation. Therefore mobile warfare must not become a pretext for the Han Fuch’us, whose movements are exclusively backwards. Such “movements” negate the basically offensive character of mobile warfare. China could not be saved even if she had her Kamchatka (allusion to advocates of continuous withdrawal before Japanese advance, on the pretext that Lenin advocated the withdrawal of the Soviet Government to Kamchatka before enemy attack) if such movements were carried out, as they would finally re-“move” Kamchatka from China’s possession.

But permanent advance/or do-or-die-ism, is also wrong. What we advocate is a war of movement whose substance is campaigning and battle offensive of outer line and quick decision, which includes the auxiliary role of positional warfare as well as “mobile defence” and withdrawal. Without these latter mobile warfare cannot be sufficiently carried out. But do-or-die-ism is militarily short-sighted. It stems from the fear of losing territories. A do-or-die-ist ignores mobility as a characteristic of mobile warfare which permits as well as requires a field army to move forward as well as backward in great strides.

From a positive point of view, to draw the enemy into a fight, unfavourable to him but favourable to us, it often requires to keep the enemy in motion until he
reaches a position abounding with conditions favourable to our side, such as favourable terrain, vulnerable enemy formation, inhabitants who would blockade the enemy’s information, enemy’s fatigue and unexpectedness, etc., etc. This demands that the enemy should advance and that we should be willing to lose a part of our territory. Because temporary, partial loss of territory is the price to be paid to preserve and recover our entire domain permanently.

From a negative point of view, in case we are forced into an unfavourable situation endangering fundamentally the existence of our army, it demands courage from us to withdraw to preserve our forces so that we would be able to strike at the enemy when opportunities arise in the future. The do-or-die-ists are ignorant of this consideration and would not give any ground or abandon a single city even when the situation is obviously and definitely disadvantageous to us. The result is the loss of both ground and city as well as failure to preserve our forces.

We have always advocated “to induce the enemy’s penetration,” which is the most effective military policy for a weak army to face a strong army in a strategic defensive.

Mobile warfare being the main form of fighting in the anti-Japanese war, the next form is guerilla warfare. When we say that in the entire war, mobile warfare is the main form while guerilla warfare the auxiliary, we mean that the fate of the war must be mainly settled by regular warfare, especially its mobile form, while guerilla warfare cannot assume this as its chief responsibility. But we do not imply that guerilla warfare does not play an important role in the strategy of the anti-Japanese war. Its role in this respect is next only to that of mobile warfare, as without its support the enemy would not be defeated. This assertion implies the strategic task for guerilla warfare to develop into mobile warfare.

In the prolonged, ruthless war, guerilla warfare will not be tied down to its old tracks but will be elevated to mobile warfare through its own efforts. Thus there are two aspects in the strategic role of guerilla warfare: as a compliment to regular warfare and as an effort to transform itself into regular warfare.

The strategic role of guerilla warfare in China’s war against Japan arises out of the unprecedented vastness and long duration of the war. Therefore China’s guerilla warfare has its tactical as well as its peculiar strategic problem, as mentioned in my article on “The Strategic Problems of Anti-Japanese Guerilla Warfare.”

II. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF ANTI-JAPANESE GUERILLA WARFARE

As outlined in preceding pages, there are three main strategic stages of anti-Japanese war in the form of fighting. In the first stage mobile warfare is the main form while guerilla and positional warfare the auxiliary. In the second stage guerilla warfare will be elevated to the main position, complemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will resume its main role, with positional and guerilla warfare as the supporting forms. But mobile warfare in the third stage will not be entirely taken up by the original regulars but partly carried on by guerillas, who will have become fighters in mobile warfare. The latter may play a very important role.
A review of these three stages indicates that guerilla warfare is indispensable in China’s war against Japan and that it will constitute an unprecedentedly dramatic scene in the war history of mankind. Because of this it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousands of the millions of China's regulars and distribute them over the enemy territories. Their task shall be the promotion of the arming of the masses and co-operating with them in guerilla warfare. The regular forces thus assigned should be conscious of the sacredness of the task, not to regard it as a demotion merely because there would be less large-scale fighting and less opportunity to prove themselves as national heroes. This is unwarranted pessimism. It is true that there are no such quick results and fanfare in guerilla as in regular warfare, but a "long journey demonstrates the strength of a horse; time-consuming enterprise tests a man’s heart." The enormous power of guerilla warfare will be evidenced through the long enduring, ruthless war; it is not a career to be slighted.

Moreover, a regular force engages in guerilla warfare when dispersed; but it could resume mobile warfare; when re-assembled. This is what is happening with the Eighth Route Army. The directive of this army is “basically guerilla warfare, but seizing upon every favourable situation for mobile warfare.” This directive is perfectly correct and those who oppose it are wrong. After the enemy’s occupation of Linfeng, Shansi, our military high command ordered all the armies remaining in Shansi to “carry on guerilla warfare with brigades as units.” This is a strategically far-sighted measure.

Positional warfare whether defensive or offensive, is generally untenable under China’s present technological conditions. This is where one of our weaknesses lies. Meanwhile the enemy also utilizes the vastness of our territory to avoid our positional disposition. Hence positional warfare can neither be the main form nor one of the important forms of our war. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and necessary to employ partial positional warfare in campaigns as a supporting operation within the confines of mobile warfare. There is even a greater necessity for mobile warfare to adopt a semi-positional “mobile defence” for continuous resistance to the enemy’s advance to wear him out and to win sufficient time for ourselves.

China should endeavour to increase sufficiently her new armament to carry out positional attacks in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. This stage will undoubtedly enhance the role of positional-warfare, for then the enemy will hold fast to his positions, and we would not be able to realise our objective to recover our lost territories without powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare.

In spite of this the main form of warfare in the third stage will be mobile. The skill of war command and the liveliness of man had been largely paralyzed when positional warfare in the western front rescued such a situation as in the middle period of the last European war. This was due to the curse of modern technique. But in a war over the vast territories of China during which China will remain in a state of technical inferiority for quite a long time, “the liberation of war from trenches” will naturally take place. Even during the third stage in which despite China’s
progress in technique, she would probably be unable to surpass her enemy, she will be compelled to endeavour for a high degree of mobile warfare if she insists upon her final victory.

It can now be seen that taking the anti-Japanese war as a whole, there will be no basic positional warfare for China; the chief and important forms will be mobile and guerilla warfare. In the latter forms there will be the opportunity for the fullest demonstration of the skill of war command and the liveliness of man. This is how we are lucky in an unfortunate situation.

III. WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION

This is a question of the nature of war. As we have mentioned, the nature of war is in its objective, which is self-preservation and enemy annihilation. Mobile, positional and guerilla warfare are three forms of war to achieve the objective. The degree of effectiveness in realizing the objective is different with each form. Hence a war of attrition is commonly differentiated from a war of annihilation.

We may state in the first place that the anti-Japanese war is a war of attrition as well as of annihilation. Why? Because when the enemy is still demonstrating his factors of strength and his strategic superiority and initiative are still being maintained, the former cannot be diminished and the latter cannot be undermined effectively at an accelerated speed without annihilating campaigns and battles. And, when our factors of weakness still remain and we have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity, we will not be able to win time, to strengthen our internal and international factors and to alter our unfavourable position without annihilating campaigns and battles. Hence annihilating engagements in a campaign are the means to reach the strategic objective of attrition. In this sense a war of annihilation is a war of attrition. It is with annihilation as the chief means to realize attrition that our war can be prolonged.

But there is also war of attrition in a campaign to achieve the strategic objective of attrition. Generally speaking, the task for mobile warfare is annihilation; the task for positional warfare is attrition; and the task for guerilla warfare is both. The three may be thus differentiated. In this sense war of annihilation differs from war of attrition, as the latter is necessary also in campaigns for a long enduring war.

From the point of view of both theory and necessity, China should, in her defensive stage, utilize the main annihilating character of mobile warfare and the partial annihilating character of guerilla warfare supported by the main attrition character of positional warfare and the partial attrition character of guerilla warfare to achieve the strategic objective of a large-scale war of attrition against the enemy. In the stage of stalemate (or parity) she should continue to utilize the annihilating and attrition characters of guerilla and mobile warfare to cause further attrition to the enemy. All these aim at prolonging the war, eventually to alter the relative position between us and the enemy and to prepare the conditions for the counteroffensive. During the stage of strategic counter-offensive annihilation to bring about attrition will be continued until the enemy is finally driven out.

But as a matter of fact, during the last ten months many, in fact, even most mobile campaigns have become wars of attrition, while annihilation which should...
be expected from guerilla warfare has not been carried out to the desired degree in certain regions. Although under such conditions attrition has been brought to the enemy, thus contributing to the prolongation of the war as well as to our final, victory, yet the enemy’s attrition has not been sufficient while our own attrition has been too great and our gains too little. This of course should be explained by the objective factors of the disparities between our and the enemy’s military technique and training, but still it is necessary in theory as well as in practice for us to endeavour for annihilating engagements whenever circumstances are favourable. In the case of the guerillas, despite the fact that many of their concrete tasks, such as sabotage and disruption, cannot but be attrition pure and simple, it is still necessary to urge upon them to undertake annihilating operations in campaigns and battles so that they can simultaneously bring attrition to the enemy and replenishment to themselves, both to the largest possible extent.

In outer line attacks of quick decision, the “outer line,” “quick decision,” and “attack” as well as “movement” in mobile warfare are manifested in a form of fighting with encirclement and envelopment as the chief tactics, which in turn require the concentration of a superior force. The concentration of a superior force and the employment of encirclement and envelopment tactics are necessary conditions for the carrying out of a mobile warfare or outer line attack of quick decision. The purpose of all these, however, is the annihilation of the enemy.

The Japanese army not only has the advantage in armament, but also in training and upbringing—its organization, its self-confidence as a result of its invincibility in the past, its superstition towards the Mikado and gods and spirits, its arrogant self-pride and its despise of the Chinese people—these have been inoculated in Japanese soldiers through many years of demagogic training by the Japanese militarists as well as through Japan’s national tradition. This is the chief reason why though we have inflicted great casualties upon them, our captives have been few. This aspect has been generally under-estimated heretofore. A long process is required to undermine these qualities, but first of all they require our emphatic attention. The next thing to do is patient, planned work along the lines Of political activities, international propaganda and then development of Japan’s people’s movement. Meanwhile, annihilating engagements in war should also be regarded as one of the effective measures.

The special qualities of the Japanese army may supply arguments to pessimists leading to the theory of our national extermination; they may also afford a basis for passive military experts to reject a war of annihilation. But we take an opposite view. We hold that these advantageous qualities of the Japanese army can be undermined as they are already being undermined. The main task for us in this respect is our political endeavour. We should not insult the arrogant self-pride of the Japanese soldiers, but instead appreciate their pride and direct it towards the understanding of the anti-people character of the Japanese rulers’ aggression through fair treatment of the captives as well as through a people’s diplomacy.

Another aspect of our endeavour should be the demonstration before the Japanese soldiers of the indomitable spirit and militant and stubborn fighting
qualities of the Chinese army and people. This means to give them a war of annihilation.

Our experience in ten months of fighting has proved the possibility of a war of annihilation, in view of the P'inghsin Kwan and T'ai-erh Chuan engagements. The Japanese soldiers are beginning to waver. They do not understand their war aims. Surrounded by the Chinese army and people, their courage in assault combats has been much inferior to that of the Chinese soldiers. These are objective conditions which will develop with the prolongation of the war. In this respect annihilating operations may also be said to be a condition for shortening the war to liberate the soldiers and people of Japan.

In this world it is only possible for a cat to make friends with another cat; a mouse cannot win the friendship of a cat.

It must also be admitted that for the present our technique and army training are inferior to the enemy. Therefore engagements with the greatest annihilating effect, such as the capture of an entire enemy force or a great part of it, are impossible in most cases, especially in flatland fighting. Undue demands by advocates of quick victory are therefore untenable. The correct demand upon the anti-Japanese war is: “annihilation as much as possible.” This means the concentration of a superior force in every engagement whenever the conditions are favourable and the employment of encirclement and envelopment tactics—to encircle a part of the enemy force if not the whole, to capture a part of the encircled force if not the whole, and to inflict considerable casualties; upon the encircled section if not to capture it. This also means war of attrition when conditions are unfavourable for war of annihilation. The dictum for the latter shall be the concentration of our force; for the former the dispersement of our force. The command for the latter shall be centralized and for the former, decentralized. These are the basic directives for field operations in the anti-Japanese war.
CHAPTER EIGHT
HOW TO STRIKE

1. POSSIBILITIES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY’S SOFT SPOT

The possibility to defeat the enemy also lies partly in his command. An infallible general has never existed in history. There are mistakes of the enemy which we may take advantage of just as we have been exposed* to the enemy through our own mistakes. Therefore there is the possibility for us to take advantage of the enemy’s soft spots. In the ten months of the enemy’s war of aggression, he has committed numerous errors in strategy and campaigning plans. Of these there have been five outstanding ones:

1) **Piecemeal reinforcements:** This is due to the enemy’s under-estimation of China, as well as his own deficiency in forces. The enemy has always despised us. After his cheap victories in the four eastern provinces (Jehol and Manchuria) seizure of eastern Hopei and northern Chahar followed. These may all be considered as his strategic reconnaissance. His conclusion about us was: a pan of loose sands. Thus he thought China would not be able to withhold a single blow, whereupon he decided upon a plan of “quick decision,” hoping thereby to rout us merely by blandishment of a small force. The immense unity and resisting power demonstrated during the past ten months by China were not expected by him. It did not occur to him that China was already in a progressive epoch, and that there were already advanced political parties and groups, advanced armies and advanced people. When his scheme failed he started to increase his forces gradually, starting with a force of around a dozen and finally totalling thirty divisions. He will have to increase these further if he wants to continue his advance. However, due to the contradiction between his country and the Soviet Union as well as his natural deficiency in men and material resources, we can predict that there will be a definite limit to the maximum force he can dispose of and the farthest line he can reach.

2) **Lack of direction for his task force:** Before the T’ai-erh Chuan campaign his forces were on the whole evenly divided between northern and central China. Within each area they were again evenly distributed. For instance, in northern China there was an even distribution along the Tientsin-P’kou, Peip’ing- Hankow and Tat’ung-P’uchow Railways. Casualties were suffered in each of these sections. Garrisons were stationed in the occupied territories. After all this, few forces were available for further penetration. After the T’ai-erh Chuan defeat there has been a general stock-taking of the lessons learned and the main forces have been concentrated in the direction of Hsuchow. But the error is only temporarily corrected.

3) **Lack of strategic agreement:** Within the northern and central China groups general agreement exists; but glaring disharmony appears between the two groups. When the forces in the southern sector of the Tientsin-P’ukow Railway were attacking Siai Pangp’u, those in the northern sector stood still. When those in the
northern sector were attacking T'ai-erh Chuan, those in the south stood still. When both sectors were routed Japan's Minister of War made an inspection trip and the Chief of Staff took up the command. But this resulted only in a temporary agreement. Serious contradictions are found within the Japanese landlord-bourgeois class and the military clique. These contradictions are developing, manifesting concretely in the disagreement in war conduct.

(4) **Missing of strategic opportunity**: Glaring manifestation of this is in the enemy’s halting after the occupation of Nanking as well as of T'aiyuan, Shansi. This is chiefly due to his lack of sufficient forces for strategic pursuit.

(5) **Frequent encirclements with little annihilation**: Japan’s Shanghai, Nanking, Ts'angchow, Paoting, Nankow, Sinkow and Linfent campaigns prior to T'ai-erh Chuan were broken through by the Chinese, few of whom fell into enemy hands. This indicates the stupidity of the enemy’s command.

These—piecemeal reinforcements, lack of strategic agreement, lack of direction for task force, missing of opportunities and frequent encirclements with little annihilation—were the five shortcomings of Japan’s command before T'ai-erh Chuan. Though there have been improvements since then, repetitions of these errors will be inevitable in view of the insufficiency of the enemy’s forces and his internal contradictions. Moreover, what he gains in one direction is lost in the other. For instance, when he concentrated his northern China forces on Hsuchow a great gap was created in northern China, affording unrestricted freedom of action for guerilla warfare. These were the errors committed by the enemy himself without our abetting.

On our part, we can yet create errors for our enemy by our intelligent and effective actions under the cover of our organized masses. In this way we devise illusions to mislead him into our designed, field, such as making noise in the east while attacking in the west. The possibilities for this have already been discussed.

All these indicate that certain bases for our victory lie in the enemy's command. While this should not be considered an important basis for our strategic planning (on the contrary, it is better to base our strategic planning on the assumption that the enemy will make the fewest mistakes, as he could just as well take advantage of our errors and hence it is a task of our command to expose the least possible soft spots of our own to him), nevertheless the enemy’s errors did occur as a matter of fact. They will continue to occur by themselves as well as by our endeavour. Therefore they should be seized upon by all anti-Japanese generals, as every one of the enemy's mistakes is beneficial to us.

Despite the fact that the enemy’s strategic and campaigning commands are defective in many aspects (but not in all aspects), his command in battle, *i.e.*, combat tactics of detachments and small corps, is rather brilliant. This is what we should learn from him.

**THE PROBLEM OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR**

The problem of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war should be treated under these three directives: a decisive engagement should be firmly fought
in every campaign or battle when we are certain of victory; it should be avoided when victory is uncertain; and a decisive engagement which puts the fate of the nation at stake should be avoided at all costs. The difference between the anti-Japanese war and many other wars is brought forth again in this problem.

As the enemy is strong and we are weak in the first and second stages of the war, the enemy demands the concentration of our main forces for a decisive engagement. But it is the contrary with us. We would choose favourable conditions and concentrate a superior force to fight a decisive engagement in a campaign or battle when we are sure to win, such as in the case of P'inghsin Kwan, Tai-erh Chuan and many similar combats. But we would avoid uncertain engagements under unfavourable conditions such as the campaign directives adopted for Changteh and similar campaigns. Meanwhile we would flatly reject strategically decisive engagements, as illustrated by our recent withdrawal from Hsuchow, by which we frustrated the enemy’s plan for a quick decision and forced him to fight a long enduring war.

Such directives are impossible for a country with a small territory; they are difficult for a country which is politically too backward. We are a big country in a progressive epoch. The only thing which worries us is that the main force of our country might be sacrificed in a decisive engagement to the satisfaction of our scheming enemy. If strategic decisive engagements are avoided, “there will always be plenty of fire-wood as long as the green mountains are preserved.” Though certain parts of our territory may be lost, there would be sufficient room left for us to manoeuvre and to mark our time for our internal improvement, international support, and the enemy’s collapse from within. This is the best policy to war against Japan. The impatient advocates of a quick victory are unable to confront the difficult and trying course of a war of long endurance, hence their anxiety for a quick victory. Whenever there is a favourable turn in the war, there is a clamour for a strategic decisive engagement. If their advice is followed the entire war of resistance would suffer immensely, the long endurance war would be entombed, and the enemy’s sinister designs would be realized. It is certainly the worst of the “worst policies.”

Territories have to be abandoned if we reject a decisive engagement. There can be no doubt on this score. Under inevitable conditions (and only under such conditions) there ought to be courageous abandonment of territory. Historically, Kussia avoided a decisive engagement in favour of a courageous withdrawal and then defeated the dreaded Napoleon. At the end of August, 1914, France avoided a decisive engagement at the Belgian border for a courageous withdrawal and finally defeated the German army which had dominated Europe. China should do the same thing now. Partial loss of territory is the condition for the liberation of the entire country. Temporary pains are the condition for eternal well-being. Real patriots should understand this.

Do we favour the curse of “non-resistance”? No. Non-resistance means fundamental rejection of war and complete capitulation to the enemy, which is not only condemnable but absolutely impermissible. If we take up determinedly the war
of resistance, it is absolutely necessary for us to thwart the enemy’s sinister schemes by saving our country’s main forces from his annihilating blow so that the continuance of our national existence and our war of resistance will not be rendered impossible, in a word, to avoid our national extermination. Scepticism in this respect means short-sightedness. It will lead to national extermination-ism. We have criticized do-or-die-ism which knows only “permanent advance,” because, if it becomes the vogue, it may be impossible to continue the war of resistance, thereby leading us finally to national extermination.

We are for decisive engagements under all favourable circumstances, be it a battle or a major or minor campaign. Passivity in this respect is impermissible. Only in this way can we achieve our objective of dealing annihilation or attrition to our enemy. Every anti-Japanese soldier must carry this out with resoluteness. Partial and relatively large sacrifices are necessary for this purpose. To avoid any sacrifice is only the view of cowards and Jap alarmists which must be resolutely combated. Death penalties have been justifiably meted out to Li Fu-ying and Han Fuchu, the flightists. To advocate courageous sacrifices, daring spirit, and heroic advances in war is absolutely necessary for correct war planning. It is imperative for our long enduring war and final victory. We have condemned with all severity the flightism of “permanent withdrawal” and have supported a strict enforcement of discipline, because only militant engagements according to correct war plans may overcome Our powerful enemy, while flightism renders direct support to national extermination-ism.

Is not there a contradiction between heroic fighting and abandonment of territory following the combat? Would not the blood in the heroic engagements be shed in vain? This is a rather improper way of putting the question. One eats and then secretes, has eating been in vain? One goes to bed and then gets up. Has sleep been in vain? Should such a problem be brought up? I do not think so. To eat continually, to sleep without letting, and to advance uninterruptedly until the shore of the Yalu River is reached through heroic fighting: this is a mechanistic view and formal logic in tackling war problems, which do not exist in the reality of this world.

Who does not know that our bloody combats to gain time and to prepare for the counter-offensive, though resulting in the abandonment of certain territories, have gained time for us as well as dealt annihilation and attrition to the enemy? We have also thereby gained fighting experience, aroused our hitherto dormant people and improved our international position. Has such blood been shed in vain? By no means. The abandonment of territory has been carried out to preserve our military forces as well as to preserve more of our territory. Because if we do not abandon a part of our territories under unfavourable conditions but resort blindly to a decisive engagement whose outcome is uncertain, the annihilation of our military power will result in the loss of our entire territory, rendering it impossible for us even to think of its recovery.

A capitalist must have capital to carry on his business. He would be no more a capitalist if he goes completely bankrupt. Even a gambler needs money to play his
game. If he stakes all he has he will not be able to gamble again if he loses. Things develop in a back-and-forth and zigzag fashion, never in a straight line. It is the same with war. Only formalists can fail to comprehend this.

I think the same directive should be applied to a decisive engagement in the strategic stage of counteroffensive. Though by that time the enemy will be in a position of inferiority while we in a position of superiority, the principle of “taking up favourable decisive engagements and avoiding unfavourable decisive engagements” shall be adhered to until the Yalu bank is reached. In this way we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginning to end, as we shall shelve all the enemy’s challenges and any other person’s “provocative schemes” and remain completely unmoved by them. Only those anti-Japanese generals who possess such firmness can be considered wise and courageous commanders. Those who “stir at the slightest stimulus” shall be counted out from such an honourable estimate. While in the first stage we are in a strategically passive position, we should maintain our initiative in all campaigning operations. Initiative should be maintained throughout the latter two stages. We stand for the final victory in a long enduring war and refuse to stake everything we have [in a single engagement] like a [reckless] gambler.
CHAPTER NINE
VICTORY TO PEOPLE’S ARMY!

I. A PEOPLE’S ARMY IS THE FOUNDATION OF VICTORY

In the face of a revolutionary China Japan will never relax her aggression and suppression. This has been conditioned by the very nature of Japanese imperialism. Japan would comfortably occupy all of China if the latter refrained from resistance. This has been illustrated by the loss of our four eastern provinces. When China resists, Japan proceeds to suppress the resisting force and would not stop until there is no way to increase further the force of suppression to overcome China’s force of resistance. This is a law of necessity. The Japanese landlords and bourgeoisie are extremely ambitious. They are seeking a breakthrough in the middle by first attacking China so that they would be able to invade the South Seas to the south and Siberia to the north. Those who think that Japan would stop at an opportune time after the occupation of northern China and the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang have completely ignored the fact that Japanese imperialism which has developed to a new stage approaching its death-line is different from the Japan of the historical past.

When we say that there is a definite limit both to the size of Japan’s invading army and its furthest point of penetration, we mean that, in order to attack and to guard against additional opponents, Japan is limited in the force she could employ and the line she could reach; meanwhile there is China’s progress and stubborn resistance, as shown already, to be taken into consideration. It is impossible to envisage a situation in which Japan would not be able to occupy all of China even without the latter’s necessary resistance. Meanwhile, in all areas which could be reached by Japan’s available forces she would endeavour to suppress China’s resistance by all and any means, until she is directly confronted with a crisis climaxing Japan’s maturing internal and external contradictions, which would hurl the body of Japanese imperialism into its grave.

Politically Japan is faced with two alternatives. The first is an immediate collapse of her entire ruling class, transferring political power to the people and thereby concluding the war. But there is no such possibility for the present. The other alternative is the increasing fascisation of her landlord and bourgeois classes, keeping up the war until their final collapse. This is the road along which Japan is travelling. There is no third road. Those who are hoping that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie would stop the war are only entertaining illusions.

The moderates of Japan’s bourgeoisie have already become captives of the landlords and the financial oligarchy. This is the reality of Japanese politics since the past year.

After Japan’s invasion of China, and before China’s war of resistance becomes capable of dealing her a fatal blow, Japan will, if she still feels strong enough, launch an attack against the South Seas or Siberia, or both. She would undertake this after war breaks out in Europe. The Japanese rulers are definitely planning on
a gigantic scale with immense self-satisfaction.

There is of course the possibility that, on account of the Soviet Union’s further growth in power and Japan’s considerable weakening in the Chinese war, the latter may be forced to abandon her original plan to invade Siberia, adopting instead a basically defensive position. But when this happens it would not be relaxation of her aggression in China, but rather a further intensified effort. Because by then there would be only one way left for her, i.e., to gobble up or dismember the weak. Under such conditions it will become more evidently imperative for China to keep up the fighting, to maintain the united front, and to insist upon a war of long endurance. Any relaxation on our part will become even more impermissible.

Under such circumstances the chief condition for China’s victory over Japan is nation-wide solidarity and ten, nay, a hundred times greater progress than the past. China is already in an era of progress and has also achieved considerable unity, but this progress is still far from satisfactory at present. The fact that Japan has effected such extensive occupation of our territory is due to her strength as well as our weakness, the latter having been entirely due to the accumulated historical errors in the past century, which have limited our factors of progress to their present status. It will be impossible to overcome such a strong opponent as Japan without enduring and extensive endeavour on our part. There would be many directions for our endeavour, I am going to deal only with the aspects of the progress of the army and the people.

Modernization or the strengthening of our technical conditions, is indispensable for the reform of our military system. Without it we would not be able to chase the enemy to the banks of the Yalu River. The employment of troops requires progressive, agile strategy and tactics, without which it will also be impossible for us to win.

However, the foundation of an army are its soldiers. Without saturating the army with a progressive political spirit and without progressive activities to effect such saturation, no genuine harmony could obtain between officers and men, war fever of officers and men could not be developed to its maximum limit, and no technique or tactics could secure the best foundation to demonstrate its proper effectiveness. When we say that despite the superiority of Japan’s technical conditions, she faces final defeat, we mean that the blows we administer to her will finally break down her army morale in addition to weakening her physical strength, so that there would be no fast adhesion between her soldiers and weapons.

We are in an opposite situation. Differing fundamentally from the civil war period, our officers and men now share the same political objective in the anti-Japanese war. This is the basis on which all army political work is to ensue. There should be a certain degree of democratization in the army—chiefly consisting of the abolition of the feudalistic system of cursing and beating—and the sharing of joys and hardships between officers and men, thus ensuring harmony between them and increasing the army’s fighting power to an immeasurable degree. Then there would be no worry over the possibility that a prolonged, ruthless war may not be kept up.

The farthest reaching root and source of the immense power of war lies in the
masses. The fact that Japan dares to insult us is mainly due to the unorganized state of China’s millions. When this is overcome Japan will face a wall of several hundreds of millions of our people standing erect. She may then be likened to a wild ox rushing into a flaming formation and would be terror-stricken even when we merely raise our voice. The beast will be inevitably roasted to death. On our part, as the army must be replenished continuously and without interruption, the recruiting by “forcible seizure” and “cash purchase” must cease. Instead, there should be instituted a broad and enthusiastic political mobilization, which will easily recruit new soldiers by millions and tens of millions. The stringency of war finance will also be relieved by mass mobilization, which will render it easy to raise millions and billions of funds. It is unthinkable that a country as large and populous as China should worry about finance. When the army and people are forged into one entity so that the one is regarded by the other as its own, it will be invincible throughout the world. A single imperialist power like Japan will be no match for us.

Many people attribute the bad relation between officers and men and between the army and the people to inadequate technical handling. But I have been telling them that it is rather a problem of a basic attitude or a basic purpose, which should be one of respect for the soldiers and the people. Policies, methods and forms of handling must ensue from this attitude, the departure from which would result in incorrigible errors. As the three major principles for army political work are: harmony between officers and men, harmony between the army and the people, and the winning over of the enemy forces, to make these effective it must start from the basic attitude of respecting the soldiers, respecting the people and respecting the war prisoners. To regard the problem as one of technique instead of fundamental attitude is wrong and such a view must be corrected.

As the defence of Wuhan and several other important centres has become the urgent task for the present, it is exceedingly imperative to mobilize all the active qualities of the entire army and people for the war. The task of defending these centres must be seriously brought forward and carried out. But whether or not these centres could be defended would not be determined by our subjective wishes but by concrete conditions. Political mobilization of the entire army and people for the struggle is one of the most important concrete conditions. If there were no effort to secure all the necessary conditions, or if any one of such conditions were not secured, there would be a repetition of the Nanking disaster. The location of China’s Madrid will be any place where the conditions under which Madrid is successfully defended are present. There has been no Madrid in China as yet. We should try to secure a number of them from now on. But it all depends upon the conditions we create. The most fundamental condition is a broad political mobilization of the entire army and people.

The general directive of a united anti-Japanese national front must be firmly maintained in all our work. Because this is the only directive which will keep up the fighting, maintain the long enduring war, improve the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people both in breadth and depth, and set
in motion all the positive qualities of the entire army and people to fight for the
defence of all our uninvaded territories, the recovery of all our lost territories and
the winning of our final victory.

The problem of the mobilization of the army and the people is vitally important.
We have been dwelling upon it repeatedly because without it there can be no
victory. The absence of various other conditions will of course also deprive us of
victory, but this is the most fundamental requirement for victory. The anti-
Japanese national united front is unity of the entire people, confined not merely to
the headquarters and members of a number of political parties and groups Its basic
objective must be the mobilization of the entire army and people for participation in
it.
CHAPTER TEN

PERSPECTIVES

I. CONCLUSION

What are our conclusions? They are:

“Under what conditions can China overcome and defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan? Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the completion of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the unity of the Chinese people themselves.

“How long would such a war last? That depends on the strength of the Chinese people’s united front [and] many conditioning factors in China and Japan.”

“However, if these conditions are not realized soon, the war will be very long. But in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated and China will win, only the sacrifices will be extensive and there will be a very painful period.”

“The strategy should be that of the employment of our main forces in a war of movement over an extended, shifting and indefinite front; a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in wide theatres of war.” “Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerilla detachments among the peasantry.” “In the process of the war a point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan’s armies in positional warfare, for as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve. Japan’s economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring out men ready to fight for freedom into our front lines. All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks fatal on fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan’s army of occupation from China.” (Edgar Snow, 1936.)

“A new stage has begun in China’s political development. The central task for the present stage is: mobilize every force for victory in the war.” “The pivot of victory lies in the development of the war which has already been started as a total war of resistance of the whole people. Only through such a war may victory be finally won.” “Because of the presence now of serious weaknesses in the war, frequent defeats, withdrawals, and internal dissensions and treachery, temporary and partial compromise and other unfavourable conditions may occur in the course of the fighting. Hence the war must be looked upon as a trying and difficult war of long endurance. But we believe that the war already started will, with the endeavour of our entire people, break through all obstacles, develop and march forward.” (August Resolutions of the Communist Party of China.)

These are our conclusions. The national extermination-ists regard the enemy as...
a god and despise ourselves as trash. The advocates of a quick victory regard
ourselves as a god and despise the enemy as trash. Both are wrong. Our
understanding is contrary to that of both these: the anti-Japanese war is a war of
long endurance, while the final victory will belong to China—this is our conclusion.

My lecture stops here. The great resistance war is in the midst of its
development. Many people are looking for a summary of our experiences for our
total victory. What I have dealt with are only the general experiences of the past ten
months. It may pass as a kind of summary. This whole problem should arouse the
attention of broad sections of the people and stimulate them to discussions. My talk
has been only in the way of an outline. I hope, friends, that you will study and
discuss as well as amend or amplify it.

OCT. 22, 1942.