China
Interview With Mao Tse-dun

On September 11, 1939, the correspondent of the "Central News Agency," the correspondent of the "Sao Tun Bao" and the correspondent of the "Tsin-Min" paid a visit to Mao Tse-dun in Yunnan and requested him to answer a number of questions. Mao Tse-dun expressed his readiness to do so. The interview was published on October 19, 1939, in the Chinese paper "Sinhua Si Bao."

As the questions dealt with have not lost their importance in any way, we print the interview below:

The Correspondents: We would ask you to explain a number of questions. Our questions fall into three groups. They have been put in writing.

Answer: Very well. I will answer the questions in their order. Let us deal first with the anti-Japanese war. You ask whether the anti-Japanese war has entered on a stable stage, a stage of equilibrium. I am of the opinion that in a certain respect a stable stage has been reached. One can say that it has arisen in view of the new international situation, under conditions in which the difficulties of Japan are increasing and China resolutely rejects any compromise. That, of course, does not exclude the possibility that the enemy may be able to carry out a greater offensive operation. Thus, for example, the possibility is not excluded that the enemy will undertake an attack on Pak-hoi, Changsha and even on Syan; but the large-scale strategic offensive of the enemy and our strategic retreat have, to a certain extent, practically come to a standstill. That does not mean to say that there is not and will not be any possibility of attack or retreat.

As regards the concrete content of the new stage, it consists in preparation for the counter-attack. This means that in this stable stage China must prepare all its forces for a future counter-offensive. Preparations for the counter-offensive does not mean immediate counter-attack; we cannot begin the counter-offensive without the necessary prerequisites—I have in mind in this connection the strategic offensive, but not an operative one. Partial attacks will also be carried out in the future. Thus, for instance, we launched an attack in order to forestall an enemy thrust to the South-East in the province of Shansi. Such operative counter-attacks will not only continue to take place but are even necessary. The time for strategic counter-attack on a large scale has not yet come. We are now in the period of active preparation for this counter attack. In this period it is necessary to adopt measures to counter possible offensive measures of the enemy. Concretely stated, in this new stage we are confronted by the following tasks: persistently to continue the partisan warfare in the rear of the enemy, frustrate all enemy attempts to destroy the partisans, render impossible the economic aggression of the enemy. On the fronts: at all costs to strengthen and extend our military fortifications, repulse any offensive operations of the enemy in our rear. Political reforms are indispensably necessary. All this is the concrete content of the preparations of the counter-offensive.

The reform of the political internal life of China is exceedingly important, as in the present stage the enemy is mainly conducting a political offensive. Consequently, we must also considerably strengthen our political resistance. This means that the question of the democratic regime must be solved as soon as possible, as only in this case can the forces of political resistance, and the military power be increased. In the war against Japan, China relies mainly on the creation and development of its own forces. In view of the new international situation it
becomes even more important to create our own forces.

*What is the most important factor for creating our own forces is the realisation of the democratic regime.*

*Question:* You say that a democratic regime is necessary in order that China can create its own forces and achieve victory in the anti-Japanese war. How can one establish this regime under the present conditions?

*Answer:* The division into military, educational and constitutional periods was undertaken by Sun Yat Sen, but in his later years he made no further mention in his manifestoes of these three periods. These manifestoes spoke of the immediate convocation of the National Assembly. This shows that the teachings of Sun Yat Sen and his opinion changed in accordance with the situation. *In view of the very serious situation called forth by the anti-Japanese war it is necessary to convene the National Assembly and realise the democratic regime as soon as possible in order to avoid the bad results of the ruin of the country and to drive the enemy out of China.* Regarding this Question there are various opinions. According to one opinion the mass of the people are uneducated, and therefore it is impossible to introduce a democratic regime. This is not true. The masses of the people have developed very rapidly in the anti-Japanese war and, provided there is a correct leadership, the democratic regime can without doubt be introduced. In North China, for instance, the democratic regime has already been introduced, and, although this is not taking place consistently, district, village and farm elders are being elected by the population. A number of heads of districts are likewise elected by the people. Many progressive and talented young people have been elected as heads of districts. Such questions must be submitted to the broadest general discussion.

*In the second part of the questions submitted by you there is a passage dealing with the question of so-called separation from and protection against other parties, i.e., with the question of the friction which is to be observed in various localities. You are perfectly right in displaying interest in these questions. A certain improvement is to be recorded lately in this sphere, but nothing has been changed fundamentally.*

*Question:* Has the attitude of the Communist Party of China ever been brought to the knowledge of the Central Government?

*Answer:* We have already raised a protest.

*Question:* What form did this protest take?

*Answer:* Already in July the representative of our Party, Comrade Chu En Lai, wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek; on August 1, a telegram was sent from Yunan to Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government requesting them to cancel the measures secretly adopted for separation and protection from other parties, which are the chief root of the friction which has arisen everywhere.

*Question:* Did the Central Government reply to this?

*Answer:* There has been no official reply. According to rumours these measures have not been finally confirmed by Chang Kai-shek. There are also a number of persons in the Kuomintang who do not approve these measures.

They know that an army which is waging a common fight against the Japanese invader must
be regarded as a friendly army and not as a “foreign army.” Therefore a Party which is fighting in common against the Japanese invaders is likewise a friendly Party and not a “foreign Party.” Various parties and groups are taking part in the anti-Japanese war. Their forces are different, there are big and little, but they are all taking part in the anti-Japanese war. Consequently, they must rally together and must in no case be “separated and protected” from one another.

What party is designated as a “foreign Party”? The party of the national traitors, of the Japanese agent Wang Ching Wei, is a foreign party, as politically it has nothing in common with the parties and groups which are fighting against the Japanese robbers. One must restrict such kind of party and warn against it. From the political point of view the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have common features—the fight against the Japanese robbers and the building up of the Democratic Republic. Therefore, the question today is not that of rallying together all forces for the fight against the Communist Party and warning against it, but how to unite all forces in the fight against Japan, for protection against Japan, and for the fight against Wang Ching Wei. The slogans issued by us must be in this direction.

To-day Wang Ching Wei has three slogans: “Fight against Chiang Kai-shek.” “Fight against the Communist Party,” “Rapprochement to Japan.” Wang Ching Wei is the common enemy of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China and of the whole of the Chinese people.

The Communist Party is not an enemy of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang is likewise not an enemy of the Communist Party. Therefore they must not combat each other nor must they engage in mutual struggle, they must not “separate from and protect themselves from each other,” but must come together and support each other. Our slogans must be different from the slogans of Wang Ching Wei; they must be opposed to the slogans of Wang Ching Wei. In no circumstance must our slogans be confused with his. He is fighting against Chiang Kai-shek, and we must support Chiang Kai-shek; he is fighting against the Communist Party and we must stand in alliance with the Communist Party; he maintains friendship with Japan and we must fight against Japan.

You ask about the attitude of the C.P. of China to the so-called friction. I can say quite openly that we are absolutely opposed to this friction between the anti-Japanese parties and groups, which mutually weakens their forces. Should anybody, no matter who, become insolent, and should this insolence become intolerable, then the Communist Party will be compelled to react most seriously and sharply against it. in accordance with the principle: if we are left in peace we shall leave others in peace.”

**Question:** How do matters stand with regard to the friction in North China?

**Answer:** There there are two specialists in the creation of friction: Chan In-u and Chin Chi Jun. The first is in the province of Hopeh, and the latter in the province of Shantung. Both go beyond all bounds, and for them there is no law. Their attitude differs but little from that of the national traitors. They spend more time in fighting against the Eighth Army than in fighting against the enemy. We have already given various irrefutable proofs of this to Chiang Kai-shek, as for instance the orders given by Chan In-u to attack the Eighth Army.

**Question:** Is there any friction in the sphere of operations of the Fourth Army?

**Answer:** There, too, is friction. The bloody events in Pint-sang created a sensation throughout the country.

**Question:** It is asserted in various quarters that the united front is the most important thing. But in order to achieve unity the Government in the frontier districts must be done away with. What is your opinion regarding this?

**Answer:** Everywhere there have been various unfounded gossip and accusations, including
the talk about the liquidation of the frontier district. The frontier district Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia is a democratic anti-Japanese point of support, and from the political point of view the most progressive district in the country. What possible reason can there be for its abolition, the more so as the frontier district has been recognised by Chiang Kai-shek and was officially confirmed by the Executive Committee of the National Government in September 1937. China certainly needs unity, that is to say, China must be united in the anti-Japanese war, united in its progress; if it is disunited then China may perish as a State.

Question: The Communist Party and the Kuomintang have different conceptions of unity. Is a breach between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party possible?

Answer: If it is a question of possibilities there are two possibilities, that of unity and that of a breach. Which possibility will be realised depends upon the attitude of the Kuomintang and the C.P., and is also determined by the conditions of the people in our country. We Communists have long spoken about the methods of co-operation. We not only desire a lasting collaboration but are striving with all our might for this collaboration. According to current rumours Chiang Kai-shek also declared, at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, that internal questions cannot be solved by means of armed struggle. If the enemy is at the gate, if the Kuomintang and the C.P. of China remember the experiences of the past, then we must all strive for a long-lasting collaboration. We must all endeavour to avoid a breach. But political guarantees are necessary for long-lasting collaboration. Only under these conditions can the possibility of a breach be finally avoided. These guarantees are: resolute continuation of the anti-Japanese war and the realisation of the democratic regime. If we succeed in doing this we shall be able to continue our consolidation and avoid a breach.

This depends upon the common efforts of the two parties and the whole people of our country, and this we must strive for without fail. “Resolute continuation of the anti-Japanese war,” “fight against capitulation,” “determined fight for progress and against retrogression,” these are the three great political slogans which our Party put forward in its Manifesto of July 7, 1939. We are of the opinion that only on this path can China avoid perishing, and drive out the enemy. That is the only way.

The Treachery of Wang Ching-wei

By M. Mal jar

There took place recently in Tsingtau, in the province of Shantung, a conference of Wan Tsin Wei’s followers, at which Wan Tsin Wei was also present. After this conference a report appeared in the Shanghai press that in the next few days Wan Tsin Wei would be proclaimed “Prime Minister” of a puppet government of the “whole of China.”

Such announcements frequently appear in the Shanghai press. For instance, at the beginning of January there appeared a report that by January 15 at the latest, a “Central” Government headed by Wan Tsin Wei would be formed.

Up to the present, however, the “Central” Government has not come into existence. Wan Tsin Wei’s followers repeatedly stated that the delay in the formation of the government was due to the fact that negotiations with the Japanese had not yet been concluded. This assertion, of course, is ridiculous, the more so as it has now been proved, on the basis of documents, that the “agreement” between the Japanese and Wan Tsin Wei was embodied in a special treaty on December 30.

The contents of this agreement have been made known, as even the trusted lieutenants of Wan Tsin Wei—Gai Tsun-U (formerly head of the Bureau for Asiatic Affairs at the Foreign
Ministry) and Dao Si-Shen (a former member of the Central political Council of the Kuomintang)—refused to be parties to such base treachery. They handed over all the material and documents exposing the treachery of Wan Tsin Wei to the editor of the Chinese paper Dagunbao. In their letter to the Dagunbao Gao Tsun-U and Dao Si-Shen write that, already on November 5 last the Japanese submitted to the Wan Tsin Wei people the text of a “fundamental programme for regulating Japano-Chinese relations.”

“We ascertained,” they write “that the conditions submitted to Wan Tsin Wei by the Japanese are even more brutal than the 21 conditions submitted in 1915. The Japanese conditions reduce China to the position of a slave state... During the discussion of the agreement the Japanese demanded the immediate acceptance of their conditions, and did not even shrink from using threats. When we realised that the fate of China was at stake, we decided to break with Wan Tsin Wei. After getting hold of numerous documents and photographs we went to Hongkong.”

The Japanese journal Contemporary Japan set forth the demands which Japan submitted to Wan Tsin Wei and which he was to fulfil after “the liquidation of the anti-Japanese policy of Chiang Kai-shek.” These demands were all included in the agreement with Wan Tsin Wei.

The agreement signed by Wan Tsin Wei and the Japanese in fact surpasses the notorious 21 demands which were submitted to China in 1915. According to this agreement, China is to recognise North China and Inner Mongolia as special Japanese zones, both economic and military. The Japanese receive the right to maintain troops in these areas, in the Yangtse Valley and on the islands in Southern Chinese waters. According to this agreement, the Chinese railways, airlines, posts and telegraphs, and also the ports and waterways in the areas in which Japanese troops are stationed are to be transferred into the hands of the Japanese. China undertakes to compensate Japan for all outgoings immediately connected with the war in China. In addition, China grants to Japan a number of privileges in regard to the exploitation of the economic resources of China, and introduces special tariffs and customs duties favouring the development of Japanese trade in China. Finally, China grants Japan the right to send its advisers into the organs of the newly-created “government.”

The arguments which Wan Tsin Wei’s supporters bring forward in favour of this agreement, the aim of which is to reduce China to a state of complete dependence upon Japanese imperialism, are interesting on account of their Jesuitical baseness. In Wan Tsin Wei’s paper People’s Tribune, which appears in Shanghai, Chou Fu Goj makes the following observations. He opposes the declaration of Chiang Kai-shek, according to which peace negotiations are impossible so long as Japanese troops are in China “History,” writes this traitor, “shows that negotiations take place after an armistice, and the withdrawal of troops on the conclusion of peace. History knows no instance of troops being withdrawn before the conclusion of an armistice. If Japan were to withdraw its troops from China before an armistice and before comprehensive negotiations, it would mean that China had won.”

These utterances completely expose the revolting countenance of the betrayer of the Chinese people, Wan Tsin Wei, whom the celebrated Chinese writer U-Tse Guj described as a “prostituted politician...” “who has been a Left, a Right, a Moderate, a semi-Monarchist and is now a black reactionary.”

The Chinese press expressed the opinion of the whole of the Chinese people when it pilloried the treachery of Wan Tsin Wei. It declares that the signing of the agreement with Japan is an act of treachery unprecedented in history.

The question of the creation of a “Central Government” by Wan Tsin Wei is not a new question. However, all the attempts of Wan Tsin Wei to fulfil the demands of his Japanese lords
and masters suffer shameful bankruptcy. These failures caused such disappointment to the Japanese that for a time they even reduced the subsidies to him from four million Yen to 400,000 Yen.

The fact that the question of forming a government has again been put forward by Wan Tsin Wei is evidence of the growing difficulties Japan is encountering in China. It is generally known that these difficulties were one of the causes of the resignation of the Abe Cabinet. The Japanese are endeavouring by every means to set up a Central puppet government which would help them to “open up” the districts they have annexed in China. The 40 million dollars which Wan Tsin Wei has now received from the Japanese can be placed under the heading of “unproductive expenditure.”